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This dissertation investigates the ways in which the natural and the social overlap 
in the symbolic center of human activity, cities. Cities are full of living organisms, 
existing not in a perfect state of equilibrium but rather in states of constant flux. The 
cycles of life moving through the city of Cairo, Egypt are dependent on water as a vital 
component and scarce resource in systems of biological exchange, as well as one among 
many pieces of infrastructure that the city requires to survive. This dissertation looks at 
the informal systems that residents of a squatter settlement in Cairo, Egypt called Ezbet 
Khairallah have created to make life possible, as well as their attempts to get the state to 
formally provide these services; work that is done at collective scales and in everyday 
practices. The dissertation also looks at what happens when areas such as Ezba are 
successful in getting the state to recognize them and institutionalize utility services; what 
the hidden costs and unintended consequences are of becoming formal end users of state 
systems. The dissertation provides an overview of the forces at work in shaping Cairo, 
highlighting the rural to urban migration patterns and shifting urban policy over the 
course of the 20th century that have funneled so many into informal housing settlements. 
In addition, the dissertation highlights the particular material history of Ezbet Khairallah, 
and how that has shaped the social and material circumstances of residents. It examines 
the material and affective implications of being unable to escape waste, of bodies that 
 xi 
bear signs of systems that both make life possible and make life difficult. By studying the 
institutional framework in which these questions get worked out in Egypt, we can better 
situate the struggles of those living in the urban margins of the global south, such as those 
in Ezbet Khairallah.   
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 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation looks at the informal systems that residents of a squatter 
settlement in Cairo, Egypt called Ezbet Khairallah (or Ezba) have created to make life 
possible, as well as their attempts to get the state to formally provide utility services; 
work that is done at collective scales and in everyday practices. The dissertation also 
looks at what happens when areas such as Ezba are successful in getting the state to 
recognize them and institutionalize utility services; what the hidden costs and unintended 
consequences are of becoming formal end users of state systems. By studying the 
institutional framework in which these questions get worked out in Egypt, we can better 
situate the struggles of those living in the urban margins of the global south, such as those 
in Ezbet Khairallah.   
To understand Ezba, we first must understand the urban context in which it is 
situated. The dissertation will provide an overview of the forces at work in shaping Cairo, 
highlighting the rural to urban migration patterns and shifting urban policy over the 
course of the 20th century that have funneled so many into informal housing settlements. 
In addition, the dissertation will highlight the particular history of Ezbet Khairallah, and 
how that has shaped the social and material circumstances of residents. It will examine 
the material and affective implications of being unable to escape waste, of bodies that 
bear signs of systems that both make life possible and make life difficult.  
This dissertation investigates the ways in which the natural and the social overlap 
in the contemporary symbolic center of human activity, cities. Cities are full of living 
organisms, existing not in a perfect state of equilibrium but rather in states of constant 
flux. The cycles of life moving through the city of Cairo, Egypt are dependent on water 
as a vital component and scarce resource in systems of biological exchange, as well as 
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one among many pieces of infrastructure that the city requires to survive. Whether the 
reason that one doesn’t have enough water to drink is due to technical failures, material 
shortages or disinterest is often under debate. State agencies and international institutions 
usually assert the privilege of defining the issues, though not always in concert.1  Day to 
day realities and peoples’ responses often challenge these discursive practices by 
reframing the “nature” of problems. Looking at the bigger picture of nature in cities 
requires attention to these political contestations, as well as attention to the array of 
biological entities that operate within urban space. In the last fifteen years there has been 
a steady increase of interest in ecologies of cities, moving in to what was perceived as a 
gap in environmental knowledge that focused on rural “nature.”2 Under the auspices of 
this new intellectual endeavor, researchers examined the impacts of globalization (Grimm 
et al. 2008) and informality (Amin 2005) on urban ecologies, attempted to shift the 
discussion of urban environmental social justice (Schweitzer and Stephenson 2007), and 
examined backyard gardens as contact zones (Head and Muir 2006a, 2006b). These 
works are not only bringing nature into view within the city, but also allow us to begin to 
examine the imbrications of other material forms, including infrastructure, with human 
and nonhuman lives. By taking seriously aspects of the built environment this body of 
literature, along with work on the city by such authors at Mathew Gandy and Nigel 
Thrift,3  allow us to encounter pipes and streets not just as inert framing objects—or as 
merely manifestations of state failure—but also as productive of a particular set of 
possibilities. Examining the urban ecology of Ezba provides another excursion into the 
                                                 
1 As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter One, there are often differing perspectives in Egyptian 
government circles and international aid organizations on what the salient and most pressing “problems” 
are that need to be addressed in the water sector. 
2 See in particular Paris 2004; Turner, Nakamura and Dinetti 2004; Pickett and Cadenasso 2006, 2008; 
Pickett 2008 
3 Chapter Four utilizes Gandy (2004, 2008) and Thrift (2005) to examine the relationship between 
infrastructure in the city and affect. 
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component elements involved in the larger story of humans and the constitutive elements 
of their environments, what Donna Haraway calls naturecultures (2008).  Additionally, 
such an investigation leads to the many ways in which infrastructure shapes and is shaped 
by political possibilities in marginalized urban spheres, the everyday contestations over 
access and affordability, as well as collective actions to shape material realities that 
highlight the relationship between citizen and state in Egypt. I argue that such stories are 
important precursors to understanding the seismic political events in Egypt over the last 
three years.   
In order to reach today’s political issues, however, we have a bit of work to lay 
the foundation of thought on the city of Cairo and on the State. In their Annual Review of 
Anthropology article on water sustainability, Steve Caton and Ben Orlove propose 
treating water as a total social fact, a ubiquitous and irreplaceable element in material and 
social life (2010).4   Seeing water as such, as a connector and conductor and illuminator 
of the things and processes that make life possible, brings the contours of human life into 
relief. As this dissertation focuses on water in Cairo, the introduction will first turn to the 
history of anthropological work on the city. Building on the work by urban theorists 
imagining political possibilities as they arise from the margins of the city, the 
introduction will then turn to the body of literature questioning the state as the 
encompassing entity within which political possibilities are enacted. Finally, the 
introduction will provide an outline of the remaining dissertation chapters.  
                                                 
4 Caton and Orlove were the Faculty Field directors for a group on water sustainability in 2007 for the 
Social Science Research Council’s (SSRC) Dissertation Proposal Development Fellowship (DPDF) in 
which I was a student fellow. This group has evolved and expanded over the course of the last seven years 
into a collaborative cohort of scholars working on water issues across disciplines and regional divisions. It 
has been a consistent source of support and intellectual engagement. 
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RESEARCHING CAIRO 
Roughly 17 million people live in greater Cairo today, making it the most 
populous city both in Africa and the Middle East, and one of the most populous cities in 
the world. Cairo contains approximately one quarter of the total population of Egypt, and 
half of the urban population (Sims 2010). Much of the ethnographic research conducted 
in Egypt is focused on this mega-city.5  Research situated in Cairo in the 1990s dealt 
heavily with questions of domestic and small scale economies in popular urban 
neighborhoods, especially as these issues related to gender. Unni Wikan’s (1996) work 
focused on the lives and living conditions in a popular neighborhood in Cairo and the 
constant struggle for the urban poor to maintain a sense of self respect in the face of 
nearly overwhelming difficulties. Wikan’s account responds to contemporaneous 
concerns about narrative and the construction of anthropological authority in her 
recounting of the struggles of a small number of central figures over a long period of 
time. Her rendition of the perseverance of self-respect has echoes of a culture of poverty 
argument (Lewis 1969), while attempting a substantive consideration of the many ways 
that people construct meaningful lives within the systems that shape them as subjects. In 
a similar vein, Evelyn Early (1993) focuses on health practices in the everyday life of 
poor neighborhoods in Cairo, and was also interested in questions about reflexivity and 
narrative. Situating herself as a symbolic anthropologist, Early was looking for the 
“coded references, the nuggets of cultural wisdom uttered in the cracks of ordinary 
discourse” from which a sense of the cultural worlds of these urban poor women could be 
deciphered (1993: 24).   
                                                 
5 There are several notable exceptions to this focus on the urban. The journal Cairo Papers in Social 
Science has a long history of publishing work on a wide variety of topics and locations in Egypt. Nicholas 
Hopkins’ work in the 1980s examined agrarian transformations in rural Upper Egypt. The work of Lila 
Abu-Lughod, including the seminal 1987 book Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, 
focuses on women’s live in rural northern Egypt.  
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Also writing in the 1990s, Homa Hoodfar (1996, 1997) and Diane Singerman 
(1995, 1996, 2006) examine in great depth gendered norms of labor and marriage 
choices, survival strategies crafted around micro-lending, food distribution, and 
management of intra-familial strife. Hoodfar locates her work on the survival strategies 
of poor urban families in Cairo as an attempt to fill an empirical and theoretical gap in 
scholarship on household economies the Middle East, as well as a move away from 
previous work that privileged religion and spirituality. Hoodfar provides a detailed study 
of men and women’s decisions about marriage partners (1997: 55), allocation of labor 
between domestic work and employment in formal and informal sectors of the economy, 
consumption practices, and fertility preferences that represent, in her estimation, carefully 
considered strategic choices that maximize limited resources for low income urban 
households.  
Diane Singerman matches this interest in families, and also speaks to earlier 
concerns on the nature of political and survival methods in poor urban areas in Cairo. In 
her work, Singerman attempts to address a theoretical and methodological oversight in 
the study of politics in the Middle East. According to Singerman, the body of literature 
on the Middle East that deals with the subject of politics has been almost exclusively 
focused on formal political associations and the political maneuvering of the elite (1995).  
Singerman seeks to fill this gap by studying the politics of everyday urban Egyptians, 
and, in conjunction, works to reformulate traditional understandings of what the 
“political” is.  She maintains that common descriptions of the “political” are insufficient 
to deal with the complexity of political activities in popular urban communities, what 
Bayat described as the quiet encroachment of the ordinary (Bayat 1997). Singerman 
argues that that this is particularly so in Egypt, for two reasons: (1) political repression is 
so severe for those who openly oppose the state that only a small powerful few can 
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manage it, therefore driving ordinary or poor people into other avenues to seek their own 
interests; and (2) the household, perhaps as the result of this repression, or perhaps just in 
previously unacknowledged ways, is much more integrated into the public field and 
national economy than was understood in the public/private distinction operative in 
customary descriptions of politics in the Middle East.6 Singerman’s articulation can be 
expanded on by taking into consideration the ways in which the urban poor are not 
treated as citizens in the same way as the vaunted citizens of democratic governance, and 
by shifting from her consistent focus on the aggregate effects of all of these small acts to 
allow for the importance of the small scale and everyday as sites of analysis.   
Farha Ghannam’s (2002) work on a post-1960s planned neighborhood for the 
urban poor in Cairo, al-Zawiya al-Hamra, reflects changing research interests in cities 
following the spatial turn in the social sciences (Harvey 1996). Ghannam examines 
processes of spatial change that began in the mid-1970s with a program of expanding 
housing into the desert areas surrounding Cairo, channeling rural migrants and the 
existing urban poor into these new locations. These changes resulted in a disruption of 
established networks of affiliation and patterns of household residence in poor urban 
neighborhoods and created new spaces of poverty on the outskirts of the city. This 
intervention into research on the urban form in the Middle East reflected a broader 
discourse on the role of the city as the site of modernity par excellence, where space was 
regulated in new ways and which produced new forms of subjectification.7   
                                                 
6 Julia Elyachar’s 2005 work Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in 
Cairo takes up the deliberate conversion of these everyday practices and social networks of the poor into 
particular kinds of value for capitalist markets, value that could be coopted and extracted by NGOs and 
multinational capital.  
7 Ghannam’s piece additionally provides a close-up view of structural constraints on women’s movement 
in public spaces in Cairo and everyday tactics and negotiations that women use to manage social 
expectations and familial pressures. 
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In 2006, Diane Singerman and Paul Amar published a work calling for a new 
school of urban studies, informed by scholars based in Cairo who are taking up 
“innovative urban research” with broad implications.  The newly minted “Cairo School 
of Urban Studies” was sparked by an attention to social movements in the Middle East 
and related violence. These social movements were in response to, and served to make 
clear, new ways in which the legal and political apparatuses of police states are 
embedded in international structures (2006: 5). Singerman and Amar are calling attention 
to the imbrications of the Egyptian state with international institutions, capital flows and 
global systems that result in particular forms of economic disparity and spatial 
arrangements. They additionally highlight the mechanisms of policing and control that 
are enabled and deployed though these imbrications (2006: 15).  Singerman and Amar 
contend that Cairo in 2005 saw a new “urban-based, cosmopolitan project of radical 
democracy,” structured as a collaboration, or perhaps just conjunction, of leftists, 
Islamists, and liberals demanding a renewal of democratic processes (2006: 8). They 
trace the genesis of this new wave of activity to 2002’s mass Arab protests in support of 
the second Palestinian intifada, and see its continuation with the mobilization of the 
Middle East in protest of the US invasion of Iraq. The new radical democratic project 
arose, according to Singerman and Amar, from a budding sense of public opposition 
shared by many across the spectrum of political and social perspectives, collectively 
calling for “justice, accountability, representation, citizenship, and political and social 
rights” (2006: 10).  Such theorization about political pluralism and popular resistance has 
come together and been pulled apart over the course of the last three years, since the 
revolution(s) began in January of 2011. The very beginning of the revolution did in fact 
seem to span the political spectrum, with people from all persuasions out on the streets 
demanding the ouster of President Mubarak. The political processes over the three 
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subsequent years have pulled such overarching narratives of "collective rising from 
below"  apart, as political interests have factionalized in a variety of ways, including but 
not limited to religious divisions. Since the ouster of President Morsi in July 2013 in what 
some have called a coup and others a revolution, thorny divisions have become clear in 
the Egyptian population over Egypt’s political future.  
Singerman and Amar locate the efforts of New Cairo School of Urban Studies in 
reaction to two dominant narratives on Cairo since the 1960s, in which Cairo appears as 
either a bomb or a tomb (2006: 21). The narrative of Cairo as a location of potential 
catastrophe, be it from population, fundamentalism, or pollution, is balanced against a 
concurrent view of Cairo as a space populated by thoroughly repressed, subdued 
traditional peasants quiescent under the thumb of despotic leaders (2006: 21-22). The 
Cairo as tomb narrative is one that Singerman earlier (1995) debated in her attention to 
the forms of political activity alive in popular neighborhoods. This new Cairo School of 
Urban Studies attempts “a critique and careful appropriation” of cosmopolitism, but a 
post-positivist one (Singerman and Amar 2006: 4).8 Following Rabinow (1986), 
Singerman and Amr reject a universal category of humanity on which cosmopolitan 
subjects can draw. They suggest the usefulness of some possibility for broadly articulated 
collective belonging for projects of mobilization, but one that engages with the 
particularities of place. They offer vernacular cosmopolitanism, or vernacular 
worldmaking, in which the connections that bind are built hand by hand. They see it as an 
essentially cross disciplinary venture that looks at multiple scales of analysis, attempting 
to encompass all without losing the specificity of each, and being comfortable with the 
                                                 
8 A positivist reading of cosmopolitism might argue for moral ideal of a universal human community, to 
which all humans inherently can or should belong, a global rationality that eschewed parochialism. 
Iterations of cosmopolitan thought look at the moral, legal, political or economic totalities or absolutes to 
which humans can or should adhere. 
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ambiguity that arises (2006: 27).  They have multiple visions of what cosmopolitics are 
already operating in the Middle East: petro-cosmopolitanism, in which neo-Islamist 
architecture is used to sell luxury goods to wealthy gulf inhabitants while its proponents 
simultaneously work with the US to repress Islamist radicalism and maintain guest-
worker apartheid (2006: 30); and an “emergent post-colonial cosmopolitanism,” which 
operates in the circulation of transnational cultural products, ideas and media in the 
Arabic speaking world (2006: 31). This is the Twitter and Facebook revolution, a pan-
Arab Spring of connection between wired urbanites. In response to these forms of 
cosmopolitanism that are inherently middle to upper class, Singerman and Amar offer 
vernacular cosmopolitanism, or vernacular worldmaking.  These are the kinds of claims 
to the city, investments and demands for inclusion by marginalized populations that 
illuminate the kinds of prosaic engagements with the state that illuminate political 
potentials. As the city has experienced substantial growth of informal housing, Cairo has 
become cosmopolitan, not in the sense of a blooming openness for all, but rather as a 
hierarchy of access to certain activities.  The urban poor are responding with crafty 
politics, which is about “subversive, grounded, fierce and world-weary articulations” of 
what a communal future could look like (2006: 33).  
City spaces have often been the sites around with the imagination is stirred. The 
imagination of the modern described the city as the site for personal autonomy and 
political possibilities, which was crystalized by Baudelaire in the idea of the flaneur who 
strolled through the city as a passionate spectator.9  But this sense of the city needs to be 
contextualized by situating those possibilities in the ways that people are differentially 
able to negotiate, cross, and circumvent boundaries that have been left over and/or 
                                                 
9 Baudelaire 1863 in Le Figaro   
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produced by colonial and postcolonial states (Ali and Reiker 2008b). For some, changes 
in sociopolitical or economic conditions have in fact given rise to greater mobility, 
greater freedom in the modernist sense, but these are not Cairo’s Carrie Bradshaws10 
enjoying and objectifying the city scenes.11  As we saw so forcefully during the 
revolution(s) since January 25th, 2011, the mobility of these marked bodies creates 
anxiety in other communities, who see them as more freely moving dangers.12  For some 
in Cairo, the residents of Ezbet Khairallah pose just such dangers, and this is in part 
related to the genesis of the area in the 1970s as a place of first arrival for migrants from 
the countryside. 
WHAT IS A CAPITAL “S” STATE? 
A number of scholars have taken up the issue of what remains outside of, 
contradictory to—or radically altered by the current phase of globalization--of the 
received categories of nations, states, civil society and communities. These authors take a 
close look at what has escaped explanation, codification, and proved perplexing to 
scholars looking at a variety of institutional forms in their many manifestations around 
the world. There seems to be a remainder of human effort and lifeworlds that these 
“dead” categories13 fail to express. For some scholars, the activities of popular 
communities provide a strong foil against which the validity of such received categories 
                                                 
10 Carrie Bradshaw is the fictional lead character of the HBO sitcom Sex and the City 
11 The figure of the flâneuse, a female flanuer, is useful for what it can show about gendered relations to 
the city. See for example Wolff 1985. 
12 During the early days of the revolution in 2011, there were news reports that some of the thugs hired by 
state security forces to beat and harass protesters were coming from Ezba. It’s impossible to assess the 
veracity of that statement from the US, but it would be difficult even in Ezba, as people reconstruct 
narratives about those days and speculate about the activity of neighbors. 
13 In Ordinary Affects (2007), Katie Stewart rejects the terms neoliberalism, advance capitalism and 
globalization not because the topics or forces are unnecessary to her project, but because the use of the 
terms belie the imbrications of the forces that they attempt to describe with the world on which they 
supposedly act, “leave them looking like dead effects imposed on an innocent world” (2007: 1) 
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can be measured (Appadurai 1996, 2002; Chatterjee 1998a, 1998b, 2004). For other 
scholars, the notion of seeing the state from its margins (Das and Poole 2004; Sharma and 
Gupta 2006; Ali and Rieker 2008a, 2008b) or in its everyday manifestations (Abrams 
1988; Trouillot 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002) serves to de-center these categories in 
order to open up a discussion of other ways that things happen. Still others take the loose 
category of informality as a place to start an investigation into what remains silenced in 
the search for taxonomy.  Perhaps the most compelling of these re-envisionings calls for 
a new mode of paying attention that is awake to the contradictions, rhythms, and flows of 
people making do (de Certeau 1984) and getting along in the creation of novel networks 
and communities (Simone 2004, 2008a, 2008b). 
According to Partha Chatterjee (1998a), the nation-state is the only form of 
community or collective project that is currently accepted as valid in the West (see also 
Amin and Thrift 2002 on the power of the notion of community in urban research, and 
Tsing 2005 on shadow communities). Chatterjee critically examines the notion of 
community as it has been articulated as both progressive--the locus of greater meaning 
for individual lives--and as regressive and illiberal--the site of atavistic holdovers of 
patriarchy and repression-- in western political discourse. In the post-colonial context in 
the “East,” attachment to large, universalist and impersonal political identities such as the 
nation were seen to be the unattained hallmark of modernity. The narrative of 
modernization was often one of the move from local, pre-modern attachments to family, 
tribe, religion, or location to the modern attachment to the nation-state.  Many nationalist 
thinkers disagreed with colonial assessments that the populace of the East could not make 
the leap to a modern attachment to the community of the nation, but fundamentally 
agreed that this leap was in fact the goal.  These thinkers contended that not only could 
people in the East make the change to an attachment to the modern nation-state, but that 
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they were in fact capable of creating better nation-states due to the inherent spiritual 
superiority of the East.14   
Following Foucault (2003), Chatterjee argues that communities often enter the 
post-colonial state’s calculations as convenient categories of the population on which to 
deploy administrative, legal, economic or electoral policy (Chatterjee 1998: 280). In the 
process of quantifying and utilizing these communities as objects of governance, 
flexibility in the boundaries and descriptions of communities that people used to handle 
social differences were erased to make discrete entities for state action. The conundrum 
to received notions of the state and civil society presented by these popular communities 
is that the state is being called on to recognize rights that individuals have as a result of 
their membership in a group (1998: 281). What sense can be made of these communities 
who are some of the most active agents of political practice in the “East”? In response to 
this question, Chatterjee looks at a field of strategic politics, to which he returns in later 
works (Chatterjee 2004 and 2011). I examine this discussion shortly, but first will 
introduce a key interlocutor, Arjun Appadurai, who has also thought through the 
inadequacy of the notion of the “state” in the context of South Asia, but situated its 
deficiency in the context of the contemporary phase of globalization.15   
Arjun Appadurai (2002) articulates a theory of deep democracy, in which a 
hollowed out nation-state is no longer the grounds on which the poor attempt to create 
opportunities and provide for necessities. Appadurai is looking for the story of the 
political and the democratic in the world left behind by the disillusionment in, and 
exhaustion of, what he calls the “two great paradigms for enlightenment and equity,” 
                                                 
14 See Benedict Anderson’s seminal 1983 work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. 
15 David Eaton (2006) has posed the question about the challenges to sovereignty that arise from the many 
new ways in which material and social systems extend beyond and often confound national boundaries. 
 13 
Marxism and modernization/development.  Tracing the post-utopian visions of political 
life and democracy, Appadurai examines the concepts of citizenship, governmentality, 
nation-states, advocacy alliances, and concrete situations of contestation by networks of 
poor slum dwellers over access to resources that are operating in the wake of the two 
great paradigms. The story that Appadurai is seeking to tell is one of the nation-state 
being hollowed out and made “redundant” by vertical and horizontal networks of 
nongovernmental organizations and civil society institutions in the provision of basic 
services to the urban poor. However, the conjunction and cooperation of forces that 
Appadurai describes as deep democracy does not imply an escape from or even revision 
of the nation-state. Even in the most celebratory passages, Appadurai clearly 
demonstrates the vital importance of political recognition.  While he casts this as “the 
politics of recognition from below” he does not offer a story in which the basic terrain of 
the struggle of individual communities has moved past the nation-state, or a story in 
which the ultimate goal of recognition escapes the fundamental need to be serviced by the 
state once recognized.16   As I will show, in the case of Ezbet Khairallah people coalesced 
around water and sanitation issues in the blue jerkin demonstrations in 2008 and were 
able to get a wastewater collection service built in their area. The construction work was 
done by a local contractor, with international donor funds, but the recognition of Ezba as 
a location, and of their need for services, had to be made by some aspect of the state to 
get these other entities in operation.  
                                                 
16 Speaking in response to an earlier piece by Appadurai (1996), Kaushik Ghosh (2008) questions the 
elevation of the transnational as a site for political possibility for indigenous communities that supposedly 
escapes and exceeds the state. Using the case study of a political movement by indigenous communities 
against two proposed hydroelectric dams, Ghosh demonstrates the ways in which these communities had 
long been finding space within the state system to make claims and contest exploitative actions and how 
such possibilities had been erased or misrecognized by leaders seeking a transnational indigenous activism. 
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According to Chatterjee (2004), the movements of NGOs and activisms that 
Appadurai cites are not outside of the nation state, but fundamentally constitutive of the 
nation-state itself in “most of the world.”17 Chatterjee argues that the forms of political 
mobilization that are occurring in many non-western local places are forms that cannot be 
described under the rubric of civil society, but rather utilize traditional or alternative 
systems of obligation and privilege to negotiate and secure resources. Unlike the arena of 
civil society in which equal, rights-bearing citizens lobby the government for rights, the 
arena of political society occurs at the level of community and is occupied by participants 
who do not qualify as equal citizens before the law.18  In the arena of political society, 
communities negotiate with the institutions and representatives of modern governmental 
systems by operationalizing a variety of personal, affective, politically strategic, or 
“traditional” methods in order to secure resources and manage new governmental 
programs in their area.  Two key components of Chatterjee’s “political society” are the 
investing of these population groups created by modern governmentality with moral 
content in order to establish the community’s legitimacy as an entity vis-à-vis the state, 
and the bargaining of votes in local elections for the promise of municipal services and 
recognition, even if tacit. As I will demonstrate in Chapter One, votes-for-service swaps 
are key to the history of utility service provision in Ezbet Khairallah, from electricity to 
sewage collection. These alternative forms of political maneuvering often do not conform 
to expectations of transparent and egalitarian political activity, but Chatterjee contends 
that these are in fact very modern adaptations to current forms of governmentality.  
                                                 
17 This refrain also echoes in the work of Singerman (1995) on how deeply imbricated the personal and 
small scale are in national politics in Egypt. 
18 In reading Maha Abdelrahman’s 2005 book Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt, the 
lines between civil society and political society seem to blur. 
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A central site at which these adaptations become visible is in the everyday 
relations between people as modes of power get worked and reworked in each 
interaction. Indeed, much recent scholarship on the state privileges the everyday, 
spatialized, and complexly licit and illicit nature of the state form and state power. 
Ferguson and Gupta (2002) suggest that looking at the daily personal practices of people 
in relation to state institutions, and of individuals within these institutions, helps to break 
down the over-arching territorial claim of the state itself. They challenge the 
metaphorical operation of verticality and encompassment that function in much of the 
social science work on the nature of states and related entities, such as civil society, 
which function to create the perception of a solid and omnipresent entity.  As I will 
discuss in Chapter One, the myth of territorial reach for the Egyptian state is neither 
complete, as in all of the many ways that other structures supersede the putative boarders, 
nor is it unimportant, as in the reorientation of the Oasis of Siwa.19  Ferguson and Gupta 
suggest that future research should become attentive to the ways in which states are 
created in the process, and are essentially composed of, the minutia of daily interactions 
between subjects and individuals who function in various capacities as state 
representatives.20  As an example, they give us the scene of a bureaucrat conducting a 
surprise visit to the schoolroom run by an Integrated Child Development Service Program 
worker (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 984). According to Ferguson and Gupta, the very 
process of supervision and the mobility required to accomplish the surprise visit were 
intended to instantiate a hierarchical state structure.  Rather than accepting well-worn 
preconceptions of the nature of the state and state power, they invite researchers to 
                                                 
19 I will return to the example of Siwa Oasis in Chapter One, examining how the changing boundary 
marking practices of the Egyptian state have impacted one small outpost in the country. 
20 See also Das and Poole 2004 on the role of state workers as simultaneous representatives of state power 
and also informal power in local networks, a topic I will return to in Chapter Three. 
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investigate the daily practices of state institutions and representatives and the spatiality of 
all forms of government (2002: 996). Following this invitation, Chapter Three discusses 
the social lives of water objects in Ezba, two of which (the meter and the bill) are 
products of institutional designs to measure and manage water.  
In a similar vein, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001) proposes that it is not only state 
institutions that should be subjected to a thorough review, but also those organizations 
that have taken over some of the functions traditionally reserved for the state. Trouillot 
does not agree with the conceptual death of the state maintained by theorists such as 
Radcliffe-Brown (1995[1940]; as cited in Trouillot 2001), in which the state ceases to be 
and only the component institutions--or their extra or intra-state successors--can be seen, 
but Trouillot does take seriously the notion that continued theoretical references to the 
state as such reaffirm problematic elisions of power (2001: 126).  These state-like 
institutions must also be contextualized in the day to day process of their management of 
health care services, welfare distribution, or water and sewage management, as in our 
case here.  Trouillot’s analysis calls for a view of the  state not as an apparatus, contained 
in particular institutions or boundaries, but rather a set of processes through which 
relationships of power are worked and reworked. Whether it is the contractor digging 
trenches to put in pipes, the bill collector trying to work out a bribe for how your meter is 
read, or police officers stopping a bus to see who is headed to Ezba, social relations of 
power situate the residents of Ezba in webs of possibility and closure. There are spatial or 
institutional iterations of particular state processes, as “national states” create countries 
and countries are defined in some fundamental ways by boundaries, however shifting and 
uncertain (2001: 133).  In fact, in the spatial interactions of state and global capital 
circulation, entire spatial realms have become extraneous and irrelevant, with devastating 
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effects on the populations living within them (2001: 131).21  Ezba is not an iteration of 
Agamben’s camp (1998), as the ties that bind it to other spaces and people in Cairo are 
strong and many, and they have had particular kinds of successes in getting state 
recognition, as I will demonstrate by looking at the implementation of a sewage system in 
Chapter Three. However, the tenuous nature of the acceptance has given rise to particular 
kinds of anxieties as improvements are made to the services connected to the area—if the 
space is being improved, are the residents currently living there without tenure really the 
intended recipients? Trouillot suggests that the study of states-in-particular should begin 
with close attention to the day-to-day (2001: 133). 
In a similar vein, Timothy Mitchell (2006) extends this insight about the 
connection between states and the everyday on its head by contending that the 
appearance of the state as a discrete and relatively autonomous social institution is itself a 
reification that is constituted through everyday social practices. The line between state 
and civil society gets drawn in exercises of power and social control.  Aradhana Sharma 
and Akhil Gupta (2006: 9) argue that academic disciplines, including political science 
and other social sciences, have participated in discursively constructing the state as a 
distinct entity with particular functions. Both the practices of social science disciplines 
and their practitioners, experts, themselves serve to deploy and legitimate strategies for 
governing populations and communities. The analysis of these processes of state 
formation focuses attention on what otherwise would seem mundane activities and 
mechanisms, such as collecting taxes, providing welfare for the poor and constructing a 
world of paper certifications (2006; see also Poole 2004). This revision then implies that 
the state becomes one among many institutional frameworks within which people live 
                                                 
21 See also Agamben 1998, 2005; LiPuma and Lee 2004 
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their lives, the others including a wide variety of networks and relationships. To our story 
of Ezba, we add to the police officers and bill collectors a cadre of aunts and uncles, 
previous neighbors, and colleagues-- as well as pipes, tomatoes and water pumps22 -- that 
make life possible.  
These theorists offer readings that focus on the group or community as a locus for 
alternative theorizations of life and survival, work that helps to provide a framework 
within which to analyze the ways that people survive, the consequential worlds that they 
construct, in the increasingly dire economic, political and ecological conditions of urban 
poor neighborhoods of Cairo.  Water is a central material and social key with which to 
examine how people craft vernacular worlds, and lives as meaningful individuals and 
within communities and networks of association.  Water is one link in the chain that 
shapes the circumstances within which people create lives and livelihoods, creating 
vernacular worlds, and connects them to other subjects in their associations throughout 
the city of Cairo.  
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this projected was developed to illuminate how water 
circulates materially and socially through the neighborhood of Ezbet Khairallah, how the 
process of distribution and use of water and management of wastewater is carried out 
within networks, and how the processes of negotiation between residents of Ezba and 
state institutions operate on the day to day level. I carried out research through semi-
structured interviews and participant observation for 16 months between August 2009 
and January 2011. Participant observation comprises an essential element of the 
ethnographic project, and is defined by Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) as a process in 
                                                 
22 See Chapter Four on Water Objects for a discussion of these items, as well as meters, bills and sabils 
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which researchers enter into the world of their research site and learn how to interpret the 
world using the tools of those around them. I conducted participant observation in 
community homes and businesses in order to understand patterns of domestic 
consumption of potable water and management of wastewater. This aspect of participant 
observation is particularly significant for this project’s choice of the day to day as the 
central analytical framework through which to engage questions of the state, community 
and social networks. 
I carried out participant observation with a key group of nineteen community 
contacts, divided among ten households, in my research site.  During weekly visits with 
each of these households, I participated in their daily tasks, particularly as they relate to 
water. This included washing dishes, scrubbing rugs, doing laundry, cooking food, 
bathing children, cleaning the street outside of the home and dampening it with water (to 
prevent dust from rising in unpaved streets), feeding domestic animals, and collecting and 
storing drinking water in jars, jugs and jerkins while water is running to tide over families 
during periods when water provision is cut. Related to the establishment of the new 
sewage system in Ezba, I participated in supervising the removal of septic tank contents, 
filling septic tanks with debris once they are no longer needed, providing assistance to 
contacts in Ezba who are working to repair damage done by sewage water on the 
foundations of their homes, replacing faulty piping, and remodeling homes after the 
sewage system had gone online. The implementation of a sewage system in the area 
enabled me to further observe the day to day dynamics of water management, the 
negotiations between community members and representatives of the state as they are 
thrown into close and daily contact, and the unfolding of relations between the 
community and the array of non-human others with which they are connected, from 
parasites to the built environment.   
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Interviewees were selected based on the “theoretical sampling” method whereby 
the results of each interview or set of interviews determines the selection of the 
subsequent set of interviewees and interview questions (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006). 
Additionally, more formal selection of interviewees was based on their positions in 
government institutions and local and international organizations dealing with water 
resources and sewage issues. I interviewed everyday users of these water resources and 
sewage systems and government administrators and non-governmental organization 
workers dealing with water infrastructure. These interviews were primarily conducted in 
Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, with a handful of interviews with high-level representatives 
of international institutions and Egyptian agencies taking place in English. The use of an 
interpreter was required for three interviews in Arabic dealing with highly technical 
language. Interviews were conducted in a variety of locations, as dictated by local 
conventions regarding private and public space and gender mixing.23  
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
One possible map of the city of Cairo is a map of pressures, flows and stoppages 
of all things liquid.   This dissertation examines the urban context in which Ezba came to 
be, and the ways that this particular location has been carved out as a place of danger and 
intervention, and what that means to the people who live there. It looks at the everyday 
and collective actions that Ezba residents have engaged in to gain utility services. These 
collective actions around everyday concerns are important stories leading up to the 
revolution(s) that started in 2011—protests for sewage collection in Ezba, or labor 
protests in al-Mahalla al-Kubra, or even mass celebrations for soccer victories, activities 
that got people out on the street, sharpened skills in collective action, moved them face to 
                                                 
23 As Farha Ghannam described of her own field work, my status as a young married woman gave me a 
great deal of access to homes but placed certain limitations on my movements in the public sphere. 
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face with the gatekeepers and security forces of the city. Coverage of the revolutions 
often tells the story of middle class kids on Twitter and Facebook connecting and 
instigating large scale political change. It is true that new media played a role in making 
things visible and connections across space possible in new ways, such as the Kullina 
Khaled Said (We Are All Khalid Said) Facebook page about the young Alexandria man 
who was brutally beaten to death by the police.  That story needs to be complicated with 
the everyday engagements, challenges, flexibility and ingenuity that Egyptians living in 
places like Ezbet Khairallah deployed in their interactions with representatives of state 
institutions to make life a little more possible in the circumstances in which they found 
themselves.  As Mark Allen Peterson (2011) admits of his own work in the book that 
went to press just after the revolution began, this dissertation predicts neither the 
beginning nor the end(s) of the revolution(s) in Egypt. Instead, the humble hope is that it 
sheds light on the sets of political possibilities, mobilizations and accommodations that 
some Egyptians living in the urban margins utilized to make their lives possible.  
Chapter One lays out the sources of water in Egypt and the ways that various 
actors and institutions make sense of it, getting a reading of the ways in which the 
political and material are shaped by the power of rhetoric and description. In particular, 
rhetoric about the geography of Egypt, and the putative mismatch between space and 
population in the country, sheds light on the way in which Egypt is constructed as an 
object of development need for international organizations such as the World Bank and 
the IMF, and to some extent the governing structures of the country itself. Look at how 
narrow a band of habitable and fertile land there is in Egypt, just take a look at the map 
that shows the narrow ribbon of the Nile river slipping through a rectangle of sand, the 
refrain goes. How little room to grow, it seems; grow in the sense of expanding 
populations and grow in the sense of raising crops to feed the nation.  Taking a closer 
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look at the function of this refrain to characterize Egypt as place in danger, a country in 
need of expert management, a picture emerges of Egypt’s material basis being 
understood and manipulated in ways that help to justify particular forms of structured 
inequality. 
 This is not, however, to imply that the Nile river is not a significant part of stories 
told about Egypt, rather that there are many possible versions given how multivalent it is. 
One version is the history of the colonial and nation-state political forms in Egypt being 
fashioned in the process of attempting to manage the river and other water resources in 
the country, including the four aquifers that provide some additional water for 
consumption. Chapter One provides an overview of the institutional arrangements that 
have been created and reformed in the process of attempting to manage water resources 
and provide water-related services in Egypt, particularly in the capital city of Cairo. 
Potable water and wastewater services were implemented in the context of changing 
notions about the nature of disease and contagion, as the technocrats and citizens-to-be of 
the city needed to be protected from the plagues that arise from so many bodies sharing 
space and infrastructures.24 
In 2004, a new iteration of institutional form for water and wastewater services, 
the Holding Company for Water and Wastewater (HCWW), was created by presidential 
decree. The HCWW was intended to restart the stagnating and incomplete conversion of 
water and sewage systems in Egypt into self-sustaining entities, so that the maintenance 
and operation of these systems were no longer the responsibility of the central 
government. The HHCW was to provide guidance, technical and managerial advice to the 
companies below it, and each governorate then has a subsidiary company providing 
                                                 
24 See Nancy Elizabeth Gallagher 1990 
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direct services. In addition to the HHCW, the Egyptian Water Regulatory Agency was set 
up to provide oversight in the water sector. There are two central concerns of these 
entities and their international donors. The first is low tariff rates, which make it difficult 
to recuperate operating costs and invest in expansion and repair work. The second is the 
number of employees of the various water companies, where the situation is described as 
one in which there are far too many people for the required work, and too few with the 
necessary skills. The difficulties experienced administratively have resulted in several 
incidents in which untreated water has caused illness, a few of which I will detail in 
Chapter One. After the January 25
th
 revolution in 2011 and subsequent election of 
President Mohamed Morsi, the water sector was again reformed by the creation of a new 
ministry, the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation Facilities, with the role of 
oversight over all of the other water and sanitation entities in the country.  
 Moving from the national scale to the local, Chapter Two introduces the research 
location, Ezbet Khairallah and the urban context of Cairo. Egypt’s capital city of Cairo 
incorporates earlier cities of Memphis, Giza and Fostat; the remains of the latter are 
situated very close to the Ezbet Khairallah, an important note in the story of how Ezba 
got a state-run sewage system. In the twentieth century, the city saw significant 
expansion in informal housing, with waves of rural to urban migration that filled in the 
agricultural land in villages surrounding Cairo, and built on areas of state-claimed desert 
land. The first large wave of building of informal housing of the century was comprised 
of people coming to the city to work in newly formed industries who could not find 
sufficient space in the formal housing market due to building and zoning regulations. 
People followed, and continue to follow, chains of kinship and acquaintance from areas 
in Upper Egypt to particular locations in the city. Development within these areas tended 
to follow the pattern of having little open space left for public facilities, small building 
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footprints, and coverage of the entire plot of land purchased. Despite these similarities in 
building styles, some informally developed areas, al-manatiq al-gheir mukhattata 
[unplanned areas], more commonly referred to as ashwa’iyyat [random], were 
stigmatized as more dangerous than others. Ezbet Khairallah has been marked out as a 
particularly perilous space. As I demonstrate in Chapter Two, the material 
disenfranchisement of Ezba as a place is both produced by and productive of particular 
types of social and institutional disenfranchisement of the residents. As I describe, simply 
getting into and out of Ezba tells its own story of how an area that is a few short miles 
from the city center can be cut off—at least formally—from the infrastructural services 
that tie the city together.  Part of the difficulties of ingress and egress in Ezba are due to 
its location along the rise of a hill, and across a plateau, creating some physical barriers to 
easy transit which have been compounded by infrastructural developments or lack 
thereof.  
The limestone plateau on which Ezba is built was slated to become a luxury 
housing developed by the Maadi Corporation. However, the Ministry of Antiquities 
stepped in after the special permit to build on the location had been issued, and attempted 
to preserve the ruins thought to be buried there. During the impasse between these two 
entities, people from rural areas in Upper Egypt moved in and began buying land from 
gangs and building the foundations for multistory family homes. At several points along 
the way, security forces were used to attempt to evict those living in the area, but people 
fought back and rebuilt what had been demolished.25 As time progressed and the density 
of the area increased, Ezbet Khairallah has become an area that must be reckoned with 
despite what various state entities, or their representatives, may have wished. Utilities 
                                                 
25 One interviewee described having barricaded the road from Zahraa with barrels of flaming oil to prevent 
police from entering. 
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that were first absent were then connected illegally through DIY piping and electricity 
cables, and then slowly became formalized through mutual interests and electoral 
politics. The state had long been “seeing without seeing” areas like Ezba, what I will 
describe in Chapter Four as ist’bat, allowing them to exist without formally providing 
them with services. The practice of ist’bat, deliberate misunderstanding or 
misrecognition, is part and parcel of how Ezba residents, and state and state-like 
institutions and their representatives, manage their engagement with each other. For 
example, residents of Ezba do not have formal tenure rights to their land, but they are 
able to register for food subsidies based on their residence there, and they are able to vote 
for candidates specifically elected for the area in which they live. In terms of water 
resources, the HCWW estimates that they lose some 30 percent of the potable water that 
they treat, which they know is partially due to water leaking in the system and partially 
due to water being syphoned off by informal connections to the state system.   
Representative Dr. Mahdi Alam referred to it as the governorate “seeing without seeing” 
places like Ezbet Khairallah (I describe this interview in Chapter Four). In fact, he 
implies that overeager civil servants who try to palpably see such locations put 
themselves at risk for having disrupted the façade. Residents themselves work to 
selectively engage and evade state involvement. For example, Ezba residents were keen 
to have the state sewage system put in place, and worked to make that happen. However, 
the potential monitoring of what goes down the drain brought its own sense of unease 
among residents as conversion of one utility into an official system brought other 
informal arrangements into view. Residents want the state to see them, but not necessary 
to observe too closely.  
After the rock slide disaster in Duweiqa in 2008, which I will describe in Chapter 
Two, Egypt’s visual acuity improved, although the response by residents of Ezba to being 
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seen hasn’t always been enthusiastic. After Duweiqa, a new system of categorizing 
informally settled areas was developed, and along with that has come some demolition of 
areas that have been deemed an immediate threat to inhabitants; other areas are merely 
unplanned and slated to be addressed at a later stage. For all of these freshly mapped and 
classified locations, the stated goal is to tie them in to state utility and infrastructural 
systems. This is a two-way street in which the governorates become responsible for 
providing services to a greater number of locations, but residents of these locations then 
become responsible for paying for services that had, in many though not all cases, been 
previously gained extralegally.  
In Chapter Three, through sharing ethnographic pieces on everyday life in Ezba, I 
provide a view of how people managed excess wastewater as the sewage systems 
changed over the period of my research, as well as gesturing towards the social and 
bodily implications of being surrounded by waste. When residents of the Ezbet 
Khairallah began building more permanent houses of concrete and brick, they dealt with 
wastewater by building a transh, or septic tank, into which all household water flowed. 
The transh was an unlined concrete box buried in the road in front of the home, and when 
it became full a septic removal truck had to be found to suck out the contents, at a dear 
cost to residents. There was a great deal of sewage spilled over in these arrangements, as 
households struggled to make the systems of filling and emptying match up temporally 
and financially. In addition to overflow, there was a great deal of seepage as tanks were 
cracked or damaged by passing vehicles on the roads above, or simply wore out over 
time. The resultant sewage water on the loose trickled down into the porous limestone on 
which the area rests and ate away at the rock, and mixed in with potable water anywhere 
there were cracks or holes in pipes and junctures in the Do It Yourself (DIY) potable 
water piping system. Puddles could become veritable lakes of untreated sewage on side 
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streets and get churned into deep pits of unpassable mud on the unpaved main 
thoroughfares of the area. The abundance of stagnant sewage water provided a habitat for 
mosquitos, flies and other insects, and compounded issues with undesired biological 
neighbors (rodents, feral cats and dogs) living off solid waste that accumulated in the area 
due to changes in garbage collection systems in the city as a whole. Smell became a way 
to index the material and social implications of all of that “matter out of place” (Douglas 
1966), and often arouse to public consciousness as a palpable sign of state neglect and 
social exclusion. In one particularly telling exchange that I caught in a shared taxi into 
Ezba, the scent of the area was used to qualify the value of the people living there. 
Moreover, scent is one way of beginning to count and account for the many creatures that 
are connected to each other, willing or not, through city infrastructure. All water 
appearing in the street is subject to public debate because water casually discarded could 
fill a transh and become someone else’s responsibility to remove. Conflict and 
cooperation arise in moments when the sewage spilled over, as the story of Nabeela’s 
engagement party will show, and appear again as the transh system gave way to the state-
run sewage system, as the story of Asma’s final elimination of the no-longer-needed 
space demonstrates (see Chapter Three).  
Moving from the issues around sewage water in Ezbet Khairallah, Chapter Four 
examines five water objects related to potable and virtual water; meter, pump, bill, 
tomato, and sabil or water fountain. Through detailing the social lives of these material 
items, I attempt to elucidate the daily practices of managing potable and virtual water in 
the networks that support and constrain residents of Ezbet Khairallah. Utilizing work by 
Nigel Thrift (2005) and Mathew Gandy (2008) on urban infrastructures, from the pipes 
and concrete to the structures of affect within the city, a picture emerges of how people in 
Ezba are making life work in the present and how they are planning and hoping for a 
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future that may or may not bring more safety and comfort. Looking at our first water 
object, the meter, we see that in Ezba, and in many informal areas in Cairo, water meters 
are not widespread. As the sewage system has been put online, the cost of installing a 
water meter for potable water consumption has increased significantly, catching people in 
the double bind of promising formal recognition of land tenure rights through utility bills 
but at exorbitant cost for installation. Some people are able to leap that financial and 
logistical hurdle on the path to becoming recognized owners of the land and buildings 
that comprise their homes; others are priced out of the market and not able to build the 
file portfolio that has the promise at least of making their home “official.” Gaps in the 
treatment and distribution systems of potable water in the city make it difficult to truly 
measure usage, which is reflected in the ways in which billing happens. As Chapter Four 
will detail, there is no consensus about whether or not the bills received actually reflect 
the services received, partially due to the inability of the state to accurately track on 
systemic levels, and partially due to work by the residents of Ezba and representatives of 
these state entities trying to bend the system to their own advantage.  
Engaging with another of our water objects, looking at the story of an argument 
over the purchase of a water pump in one of the apartment buildings in Ezba shows how 
improvements in one portion of larger water systems can put in stark relief the cracks and 
failures in other portions of infrastructure. Once the state sewage system came on line, 
water restrictions that had been imposed by the limited space in a transh were eliminated; 
however, there were still problems provisioning all of the apartments in a tall building 
without supplemental pumps to enhance water pressure. Can neighbors demand of each 
other contribution to a common good, if they don’t have the resources to put into the 
pool? Following the movement of tomatoes in Ezba, another of our water objects, 
captures a bit of the cartography of affection and connection that make life possible in 
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Ezba. Finally, the sabil or charitably funded water fountain reveals how people plan for 
the future and work through difficulties in the here and now. The dissertation does this 
work in order to examine how water can help us to make sense of the ways in which built 
forms relate to political possibilities in marginalized urban areas. 
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Chapter 1: Water in Egypt 
Research about water asks some basic questions, some of them technical, about 
how water gets from here to there, and about how much time, effort, space, money, and 
pressure it takes it to go from point A to point B. Other questions extend the technical 
into the social, focusing on why it goes one place and not the other, or only at certain 
times, or about why some places have buildups of wastewater while other areas seem to 
be spared. This chapter examines the shifting institutional and organizational paradigms 
that have worked to shape relations between water and people in Egypt.  Through 
examining the sources of water that enable life in Egypt, a picture emerges of struggles 
over what matters about water, how to measure it, and what different scales of analysis 
enable or preclude from view about how political and material systems intertwine. While 
the Nile is the main source of water for most agricultural, industrial and domestic uses in 
Egypt, the ground water in aquifers is an important part of the story of possibility in 
Egypt, as is soil water. In all three of these types of water, our story bumps up against the 
state. In the literature about water, be it on riparian relations along the Nile or reports on 
the status of sewage collection systems, we find a state that has borders over or under 
which water flows, and within which policy and institutions must be established to 
manage water. Reading recent work on the “nature” of the state as was done in the 
introduction to this dissertation, the state as the de facto category of analysis begins to 
make less sense. Do states really have firm boundaries, a territorial body? Ferguson and 
Gupta (2002), and Trouillot (2001) would argue that they do not.  Does the State manage 
water, or, as Mitchell (2002) argues about the case of Egypt, is the state created in part by 
its never-wholly-successful attempts to manipulate the material world? This is where 
water and notions of the “state” as such meet; in the details of conceptualizing and 
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managing resources at hand. In particular, what is the role of institutions—are they 
constitutive of a state, like body parts? Or are they part chimera, creating the perception 
that such a thing exists? Where are the people in our story, the intersectional beings with 
their raced, classed, and gendered (and othered) bodies?    
The next three chapters of the dissertation take on the last question above, looking 
closely to see how people in a particular location are making sense of water in the context 
of the institutions within which they are embedded. This chapter lays a framework for 
those stories by providing an overview of the history of the water and sanitation sector in 
Egypt. As will be shown, the various institutional components of what we call the 
Egyptian State are disjointed and often oddly aligned, for reasons having to do with 
colonial histories, international donor groups, military dictatorships, and the accretion of 
time that has solidified certain flows, while blocking others.   
The 2010 Untied Nation General Assembly’s declaration that access to safe and 
clean drinking water and improved sanitation services are fundamental human rights 
articulates an ambition to include the provision of water and wastewater services to all as 
a moral and structural obligation of states.26  Yet, in many rural and urban zones the 
social contract of the welfare state has been broken as a result of inability or 
unwillingness to invest in appropriate infrastructure. Communities are often left without 
water services and then criminalized for its “theft.” In the case of Egypt, this dynamic 
plays out against the backdrop of massive government investment in new water and 
sanitation infrastructure for wealthy enclaves being built on reclaimed desert land,27 
making dire under-provision or non-provision of water and sewage services in slum areas 
                                                 
26 UN Resolution 64/292 http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=A/RES/64/292&lang=E Last 
accessed March 30, 2014 
27 Such wealthy enclaves were built largely by businessmen closely associated with the Mubarak Family. 
Talaat Moustafa’s Al Rehab is just down the street from the new desert campus of the American University 
in Cairo. See Dennis 2006. 
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of major cities all the more glaring. Here, certain sections of the population have been 
singled out for maintenance and protection, while others are left without the necessities 
for biological survival (Foucault 2003; Butler 2004). Places like Ezbet Khairallah 
highlight the gap between the ethical impulse encapsulated in the UN’s 2010 elevation of 
access to potable water and wastewater services to the status of human rights, and the 
realities of many poor areas around the world where the expansion of services is often 
haphazard, rife with corruption, and fundamentally insufficient to the needs of residents. 
THE SOURCE(S) 
Generally regarded as the longest river in the world28 and flowing some four 
thousand miles, the Nile is the primary source of water for Egypt and ties it in fraught, 
long-standing relationships with upstream riparian neighbors. A river of ink has been 
spilled about the importance of the Nile to the changing geographical and social forms of 
Egypt through time, and about relations of force and precedence that have shaped the 
legal and material arrangements for allocation of water along the Nile’s length.29  
                                                 
28 There is some debate  about whether  the Nile or the Amazon is the longest river in the world. 
29 The 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan allocated all of the water of the Nile River between the two 
countries, with Egypt to receive the lion’s share at 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan to receive 18.5 bcm 
of water annually; while allocating no water to eight upstream neighboring countries (Rwanda, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea). In 1999 the 
Nile Basin Initative (NBI) was established in an attempt to increase cooperation between the riparian 
neighbors. See Allen 2000. 
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Figure 1: Image of the Nile River from Google Earth; locations and borders added by 
author and are not exact. Image captured on March 29, 2014 
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In a certain sense, it would be true to say that there is no Egypt without the Nile, 
as some 95% of the population of 80 million people live in the 4% of the total land mass 
of Egypt: in the fertile valley of the Nile (Melesse 2011). The remaining 96% of the 
geographic area of Egypt is classified as non-arable land, primarily desert, and is sparsely 
populated (2011). Or so tell us the documentary sources for national snapshots and 
international testimonials about the dire state of the world’s water supply. Such pictures 
neither unpack the science behind such measurements—What hidden guesses, hunches 
and assumptions lie in the big picture?--- nor do they contain within their imagery all of 
the ways that Egypt’s borders and middles do not line up with maps that calculate down 
to the square kilometers of a country. Troubling borders is an established right of the 
geographically sophisticated social sciences, as the introduction showed. Egypt is, of 
course, not as neatly demarcated from Libya or the Sudan as pictured; people within 
landscapes measure their affiliations in scales and linkages that may be parallel or 
tangential to state claims of overarching territorial bodies. Nor is the water, in a material 
or social sense, simply flowing south to north in an endless preordained trajectory. These 
big picture shots of what Egypt is, and how it lives along the navel of the Nile River, miss 
also the little places scattered through sage-brush desert, the camels who find enough 
moisture to live in the great sand sea, chains of life along the Mediterranean and Red 
Seas that include half-lives of hulking unfinished holiday villages (Cole and Altorki, 
1998).  
But of course, such big pictures also matter, as boundary making practices of state 
entities such as the army and passports and selective recognition of bodies as citizen or 
foreigner orient places. Such was the fate (in the ethnographic present) of the Oasis of 
Siwa, located along the border with Libya. In the past it had been deeply entwined with 
the nearest oasis to the west, Jaghbub, as the residents of both oases are largely one 
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linguistic unit and tying many family threads together of the Tamazight people’s 
easternmost outpost along North Africa. After hostilities between President Sadat and 
Moammar Gadhafi over just who had claim to the western desert of Egypt (or eastern 
desert of Libya), a firm line appeared that severed such “easy” contact between the oases 
as a one day trip between them by donkey could manage. Now all travel between Siwa 
and Jaghbub must first be routed 300 km north through the boarder at Sallum, and then 
south again to reunite family, on pain of punishment for smuggling. After this cutoff, 
firmer and deeper grooves have been made in tracks leading to Marsa Matrouh on the 
Mediterranean coast and eastward to Alexandria and Cairo. The whole oasis pivoted to 
the right, turning its face to the sun in the east for official recognition, birth certificates, 
deliveries of fruit and vegetables, and universities. Young Siwi men now head off to the 
Gulf States in search of work, where their fathers once had headed west to Tripoli or 
Benghazi. Such state claims to territorial boundaries matter. But, things change. With the 
revolutions in Egypt and Libya over the last four years, this border area has become more 
porous again—though not all such stories are happy ones, as the reality of smuggling 
food between Siwa and Jaghbub is also the reality of smuggling guns and other things.  
The water that makes these oases possible comes from aquifers, of which Egypt 
has four of substantial size. The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer is the largest and is unique in 
its size, covering some two million square kilometers across Egypt, Sudan, Libya and 
Chad, and for the fact that the water is fossil water.  Fossil water is water that has been 
trapped in an underground location for a very long time, possibly thousands of years, and 
which does not receive substantial recharge from precipitation.30  The Nile, Moghra and 
Coastal Aquifers in Egypt are meteoric water, or water that comes from precipitation, and 
                                                 
30 Gossel et al 2004 describe the issues in estimating the extent and condition of  the Nubian Sandstone 
Aquifer due to research that was limited by state borders. Heinl, M. and U. Thorweihe (1993) estimated 
that the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer houses 150,00 square kilometers of water.  
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are renewable (Hefny, Farid, Hussein 1992). When looking at the future of water needs in 
Egypt, and in other areas above the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, arguments have been 
made to tap in to these aquifers to a greater extent to meet the requirements of growing 
populations (1992), although there is debate about how to best estimate aquifer yield 
(Eaton 2013). Where these extractive practices have started in earnest, desertification has 
become an issue. Such withdrawals of water from shared underground resources 
confound state boundaries, visions for sovereignty and narrowly construed plans for state 
good. This is true for Libya’s Great Manmade River Project (GMRP), the largest 
irrigation project in the world, which draws on the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer to bring 
water to northern cities along the coast. This withdrawal of water from one territorial unit 
impacts the availability of water in other places that depend on the Nubian Sandstone 
Aquifer, whatever their locations within national boundaries. Narrowly construed plans 
for state good are also challenged by the water that is returning to circulation at faster 
rates due to the pumping of aquifers. The pumping of fossil water and the return of this 
water into circulation has been estimated to have contributed one-fourth of the sea level 
rise around the globe in the 20th century (Wada et al 2010). It’s not just an argument 
between Egypt and Libya over the aquifer, but also of an island nation a continent away 
slowly being engulfed by the sea—such as the Maldives.  
J.A. Allan (2000) argues that noting only the surface water (Nile) and 
groundwater (aquifers) when assessing the water available in any location misses a larger 
picture of the water needed to provision life, as it fails to include the soil water, which 
plays a key role in the production of crops. Herein lies a key to the larger water picture—
it’s not just about the water that you can see, or drink, it’s also about the water it takes to 
grow the wheat in your bread (staple cereals loom large in the literature), the tomatoes 
you eat, or to produce the bricks that structure your house and the plastic bag holding 
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your dish detergent. The concept of virtual water is native to the Middle East, having 
been developed in response to research on agricultural imports and exports in the area.31  
The basic idea is that all things that are produced have water embedded in the process and 
the water that was used to grow or manufacture the item should be accounted for, in 
particular when looking at trade between countries. Water-poor or water-scarce nations 
like those in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) would be better off if they were 
net water importers, the argument goes, and therefore bring in water-intensive items to 
make up for the lack of water in the soil profiles of the area. Allan suggested that “a 
quarter of the water needed to feed the Middle East and North Africa’s people in the 
1990s lies in the soil profiles of temperate humid environments in North America, South 
America and Europe” (2000: 19). Really, is that surprising when scientific calculations 
can demonstrate that the Middle East is the first region in the world to run out of water 
(Allan 1994 quoted in 2000: 9)? Also unsurprising, in Allan’s view, is the reluctance of 
the political leaders of the area to acknowledge these realities (2000:9). The assumptions 
embedded in these assessments, about populations and production capacity and political 
entities, is something that I will return to shortly.  
The concept of water footprints has re-envisioned the discussion of embedded 
water to speak more broadly to the various kinds of water usages and their environmental 
and social costs.32  Like the carbon footprint on which it is modeled, the water footprint 
concept attempts to connect dots between all of the ways in which water is used, polluted, 
or otherwise taken from circulation in order to make anything from an item to a lifestyle 
possible. Water footprints are calculable at the product, individual, and national level, and 
                                                 
31 http://www.siwi.org/prizes/stockholmwaterprize/laureates/professor-john-anthony-allan-great-britain/ 
accessed November 13, 2013 
32 See Hoekstra, Chapagain, Aldaya and Mekonnen 2009 
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work to shape a worldview where embedded water becomes visible and actionable. For 
example, once the full impacts of a bottle of water are made clear, the hope is that 
political and social change will follow. At the heart of these ideas are questions of 
scale—at what level of remove does it make sense to speak of these trades in embedded 
water; where, to use the terminology of the embedded water literature, is the 
problemshed—which has replaced the watershed as a fuller scaleular category of 
analysis.  
The MENA region is generally categorized as water-poor, but there is geographic 
diversity. Part of the MENA region sits on top of the largest fossil water aquifer in the 
world (the Nubian Sand Stone aquifer), and it contains some significant rivers (Nile, 
Euphrates, Tigris, Jordan).  Egypt is a net water importer, largely due to the import of 
wheat from the United States, and despite the sale of such water-heavy crops as tomatoes 
and watermelons to the European market in search of hard currency to service national 
debt.33  The story that needs to be unpacked here is the story of the state as the unit of 
analysis, where the import and export of water, virtual or otherwise, is marked across 
state boundaries despite the fact that neither the watershed nor the problemshed fit such 
scales.  The unit of the state does, however, lend itself very neatly to other kinds of 
calculations, particularly those enabled through the knowledge forms of extractive 
relationships, from the colonial to the neoliberal. Timothy Mitchell (2002) critiques the 
expertise and interests as they played out in Egypt in the twentieth century by examining 
the function of a simplistic and flat image of Egypt in international aid discourses about 
the “problems of Egypt.” Much like we just saw in Allan’s calculations about water, 
these problems are framed as a mismatch between the number of people to be fed and the 
                                                 
33 Export-oriented agricultural production is motivated in part by the need for hard currency to pay on 
debts that the Egyptian Government has to international donors, not least of all the US and European 
nations. 
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amount of land available to feed them, “The question of Egypt’s economic development 
is almost invariably introduced as a problem of geography versus demography, pictured 
by describing the narrow valley of the Nile River, surrounded by desert, crowded with 
rapidly multiplying millions of inhabitants” (Mitchell 2002: 209).  By examining what 
this image compresses and excludes from view, Mitchell is able to show the discourses 
that enabled particularly damaging economic and environmental policies by USAID, the 
IMF, the World Bank, and institutions of the Egyptian state.   
Taking the language, statistics, and measuring mechanisms of international 
development as it has been applied in Egypt as the starting point, Mitchell is able to show 
the miscalculations, exclusions and manipulation of knowledge about agricultural 
production and demographics in Egypt. In terms of agriculture, production capacity and 
the allocation of land for different purposes impacts the total food produced. As we will 
see in detail in Chapter Two, particular regulatory and economic pressures have 
contributed to the rapid conversion of agricultural land to informal housing on the edges 
of cities and towns up and down the Nile Valley. Additionally, the diversion of cultivated 
land from staple agricultural production to expensive luxury products (meat, dairy) for 
elites and tourists, and land mismanagement also combined to make Egypt dependent on 
the import of staple foods from the US (2002: 240). Having problematized half of the 
equation of Egypt’s food-to-person imbalance, he next addresses the essential 
ethnocentrism in the ways in which fertility rates among rural poor in Egypt were 
understood, highlighting the context of high infant mortality and family-centered care for 
elderly that helped to structure a preference for larger families.34  Breaking down the 
comparative analysis of a World Bank report from 1989, Mitchell questions the choice of 
                                                 
34 This focus on body counts and acreage yields forestalls an investigation into inherently unequal 
distribution practices. 
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the relatively poor and less densely populated countries of Bangladesh and Indonesia as 
counterpoint countries for Egypt’s population density 2002: 2012). Implicit in the logic 
of selecting those countries, he suggests, is that the comparison heightens the sense that 
Egypt is in danger. In the language of experts on Egypt, the real problem is not just that 
there are so many people crowded in such a small amount of land, it's that the growth rate 
of the population is so high that Egypt cannot meet its development objectives (Ali 
2002). There are just too many people, and they keep coming—a topic I will return to 
later in this chapter in discussions about staffing in the water sector. By closely 
examining the evidence on Egypt’s food/people problem, Mitchell is also challenging the 
convention of understanding and operating on countries as distinct and internally 
coherent units by highlighting the mechanisms used to imagine communities in these 
specific instrumental ways. 
Mitchell’s (2002) work also takes on the river Nile and many of the iterations of 
history, technology, force, and fate that help to explain its current form. Egypt has a long 
history of managing the Nile river, measuring its annual flooding, creating dam works 
that transported water through series of irrigation canals designed to capitalize on natural 
forces to serve human demands. Historically, the Nile floods brought with them not just 
an abundance of water, but also a plentitude of rich alluvial mud, some ten million tons of 
which were deposited annually on the flood plain, traveling down from the Blue Nile and 
contributing to the fecundity of the Egyptian Nile Valley (Mitchell 2002: 195). The 20th 
century began with the building of the Old Aswan dam in 1902, which partially blocked 
the flow of the Nile and worked in concert with a series of barrages to channel the flow of 
water into irrigation canals running parallel to the river. A number of these barrages are 
central to provisioning cities in Egypt with drinking water, including the Fresh Water 
Canal to Ismailia and al-Mahmoudia Canal to Alexandria. The flooding and 
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accompanying silt were put to an end by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970, 
which also created Lake Nasser and thereby displaced the vast majority of the Nubian 
population.35  Lake Nasser holds approximately one and a half times the annual flow of 
the Nile, which then is distributed by the government throughout the year to downstream 
segments of the river. This change has had significant impacts on the biodiversity of the 
Nile, as well as water quality, and has furthermore increased processes of coastal erosion 
along the Mediterranean coast. Currently, agriculture swallows up the vast majority of the 
water extracted from the Nile in Egypt, at some 85% of the water consumed.36  There 
have been a number of large scale projects to manage water for agricultural purposes, and 
in recent history as part of what might be termed the national pastime of desert land 
reclamation. In addition to Lake Nasser and the oasis of Fayoum, which is fed by a canal 
dating back to pharaonic times, the Bahr Yussef, there are a number of other large water 
diversion projects such as Toshka off of Lake Nasser (Barnes forthcoming) and projects 
in the Sinai.   
MODERN WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 
Modern water infrastructure in Egypt follows the changing organizational 
imperatives of institutional regimes as they shaped the material and social worlds to their 
own ends, or at least tried to do so. British colonial projects aimed at configuring water 
infrastructure in ways that further enabled the extraction of resources, such as 
improvements to the agricultural water systems to enable the production of cotton and 
sugar, or to facilitate the management of labor, as with the water diversion projects set up 
to feed Ismailia and Suez City for the workers building and maintaining the Suez canal 
(Mitchell 2002). Improved water systems in urban centers like Cairo and Alexandria, 
                                                 
35 See Fernea and Rouchdy 1991; Smith 2006 
36 Jagannathan, N. Vijay, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, and Alexander Kremer. Eds. 2009   
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such as the institution of potable water and wastewater piping systems, also functioned to 
support the colonial government in their seats of power.  Water and wastewater 
infrastructure in Cairo developed as part of colonial processes as cities were connected in 
other locations.37 In the couple of decades following the 1952 Egyptian Revolution that 
ended the Monarchy in Egypt, technological advances in the management of water such 
as the Aswan High Dam were testaments to the viability and prowess of the new nation 
state. Around this time international structures organized around the idea of development 
took shape that were aimed at building the capacity of states characterized as weak to 
provide these greater goods—roads, schools, potable water and wastewater, etc. The 
League of Nations—later the United Nations—and the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and others arose in the post-war period in large part in response to the 
humanitarian and financial turmoil of the time (Sellman 2013). It was a moment that 
expanded the idea of state welfare responsibilities to their own populations, as well as the 
duties of states as global citizens to ensure the welfare of all people by policing the 
behavior of other states to their own populations. These institutions were part of larger 
processes functioning to expand particular types of infrastructure, the aims and 
mechanics of which changed over time. With the Infitah, or open door economic policy, 
that President Anwar Sadat instituted in the early 1970s, water and other infrastructures 
were part of the great promise of the budding nation state, development for the good of 
the population. These were the promises to their populations that the “developing” states 
                                                 
37 The Sanitary Revolution of the 19
th
 century was implicated in colonial projects to manage populations 
and maintain the health of colonial authorities.  See Warwick Anderson’s 2006 Colonial Pathologies: 
American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines for a latter day example of the 
relationship between hygiene and colonialism. See Kamran Asdar Ali’s 2002 Planning the Family in 
Egypt: New Bodies, New Selves, for a look at national and international discourses about bodily regulation 
as they play out in Egypt. 
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were castigated for failing to provide on their own, and needing the financial, technical 
and managerial assistance from “developed” nations to achieve. 
An example of a recent iteration of the development are the United Nations (UN) 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG), a broad-ranging set of social, political, 
economic, and environmental objectives adopted in 2000, which include specific targets 
for the improvement of water and wastewater issues globally.38  By 2015, the UN and its 
component and partner entities have aimed to cut in half the number of people who have 
no access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation services.  Measurement in the 
progress towards these goals falls under the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) between 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) on Water Supply and Sanitation. The JMP website describes an improved 
sanitation situation as one in which there is “hygienic separation of human excreta from 
human contact.”39  This includes within it flushing or pour-to-flush systems of piped 
sewage, septic tanks or pit latrines, improved pit latrines with ventilation or pit latrines 
with slabs, and composting toilets. Despite the relatively low bar set here, this describes 
the top rung of the JMP’s four step Sanitation Ladder, the bottommost rung of which is 
open defecation in fields, forests, and bodies of water. Potable water similarly has a 
ladder, where the gradation of quality goes from Surface Water up to Piped Water on 
Premises (Drinking-water Ladder). Such ladders allow for more accurate estimation and 
comparison across countries, a sharper edge to the evaluative process. Again the notion 
of the state is the scale at which such lack is measured, as we saw earlier with the 
                                                 
38 Other broad topics for the MGDs were elimination of extreme poverty and hunger ,universal primary 
education, gender equality and empowerment of women, reduction in child morality, improvement of 
maternal health, combatting HIV/AID, Malaria and other diseases, environmental sustainability, and 
development of a global partnership for development. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals Accessed March 
8, 2014 
39 http://www.wssinfo.org/introduction/ last accessed March 30, 2014 
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marking of boundaries, the calculations of water availability, food production and 
population growth. The state is also a key scale at which the management of water is 
organized, though it is hardly the only scale in that story. The chapter next turns to the 
state water sector and reforms that have reshaped its constitutive elements.  
WATER SECTOR REFORMS 
The Holding Company for Water and Waste Water (HCWW) was created in 2004 
by presidential decree 135, and restructured the existing regional water and sanitation 
companies into subsidiary entities beneath it.40 Additionally, The Egyptian Water 
Regulatory Agency (EWRA) was established in 2006, as a technical and financial 
regulator for the water and wastewater sector. While the mandate of the HCWW was to 
maintain and operate the water utilities, building the infrastructure itself remained under 
the auspices of three entities; the Cairo and Alexandria Potable Water Organization 
(CAPWO), The New Urban Communities Authority for desert satellite cities, and the 
National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD) for the rest 
of the country.  The aim in the creation of the HCWW was to create a central agency to 
oversee the operations of the subsidiaries, with responsibility for improving equipment 
and training staff. According to a HCWW brochure, as of 2010, there were 23 subsidiary 
companies operating in 25 governorates, serving an estimated 80 million people with 
potable water. The number of paid accounts is significantly less, with only 10 million 
subscriptions for potable water and four million for sanitary drainage. The HCWW, with 
international donor support, has also invested in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
technology, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for monitoring 
water plants, and mobile repair units utilizing TV photography to minimize the need for 
                                                 
40 http://www.hcww.com.eg/en/Content.aspx?ID=1 Last Accessed March 8, 2014 
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drilling.  In addition, water-quality testing laboratories were created in subsidiary 
companies and a central laboratory at HCWW was established as a secondary line of 
quality control. Part of the package of development at this stage has been the acquisition 
and deployment of advanced technology for leak detection in an effort to reduce the 
roughly 30% of water that “disappears” through network loss.  
Water network loss comes either from leaking in pipes or through illegally 
tapping into the system, as residents of Ezba do. The accuracy of HCWW’s water loss 
estimates is unclear, as systems are lacking that calculate the water produced at treatment 
stations and what is received by consumers. Theoretically, water loss is calculated by 
measuring the difference between how much water is produced by a treatment station via 
a meter at its main output, and how much water is received by customers as registered on 
their on-site meters (at their homes, stores, factories, etc.).  Most of the water purification 
stations in Egypt do not have a meter at the main output and most homes do not have 
onsite meters, so calculations are made about how much water was produced based on 
how many hours the pumps were running and what the capacity of each pumps is, though 
that doesn’t establish a basis for estimating how much was received. Foreshadowing 
issues to come in Chapter Four, the HWCC has attempted to address deficiencies in water 
measurement through the manufacture of water meters in Egypt to increase the 
accountability of water usage, and has initiated systems to automate billing for services to 
mitigate long standing problems with the accuracy of bills.  
According to the water and wastewater sector administrators with whom I spoke, 
there are two overarching issues still in need of being addressed: inappropriately low 
tariffs41 and the contradictory issue of overstaffing while lacking trained personnel. As 
                                                 
41 Water tariffs encompass the cost of pumping, treating and distributing water, and can be proportional to 
consumption, rise in cost as consumption increases (IBT), or decrease in cost at consumption increases 
(DBT). 
 46 
we saw earlier in the demographic and agricultural domain, the development story of 
Egypt is one of too many people. During an interview David Osgood, head of the 
Chemonics International office in Cairo, a development company working under the 
auspices of USAID, articulated the dual problem perspective well:  
  
By 2004 these fourteen organizations were still not meeting operating costs, and 
had additionally accumulated a deficit of about 7.6 billion Egyptian pounds, and 
debt of 7.3 billion Egyptian pounds. Primarily because nobody was accountable 
for financial performance and tariffs were low, and, because they reported to the 
governors, they were overstaffed because they became sort of a place where 
governors could send people for employment. So those fourteen companies had a 
combined staff of 74,000. Like a small town. So 2004, huge problem because the 
Ministry of Finance was holding the bag, because this stuff had to be accounted 
for, they couldn’t just ignore it. It was getting so big that it couldn’t be ignored 
any longer. The stars were aligned and everyone understood that something had to 
be done and so, we were providing assistance through the USAID project at that 
particular time and we were able to get presidential decrees issued forming the 
Holding Company and forming the water sector regulator [EWRA]. And then 
transferring those fourteen organizations into subsidiaries of the Holding 
Company. 
The fourteen regional water and wastewater companies that he is referring to here were 
those created subsequent to the 1981 water sector reforms, which themselves had been an 
attempt to consolidate and improve on a patchwork of projects built with development 
funds coming in after Sadat’s open-door policy was established in the 1970s. Between 
1975 and 1989, $1.5 billion in US economic assistance funds were paid to US 
engineering and construction corporations to build drinking water plants and sewage 
collection networks in Egypt, which accounted for some 23 percent of the total USAID 
development (nonmilitary) funds designated to Egypt (Mitchell 2002:238-239). It was 
spent primarily, though not exclusively, in Cairo and Alexandria, building on the two 
oldest water companies which had been private entities established in the 19th century 
and then nationalized in 1954 by President Nasser. Outside of these cities, there was a 
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mixture of municipal and governorate systems, with potable water and wastewater 
systems run by separate entities.  A key development concern then, as now, was that 
these entities did not pull in enough rent to pay for their operation costs, much less for 
capital investment, so the Ministry of Finance subsidized the operating costs while 
looking elsewhere for infrastructure.    
 
Osgood: And you will see, except for places—and I’m just going, and I haven’t 
read this year’s [report], but I’m just going by-- except for places like Saudi 
Arabia where they just don’t charge people for water, or Kuwait, Cairo is almost 
as low as it gets in terms of tariffs. And it’s just a political, the government just 
doesn’t have the political will to increase because there is a sense here that water 
is a gift from God and you shouldn’t charge them for it. And so, plus there is still 
sort of remnants here of socialism from the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and so 
people feel the government should take care of this and this is something that 
government should take care of and I shouldn’t have to pay for it. So, you know, 
they fight those fixed ideas in people’s minds. 
 
Farmer: Who is fighting those ideas? 
 
Osgood: The government. 
 
Farmer: The government is working to try to change people’s opinions about- 
 
Osgood: No, they are not really working, but they are very influenced by that. It’s 
a real irony here, and I suppose that it’s in other places too, we don’t really have a 
democratic system here although they have elections. But they pay a lot of 
attention to what they think the people think, okay?  Because there is always the 
threat of riots here. It doesn’t happen very often but every once in a while it 
happens. They raised the price of bread 20 years ago and it really set off a big 
problem. They are conscious of those kinds of things. 
“Those kinds of things” being resistance by the population in great enough 
numbers to put the political and economic status quo into question. This is part of the 
political society in Egypt, using Chatterjee’s (2004) terms, a realm within which the 
potential for extra-state violence makes particular kinds of sense. It is not ballot-box 
democracy, a hollowed out export at any rate, but the potential for counter violence that 
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puts the lie of the legitimacy of violence by state security forces on display. As discussed 
in the introduction, less than a year after this conversation, “those kinds of things” took 
over Tahrir square for the first of several reversals in the following three years. But 
during this conversation, that threat was spectral. More immediately of concern were the 
small ways in which calculations about how far was too far, how much was enough were 
still the point of discussion. When I asked Mr. Osgood how the tariffs were calculated, he 
replied: 
 
It’s what people are expected to pay, and at this point it’s not really based on 
anything except somebody’s judgment of what people are willing to pay. So the 
current tariffs, in 2004 there were two organizations that were meeting their costs, 
and that was the Alexandria water company and the Beheira water company. Due 
to reforms by the Holding Company two years later there were eight companies 
meeting their costs. Not because the tariffs were going up, but because they were 
doing a better job of controlling their costs. There is just so much you can do with 
costs, plus salaries automatically go up every year. I’m not sure, because we don’t 
work with the Holding Company, I’m not sure what the most recent data shows. 
But my guess is that most recent data would show that things are getting worse 
because tariffs aren’t changing but costs are going up, costs they just can’t do 
anything about. So what the Holding Company has done is allowing companies to 
make—the sacred part of the tariff schedule is the domestic. The way that the 
tariffs are structured is that anyone who consumes less than 10 cubic meters a 
month pays one amount per cubic meter. Then between 20 and 30, consumption 
between 20-30 cubic meters a month would be another rate, then above 30 they 
pay another rate. So for sure, that lowest category is absolutely sacred. Nobody is 
going to be able to raise that. In most cases the other two classifications are 
untouchable also, but there have been some situations where those have been 
raised in a kind of stealth manner. They never announce it. People just get a bill 
and they say, why is my bill so much higher this month than it was last month? 
This is an issue that I will return to in Chapter Four, as the contention over water bills 
was a theme in many conversations with people in Ezba. They wondered how the bill was 
calculated and why it varied so greatly from month to month.  
 
Osgood: But they also have classifications for industrial, commercial concerns, 
touristic, government and so the companies have latitude to make changes in 
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those areas. Unannounced. They never come out—I don’t know if you’ve ever 
looked at your utility bill in the United States, every once in a while you’ll get a 
schedule of the rates, and if there is an increase you’ll get a little announcement 
with your bill that we got authorization to raise the rates and they’ll give the 
reasons that they’ve raised the rates and generally they’ll be public hearings on 
those kinds of things and consumers will have a chance to give their side of the 
story. But that doesn’t happen here.  
Contention over the cost of state-run water services was something that everyone 
in an official capacity in the water sector with whom I spoke was concerned about—how 
can the value of the service itself be impressed on the public? In an interview with a 
USAID staff person working on the water sector, Atif Abdel Sayed, he returned 
repeatedly to the comparison between the communication sector and the water sector in 
people’s willingness to pay. Like the water sector, the communication sector had also 
undergone restructuring to consolidate operations and regulation, and services had 
dramatically improved. Unlike the communication sector, however, people are reluctant 
to pay for water. People in Ezba for example, he told me, would willingly pay 100 LE a 
month for their phone and use it for pleasure—chatting with relatives, buying ringtones, 
sending ringtones to friends. This is a cost that people willingly pay, but paying for water 
is a hard sell. The cultural conception of water as a gift from the divine got in the way of 
being able to “appropriately” charge for water services. “Yes,” Mr. Abdel Sayeed said, 
“God did give you water, but not to your home.”  
This binary that Mr. Abdel Sayeed set up, that of a frivolous use of money done 
gladly and stinginess in use of money for a fundamental service misses, I think, the 
calculation of benefit and responsibility that people have made. Suggesting that people in 
Ezba saw it as a trade between these two things is doubtful, but it’s a fruitful comparison 
nonetheless. The provision of water is seen by people in Ezba as a responsibility that the 
state has towards its citizens—if they are recognized as full citizens, they should also be 
accorded access. Connecting with others via phone is part of maintaining networks of 
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love, reciprocity, and possibility, as Simone (2004) shows us, that offers hope of help 
when an emergency surgery looms, or a chance at a job in a far flung city that a friend of 
a friend has heard about. The time and money spent connecting with others is neither 
frivolous nor entirely instrumental, but instead fundamental to connected lives. And when 
there is no money, there is no cell phone credit, and landlines—where they exist—will be 
shut off for nonpayment. But how is one to go without water when there is no money to 
pay?   
Following the dual problem narrative about the water sector, the other piece of the 
puzzle is the problem of too many people. According to both Atif Abdel Sayed and David 
Osgood, getting the staff size of the water companies down to size is a primary objective. 
It is not, however, an easy one. Mr. Abdel Sayeed said that it was incumbent on the 
HCWW to reduce staff before it can increase tariffs, so that the costs passed on to the 
consumer are the optimized operations costs. Mr. Osgood thought that major strides had 
been made in reducing operating costs everywhere but in staffing patterns, and that this 
was an entrenched problem: 
The Holding Company has made some good strides on the cost side, in terms of 
 rationalizing costs, achieving better efficiencies. But there is only so far they can  
 go on that. And so they are still plagued with low tariffs and in Egypt, you don’t 
 fire people. You can’t fire people. So, they occasionally talk about a hiring freeze, 
 but nobody ever sustains a hiring freeze because they can’t fire people. When they 
 have a nonperformer, they just shuttle them over to the side and they hire people 
 to do the work that the nonperformers are supposed to be doing. But the 
 nonperformers are still in the company and still get paid. I mean, that’s the 
 management methodology here. So, there are still a number of problems.  
 
Keying in on the word nonperformer here, Mr. Osgood is alluding to another part of the 
problem, that of questions around water quality stemming from lack of technical 
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expertise and sufficient training among staff of regional water companies and water 
pumping and purification stations, as well as staff of wastewater treatment stations.  
WATER QUALITY 
In addition to the sheer number of people on the payroll, there are questions about the 
capability of those working to meet standards for quality production. One of the issues 
stemming from the lack of trained staff is water quality, particularly handling of chlorine 
in the water purification process. This is something that Chemonics is working to address 
through a certification program.   
Osgood: In the United States you can’t manage a treatment plant unless you are 
 certified and certification takes place at the state level. Every state has its own 
 certification. So, we’re trying to get a similar type of certification program 
 established here in Egypt. 
 
Farmer: To ensure that all sanitation or water— 
 
Osgood: Both, are managed by people who meet a set of core competences. 
 
Farmer: Has that been a challenge? Has that been something that hasn’t been… 
 
Osgood: Well, do you mean has it been a challenge getting it done? 
 
Farmer: Have the quality of the water and sewage treatment not been up to par? 
 Has there been concern there? Or was it just— 
 
Osgood: Well, yeah, I don’t think that it’s assumed that a certification program 
 will automatically –it’s not the only factor.  
 
Farmer: Right 
 
Osgood: On water quality, there is almost one serious incident a year, in terms of 
water, where people get sick and die someplace. The last one was, I’m not exactly 
sure, but just north of Cairo. The year before it was in Dakahlia, in Mansoura, in 
an area outside of Mansoura, where the sewage somehow managed to 
contaminate water supplies. So water quality continues to be an issue. You know, 
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in the last project when we were working with the Holding Company and working 
directly with water or the treatment plants, we were doing assessment, there were 
some reasons to be concerned, in some cases. With the quality of the treatment, 
but probably overall it’s okay, but you will find instances when it’s not okay.  
Indeed, there are often scandals about the quality of drinking water. In 2010, 
drinking water from the Abu Ali water purification station in Kafr Magar, a village in the 
delta governorate of Kafr al-Sheikh, was declared unfit for human consumption (El 
Sherif 2010).  Testing revealed high concentrations of ammonia and there were reports of 
the spread of red worms and higher-than-normal algae concentrations.  Despite long-
running complaints by residents of the area about the smell and visible pollution, and 
reports from health authorities in Dessouq from October – December 2009 that the water 
was unfit for human consumption, no action was taken until a number of people who had 
become ill filed a complaint with the Dessouq Public Prosecution. It was a technical team 
created by the Dessouq Public Prosecution that carried out the water quality tests and 
made the declaration. Additionally, the Hisham Mubarak Law Center (HMLC) and the 
Association for Health & Environmental Development (AHED) sent a team to 
investigate.  Shaimaa Ezzat Abdel Salam, a doctor in the village, identified contaminated 
drinking water as the cause of severe intestinal complaints in young children she had 
seen.  A representative of the AHED accused the Dessouq Public Prosecution of 
intentional intimidation in their treatment of Dr. Shaimaa Ezzat Abdel Salam; Dr. Salam 
was later penalized for missing work on the day that she delivered the requested reports 
about the cases of water-related illness she witnessed.    
Nor have the regimes since the January 25 revolution been exempt from water 
contamination scandals. In August of 2012, some 1,500 residents of the village of Sansaft 
in the Monufia Governorate became very ill from contaminated drinking water from their 
home taps (Abdel-Baky 2012). Reportedly, the treatment of the water with chlorine did 
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not take place and water was simply pumped through the system due to staff turnover at 
the state water purification station. The state station was one of two water purification 
stations in Sansaft, the other station being an unlicensed one created as charity by 
wealthy families in the area. According to some news reports, most people in the village 
relied primarily on the charity water station because of long-term issues with the quality 
of water from the state-run operation, but the charity water station closed temporarily for 
the Eid holiday.  The state run station had not conducted the mandatory tests in several 
years, despite the requirement to test the water every 15 days. After the crisis, water 
quality testing showed the presence of salmonella and e. coli microbes, along with high 
concentrations of heavy metals including iron and manganese. Additional coverage of the 
issue resulted from the response of the villagers, who held the health minister and 
Governor of Monufia hostage for a brief period in the Menouf city hospital. Then 
President Mohamed Morsi’s administration established a crisis management team to deal 
with the issue, and the head of the station and some of his aides were held by authorities. 
President Morsi additionally created a new ministry, the Ministry of Water Supply and 
Sanitation Facilities as an oversight entity to manage the various entities that comprise 
the water and wastewater sector in Egypt.  
 In addition to filtration for floating elements, chlorination is the primary method 
of treating drinking water for living organisms, and the balance of chemicals is something 
that people in Ezba often complained about—from the smell and taste of the water, to 
liver and kidney problems from prolonged consumption of highly chlorinated water. It 
was a corollary, according to David Osgood, of the poorly trained staff at the water 
purification stations. During our discussion, Mr. Osgood said: 
 
Osgood: And when you open the tap, you can probably smell the chlorine.  
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Farmer: Yes 
 
Osgood: So you know that it’s there. Years ago, I asked a guy-this was before I 
was working in water-and I asked him “Is the water safe?” And he said, “Well, 
they chlorinate it enough that they probably kill everything.” Now, these days you 
are hearing talk about chlorine being a carcinogen, so you are not exactly sure 
what the situation is. For instance, you know the Britta filters from the United 
States, so I brought one of those and I—it’s a carbon filter  and I’m not sure 
how—I’ve operated on faith, I guess, that the filter is taking care of any problems. 
 
Farmer: We also use a filter in our house, because the bottled water- 
 
Osgood: Well, we used to drink bottled water all the time, of course, but you 
 never know where the bottled water comes from either, so, I don’t know. 
Water quality was something that interested everyone with whom I spoke about 
my research in Ezba, with a lot of conjecture about just what could be found in the water 
there. Following up on an interest in thinking through the many biological entities that 
converge around water in urban environments, and more a prosaic interest in being able 
to practically respond to the difficulties facing contacts in Ezba, I tried to find a way to 
get water quality testing done on water from faucets and water from standing pools and 
puddles in the area. My quest was ultimately unsuccessful as my original plan to work 
through Cairo University fell through and I was not able to make another arrangement in 
time. The process of trying to test the water, however, was instructive in and of itself. At 
Cairo University I had a contact through my Fulbright affiliation. Dr. Mubbashir was a 
considerate and intellectually generous research mentor while I was in the country, and 
on one of my visits to his office at the University we discussed the possibility of testing.   
 
Farmer: I was also thinking about doing water testing, some on water puddles 
 and— 
 
Dr. Mubbashir: You mean the puddles on the street? 
 
Farmer: Well, yes, because people are always complaining about water making 
 them sick so I wanted to see what was in it—from chlorine to- 
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Dr. Mubbashir: No, that wouldn’t work. You’d have everything in there. You’d 
 have algae, small animals, insects, worms, bacteria, fungi, parasites. Look, this is 
 Cairo University, best of the best, and you’d have to send the water to six 
 different departments to get tests done on everything in there. It just wouldn’t 
 work. Without even looking I could give you a list of what would be in there.  
 Any standing water will have these things. Here, even in Cairo University, we had 
 a water leak and it left puddles. Within a couple of days, with the water in the sun, 
 the green stuff which we call algae grew on top, then all of the secondary things 
 come in, all of the other stuff eat the algae and live in the puddle. There’s no point 
 in testing that water. 
A few colleagues entered his office and we were introduced. Dr. Mubbashir 
appeared to be happy to be able to show off his Fulbright affiliation, and his mentorship 
of an American doctoral student.  As the colleagues were both involved in environmental 
research, they started asking questions about my project. One asked me how I had chosen 
Ezba. I told him that I had done research on water elsewhere through a fellowship and 
had enjoyed it, then looked for a place in Cairo to do similar research. A friend working 
near Ezba told me about their water problems and sent me articles on the blue jerkin 
demonstrations, so I had gone there to check it out. 
 
Visiting Colleague: That’s very good, so you are the source of your own 
 information on Ezba. 
 
Farmer: Have you been?  
 
Visiting Colleague: Me? No! I’ve only heard about it! 
 
Farmer: What have you heard? 
 
Visiting Colleague: I’ve heard that there are lots of, lots of, lots of (making a 
 piano playing gesture  with his hands.) 
 
Taking pity on my confused look, Dr. Mubbashir translated the gesture, while 
copying the motion with his hands, saying that it meant that that there are lots of small 
animals in Ezba. They all laughed. He told them that he tried on a previous visit to assign 
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one of his Egyptian graduate students to accompany me to Ezba, chosen as much for his 
imposing physical stature as his knowledge of environmental science. After the student 
left his office, the student had called a friend who was a police officer and was advised 
not to go if he could get out of it. “But,” Dr. Mubbashir related, “I told him, she’s from 
America and she’s not afraid to go and you as an Egyptian are afraid?” To which his 
colleague expressed his agreement with the student’s reluctance to venture into Ezba, 
“Yes, as an Egyptian I’ve heard about it but never been there.  I’m surprised that you 
would go on your own.” The topic turned to issues of nutrition, and the gender unequal 
ways that nutrition is distributed within families. Another colleague told me that he had 
heard that boys were given more protein and the girls more carbohydrates to make them 
fat and attractive to future husbands. This, he assured me, was the mother thinking long-
term about how to get her daughters to be attractive to potential husbands, while getting 
the sons to be “strong and do important things.”  After they left, Dr. Mubbashir and I 
returned to the idea of testing water in Ezba, discussing the value of knowing more about 
water collected from kitchen taps. He agreed to provide water collection kits, which I 
picked up on a later visit, and gave me instructions on how to collect samples. I took the 
collection bottles to Ezba and asked if contacts in the area were willing to let me test the 
water from their homes. Um Amina agreed to let me test the water from her kitchen 
faucet and was very interested in finding out the results as her children were often ill. 
When I visited to deliver the water testing bottle, she told me, “Oh this will be useful for 
your research!” For the last couple of weeks, while they were putting in the sewage pipes 
along Um Nadia street, the water had been turned off to their area for two to four days at 
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a time, then was turned back on for a day or so. When the water returned, it stunk of 
sewage for the first half of a day and they had to just let the water faucets run until the 
water seemed to them to be potable again.  
Um Amina: We were very lucky on this street, as half the street follows [is 
 connected by pipes to] Um Nadia and the other half from up by the church, so 
 only half the street was without water. People who had been cut off just took 
 water from their neighbors. I just connected a hose to the house next to me 
 and was able to get water without a problem. But the people further down the 
 street, it was very hard for them as they had to get jerkins and carry their water. 
 And it lasted for three days! 
 
Despite this conversation, and many others where the scent of sewage was said to 
be emanating from water taps, at least sometimes, illness wasn’t always attributed to 
water quality problems. I told her that I was being treated for an ameba. 
Um Amina: Like worms? 
 
Farmer:  Something like that. 
 
Um Amina: The kids suffer from that. It’s so frustrating. I’ve taken them to be 
 treated, but it just comes back.” 
 
Farmer:  Could it be from the water? 
 
Um Amina: Yes, it could be from anything. They eat out, whatever. Where did 
 yours come from? 
 
Farmer: I don’t know. 
 
Um Amina: Do you eat in restaurants? 
 
Farmer: Not a lot. Do you think that your kids got it from restaurants? 
 
Um Amina: Maybe. When one gets worms they all have it, from washing clothes 
 together, from using the same toilet. It makes me very mad. 
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Um Amina told me that she had just taken her four children to have complete 
medical checkups because they seemed so physically weak. The day prior she had asked 
her daughter to clean the stairs, which she had done lightly, then said that she was really 
exhausted. The doctor told her that the three younger children had worms. All the kids 
have to take medicine though, as wisdom is that if one has it they all have it. She showed 
me the pictures on the box of medicine and they were frightening. Four different kinds of 
worms were shown on the front cover and they all looked fierce and disturbing, with lots 
of teeth. Um Amina laughed at my horrified reaction. She’d taken the stuff from a huge 
bag of pills that she’d gotten for the kids, and then took out liquid vitamins that she had 
been given to help their health improve. She had to physically force the kids to take the 
vitamins, running after them and holding their mouths open like they were infants. As 
they were headed out, they demanded money so that they could buy the omnipresent 
goodies—ice cream, potato chips, lib [melon seeds]. She told them not to buy these 
things, as they were forbidden by the doctor as being what was giving them worms.  
 Eldest Daughter: Okay, I’ll just buy the white lib, they don’t have worms. 
Um Amina: No, the doctor said no lib. 
 Youngest Son:  I’m going to get ice cream! 
 Um Amina: No, don’t buy any of it [junk food]! 
Youngest Son: I’ll just buy chips! 
With that, her youngest son took the money that he’d been given for successfully 
completing his exams and bought a bag of potato chips from a small snack store down the 
street. Um Amina sent the eldest daughter out to take the chips away from him and give 
 59 
them back to the store. They kept going back and forth and she really had to argue with 
the kids to keep them from buying the things that the doctor said would give them worms 
again. I found it surprising that, in the context of repeated exposure to sewage in tap 
water, food was identified as the source of contamination. However, pulling apart the 
strands of causality for illness is not always easy, and there are many vectors for exposure 
to parasites and diseases, as well as toxins. As is clear from these encounters, the impacts 
of water systems are felt on bodies that are implicated in multiple other systems in the 
city, including food preparation and distribution, and medical care. 
Through situating the water sector in the context of governance in Egypt, this 
chapter examined the ways in which water is collected, cleaned, distributed, valued, and 
managed and the different systems of control and social relations that manage these 
currents. Understanding the way in which the surface, ground and embedded water are 
measured and managed in Egypt helps to frame the relationship between water and the 
construction of the Egyptian state. Following the thread of the literature questioning the 
composition of the state as such, this chapter examines the scale of the state as it is used 
in discussions about water and population in Egypt.  Chatterjee (1998, 2004), Appadurai 
(1994, 2002), Ferguson and Gupta (2002) and Trouillot (2001) offer readings of the 
“state” that focus on the community as a locus for alternative theorizations of life and 
survival. These theorizations are significant for understanding Ezbet Khairallah as they 
provide a framework within which to analyze the ways that people survive, the 
consequential worlds that they construct, in the increasingly dire economic, political and 
ecological conditions of urban poor neighborhoods of Cairo. Understanding evaluations 
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of water quality and how these interact with other water systems is an important piece of 
this puzzle. State or state-like institutions that manage water and wastewater are links in 
the chain that shape the circumstances within which people create lives, creating 
vernacular worlds, and connects them to other subjects in their associations throughout 
the city of Cairo.  The next chapter provides a closer look at the history and context of 
Ezbet Khairallah.  
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Chapter 2: Locating Ezbet Khairallah 
GETTING THERE: STORIES OF ENTRY 
Ezbet Khairallah, also known as Ezba, is only a few miles from downtown Cairo 
as the crow flies. Crows do fly to Ezba, but for human residents and visitors the journey 
to reach Ezba is a tiresome and difficult one. If you are lucky enough to be coming in a 
personal car, the easiest way to enter Ezba is via Salah Salem street, a long arterial street 
running through much of old Cairo.  From Salah Salem, you take a smaller street right by 
the much more well-known area of al-Basateen. On your right you'll pass a small spring-
fed lake, an eyen that has become so polluted with waste-water runoff that it no longer 
serves any purpose other than occasionally flooding the adjacent roadway. Ezbet 
Khairallah is hemmed by old places, by the remnants of the city of Fostat, which the first 
settlers of the Islamic conquest built, and al-Basateen, which is housing that was built in, 
on and around the mausoleums of one of the city’s graveyards. It is built upwards along a 
hill whose bedrock is a porous limestone. For many years, the area was used as a dump, 
evidence of which can be seen as layers of waste that appear as geological strata along 
the sides of great trenches opened by backhoes to put in sewage pipes. 
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Figure 2: Image of the Cairo, Egypt from Google Earth; locations added by author and 
are not exact. Image captured on March 29, 2014. 
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You can also enter Ezba on these roads via a twenty-minute bus ride from the al-
Malek al-Saleh metro station. These old white government buses are the only form of 
official transportation that passes through the area. The first time I rode this bus to Ezba 
alone, we were stopped by a group of policemen at the benzima, a gas station that serves 
as a major landmark when people give directions to and from Ezba. They came on board 
and asked who was heading to Ezba, then took a couple of young men off the bus to 
question them about circulating illegal goods. After about ten minutes, the young men 
were released and allowed to return to the bus, but without the bags of clothing they had 
been carrying. Other than the driver, who argued with the police to let the bus proceed 
without them, no one on the bus said anything. Young men from Ezba are regarded with 
suspicion not only by the police, but also by residents of the nearby areas of Basateen, 
Abu Ashraf, and Dar al-Salam, despite their own relative poverty. Part of this story of 
prejudice is Ezba's history as a squatter settlement and reputation as a refuge for 
lawlessness, which lingers among those living nearby. More than that, though, moments 
like these, when representatives of state security institutions engage with people, are 
tense with potential threat. Speaking up may mean that one becomes a target, and the 
possible consequences of being noticed could be anything from the confiscation of 
meager goods obtained for resale in the vast informal sector, to beatings or detention, as 
security personnel operate largely outside of systems of accountability. Better not to be 
noticed, if possible, but simply heading to Ezba increased these young men's visibility. 
Those without the wealth or connections (wasta) to provide specialized protection are 
subject to coercive activities of a variety of state actors. These are not limited to the 
pantheon of security services in Egypt, but extend into mundane interactions with bill 
collectors and utility repairmen. Had these young men actually been carrying anything 
illegal, it is unlikely that they would have been allowed to return to the bus. As the goods 
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were confiscated, it is more likely that they were simply taken as an added layer of tax on 
the poor.  
Returning to our journey into Ezba, the bus drives by the eyen and prepares to 
turn right into the main entrance of Ezba, where it passes by a lushly green walled 
compound that serves as the stables and training yard for the Egyptian Calvary. Turning 
up this road, the bus rocks and shakes at it bumps its way down a narrow lane, hitting 
potholes and sliding in the thick pools of sewage fed mud. The destination is a bank of 
microbuses that lead from Ezba to many places in the city – to Basateen, Sayeda Aesha, 
Khalifa. The bus now continues its path closer to the rough brick and cement buildings of 
the settlement. Here, frames of old cars, stripped and abandoned, punctuate burning piles 
of garbage, shade stray dogs, and offer a perch for a variety of birds. All of these things 
need explanation, as the birds and garbage and dogs and looming husks of cars have 
history, reasons for living on the borders of Ezbet Khairallah. But we will leave those 
stories where they are for now, and return to them when it’s time to take a quiet 
accounting. First, we will continue to map the ingress and egress of Ezba, the winding 
and bumpy paths that can take you in or take you out, if you have reason to visit. 
Once I’d become more familiar with Ezba and after my friends in the area had 
explained to me that riding four stops from my apartment in Hadayek al-Maadi42  to al-
Malek al-Saleh was inefficient, I came to Ezba from the Dar al-Salam metro station, 
which is only one stop away from my own stop. From the very busy Dar al-Salam metro 
stop, in a metro system that serves some four million passengers a day,43 the next step is 
to walk down the bustling commercial roads of the Dar El Salam market. Clothing stores, 
                                                 
42 Hadayek al-Maddi translates at the Gardens of Maadi, a misnomer in this day and age when it has 
become a densely packed working class neighborhood 
43 http://cairometro.gov.eg/HomePage.aspx. Accessed February 1, 2014 
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dry goods stores, shops full of accessories, baby clothing, goods for holidays and baby 
showers crowd the space. Skin-tight sweaters and long abaya compete for attention 
hanging five or more feet above head level, on racks and display mannequins jutting out 
into the path. In between the stalls, independent vendors with a cart or basket or simply a 
cardboard box sell everything from jackets to homemade cheese to cut vegetables. For 
busy working women who are attempting to balance work lives and the responsibilities of 
home and children, the few extra pounds that you would spend on purchasing your 
vegetables already cut, peeled, shelled or emptied for stuffing may be worth it, but tight 
budgets only extend so far. The pace of the market is quiet in the morning as vendors 
slowly open around 12 or 1pm, busy and full in the evening until late hours. Some 
mornings, a long line of women with small children from surrounding areas can be seen 
waiting for their turn at a social security or charity office, chatting and scolding and 
eating lib. At night, small clusters walk slowly through the lanes to window shop or 
bargain for new school clothing or items for a trousseau, much to the frustration of the 
men (and some women) commuting through the area, walking quickly and maneuvering 
between crates, displays and shoppers, anxious to get somewhere else.  
At the end of the shopping lanes are lines of micro buses, small vans which have 
been modified to fit as many passengers into their cramped confines as possible, with 
little regard for leg room or ease of access. As much as possible, women sit next to 
women, men with men, children on laps and grocery bags full of tomatoes or t-shirts at 
their feet. People push hard to get into the microbus first when it’s a busy day, crowding 
around the door to hop in even as the driver shifts the bus back and forth to park. On 
slower days or times, one goes to the first microbus in the line and finds the first available 
seat. Once the microbus is full and gets in motion, people hand their half-pound to 
whomever in the bus has temporarily assumed the role of bursar, and I keep a sharp eye 
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out for Abu Ashraf , calling “ala gamb hina [on the side here],” to be let down. From 
then, it’s a dangerous hop across al-Fayoumy street to walk the length of the Abu Ashraf 
market area. Near the end of my fieldwork period, there were mid-sized buses that took 
off from the inner section of the Abu Ashraf market, past the blockade posed by large 
areas cordoned off for sewage stations, which passed through Ezba. The busses had 
stopped entering the area when the sewage system installation began in the lower areas of 
Ezba. The whole process from metro stop to the underpass below the ring road entering 
into Ezba could take anywhere between 20 to 40 minutes.  
Coming from the metro line, the easiest way by far into and out of Ezba was 
through the al-Zahraa metro station, only one stop past Dar al-Salam. From this metro 
station, there were two methods to enter the area, the more comfortable being the 
shambling hulks of service taxis that seat four passengers, three across the back bench 
and one in the front passenger seat. Without license plates or other forms of government 
registration, these services work off the books.  
 
 
Figure 3: Image of the cars at the top of the hill coming in to Ezbet Khairallah from 
the Zahraa metro station. Image by author, 2010. 
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Like Franken cars, they are the remnants of 1950s Fiats with fixes from whatever will 
work; in many, the ignition is simply two wires to be touched together to start the engine, 
and doors are held closed by bent pieces of steel rebar. The taxis make it up the steep 
incline into Ezba b-l-‘afya [barely/by force], and it is hard to resist the urge to lean 
forward to help the car climb the hill. The privilege of having a seat and only waiting for 
three other passengers, however, is worth the one pound price. 
 The less comfortable option from the al-Zahraa station is via a perch in the open 
back of pickup trucks, cheaper by half a pound, but it requires a hike from the metro 
station to the mosque at the bottom of the hill leading into Ezba. In these pickup trucks, 
wooden benches have been installed along the sides of the bed, and one simply climbs on 
and hopes for a perch closer to the cabin. When school lets out, children pile several deep 
onto the back bumper, holding onto the tailgate, benches, or each other for the short, 
steep ride up the hill.  
The many difficulties of entering Ezba demonstrate some of the challenges facing 
residents of this area. While Ezba is situated relatively close to the center of Cairo, Tahrir 
Square, it is very cut off from most of the resources connecting the city together as a 
whole. Infrastructurally and socially, Ezbet Khairallah is marked off from the city and 
from adjacent neighborhoods. It lacks paved roads, formal transportation and, until 
recently, a sewage system. The areas around Ezba are also quite poor, but having been 
around for a longer time, they are more integrated into the network of the city.  Reading 
the physical landscape of the city provides insight into the social histories of Cairenes, 
relations of power and possibility sedimented into roads that do or don’t connect, spaces 
that are laid out on grid systems or follow other logics of order. A great deal has been 
written about Cairo and its denizens, investigating how people manage or get by in one of 
the largest cities in the world.  
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URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN CAIRO 
Cairo is an old and storied city, having first been settled by the Fatimids in 969 
AD. What is now considered Greater Cairo has in fact absorbed the earlier capital cities 
of Memphis, Giza, and Fostat (Abu-Lughod, J. 1971). Fostat is very close to Ezba and the 
proximity of the two areas has left lasting impressions on both (see Chapter Three on 
sewage spillage).  Much of this vertical and horizontal expansion of the city has been in 
the form of unplanned areas, al-manatiq al-gheir mukhattata, more commonly referred to 
as ashwa’iyyat, slums or informal areas.  In terms of urban planning, informal areas are 
distinguished by building patterns such as “small building footprints, 100 percent plot 
coverage and little or no allocation for public open space or social facilities” (Sims 2010: 
62).   
 
 
Figure 4: Image of wood recycling workshops in Ezba, with the red brick and cement 
style of most of the building in the area visible. Image by author, 2010. 
 69 
There remains a stigma attached to living in locations referred to as ashway’i and 
some locations such as Ezbet Khairallah suffer the infamy of being marked out as 
particularly dangerous.  While attempting to get a monthly metro pass between my home 
and al-Zahraa, I was informed by the ticket saleswoman that the people of Ezba would 
kill me. The irony of the ashway’i stigma is that a sizable majority of Cairenes actually 
live in locations that would fall into that category. As of 2000, it was estimated that some 
sixty two percent of Cairo’s population lived in such areas (Sims 2010: 69).  
In the 20th century, there was a boom in informal settlement in Cairo, starting 
after the Second World War when people were attracted from the countryside by the 
growing industries in the city (Kipper 2006).  Formal housing stock was in short supply 
due to rent controls, and strict regulations on land subdivision and urban development 
instituted largely in the 1940s (Sims 2010: 46). In that period, the rural migrants largely 
settled into established neighborhoods in Cairo, and then branched out later to buy plots 
of land for building once they had amassed sufficient capital. The expansion of informal 
housing during this time primarily took place on agricultural land around villages located 
on the outskirts of Cairo (2010).  Such land was attractive not only for its proximity to the 
urban center and lower price, but also because agricultural land in villages near Cairo has 
been held primarily in small parcels of freehold property, and  is easily subdivided into 
building plots. Lingering impacts of this history can be seen in the conversion of 
irrigation channels between fields into roads between buildings, as pathways for water in 
an earlier iteration of land use become pathways for people in informal settlements (Sims 
2010:113).  
The state undertook a number of projects to create subsidized public housing, 
primarily for the lower-income classes through the course of the 1950s and 60s, and later 
added upmarket housing that often was let out to government officials and military 
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officers (2010: 50-51). Such housing privileges (with access to newer and more luxurious 
units) are among the perks that the military establishment in Egypt is anxious to maintain 
in the “post-revolutionary moment” since 2011. The public housing was almost 
exclusively under rent laws that granted tenure in perpetuity as long was rent was paid 
(2010). 
Later waves of migration, particularly during the 1970 and 80s, continued the 
expansion of housing on what was agricultural land, despite country-wide legislation 
aiming to preserve farm land. In addition, this period saw the development of many new 
areas on what was considered state land, primarily desert land but also some state-
claimed agricultural land (Singerman 2009). This coincided with then-President Anwar 
Sadat's Infitah, or open door policy, which reversed earlier moves by President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser to redistribute land holdings nationally. In the mid-1970s, during the time 
when President Sadat began a program to expand housing into the desert areas 
surrounding Cairo, the existing urban poor began to be channeled into new locations. 
These policies had the effect of breaking up old neighborhoods and creating new spaces 
of poverty on the outskirts of the city. Farha Ghannam (2002) discusses the discourses of 
modernity and civilization that were utilized by President Sadat in his attempts to remake 
the city of Cairo into an urban metropolis that was inviting to tourists and international 
capital (2002: 2). Through such new spatial divisions, they aimed to revitalize the urban 
sphere, but also to normalize and discipline the poor into becoming productive members 
of the nation.  However, the real political lessons of such areas were far more about the 
costs of being recognized by state entities, where being acknowledged means to be 
constituted as a problem to be solved. The flip side of this cunning of recognition 
(Povinelli 2002) has been the disconnect between state policies and the interests and 
actions of bureaucrats interacting with the public; the gap between these two poles is 
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littered with the petty bribes extorted from the poor to look the other way on illegal but 
ubiquitous small scale building projects. Such was the case in the wake of two decrees in 
1996 which promised harsh punishments through military courts for any new building on 
agricultural land or urban construction without appropriate permits (Sims 2010: 68).  The 
decrees created a short lull in the expansion of informal areas as fear of substantial 
repercussions kept people from building. However, the system soon righted itself with 
higher bribes being requested for the favor of government ist’bat [pretending not to 
know] (2010). The building of informal housing has continued at a rapid pace, propelled 
in part by the increase in migration to the gulf countries for work in the oil fields and 
construction which provided the necessary capital for many more lower income 
Egyptians to build the foundations for multi-story family buildings.   
Agnes Deboulet (2009) discusses the relative positioning of the “informal” areas 
of Dar al-Salam and Establ Antar. Dar al-Salam, Deboulet argues, is infralegal, having 
been built without proper permits and despite laws prohibiting building on agricultural 
land, but having been purchased from the landowning farmers and having long been 
connected to state utility services and populated by lower middle class families. Establ 
Antar, which is located along the ridge of the Fostat Plateau on which Ezbet Kherallah 
also sits, is an informal area in more entrenched ways. Having been built on state-owned 
desert land by people coming largely from poor rural areas in Upper Egypt and primarily 
employed in the informal sector -- and largely lacking services from the state -- Establ 
Antar is marked as significantly more dangerous. The distinction between the two areas is 
clear at the local level, but they are often lumped together when Cairo’s informal areas 
are discussed in national and international circles. This, Doboulet argues, is a function of 
the metanarrative of informality and urban poverty that allows various agencies of the 
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Egyptian state to “see without seeing”44  these areas, lumping them together as problems 
to be solved, but problems created by and comprised of social disorder. In this way, 
informality remains the anomaly, the exemption, rather than a reflection of inherent 
inequalities built into the urban structure, and a truer picture of what life is like for a 
majority of Cairenes. 
Since the 1990s, development in the “formal” housing section has been primarily 
intended for wealthier segments of the population, with significant government 
investment and subsidization of infrastructure for expansion into the desert. In contrast, 
relatively little government attention was paid to the significant needs of areas built 
informally or the outdated and insufficient infrastructure in preexisting areas of Cairo 
(Davis 2006: 85). Additionally, land speculation and real-estate development took up 
pride of place in economic schemes around the nation as the result of increasingly 
“liberalized” economic policy during the latter part of President Hosni Mubarak’s term in 
office.  
 
 
Figure 5: AS&P – Albert Speer & Partner GmbH Architects: Open space planning for 
the central spine and CBD, 6th of October City, Cairo, Egypt, 2009 - 2011 
                                                 
44 To “see without seeing” is a term that one of my interviewees used to describe how the governorate has 
dealt with areas like Ezbet Khairallah, as I detail in Chapter Four. 
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SITUATING EZBET KHAIRALLAH 
The neighborhood of Ezbet Khairallah is situated on 700 feddans (roughly 
equivalent to 700 acres) south east of downtown Cairo.  The Cairo Ring Road, which was 
constructed between 1985 and 2001, divides Ezba from Abu Ashraf. The part of the ring 
road that passes by Ezba was constructed in the last phase of the ring road project due in 
part to conflicts over the possible desecration of Jewish graves in the Basateen 
graveyard.45 Cutting the Ring Road through areas such as Ezba and Basateen had the 
unintended consequence of making the vast areas of informal housing in Cairo visible to 
the driving public in new ways. The location, originally 800 feddans, was set aside by the 
Egyptian government for the Maadi Corporation to build a modern, planned suburb.  
However, before the Maadi corporation could begin building on the site, the Ministry of 
Antiquities stepped in to preserve the artifacts believed to be buried there. While these 
two titans battled it out, migrants from Upper Egypt or from older areas of the city such 
as Bulaq, al-Sayeda Zainab, or Bab El Shaeria began to build homes on the land, 
primarily mud and rock structures. The land itself was parceled out by what both current 
residents and government officials refer to as gangs.  These gangs carved out sections of 
the area and sold plots in a somewhat haphazard way. According to many of the older 
residents in the area with whom I spoke, it was up to the individual then to ensure that 
their claim to that land "stuck." Hajja Mona, who sells vegetables in a self-styled kiosk at 
the entrance to the tunnel under the ring road, has lived in Ezba for roughly thirty years. 
In the beginning, she said, an elderly member of the family would stay at the house over 
the course of the week while the adult children stayed closer to their places of work. On 
                                                 
45 Kline, A. “Environmental Geotechnics in Israel- Overview and Case Studies” in Contaminated and 
Derelict Land: The Proceedings of GREEN 2 : the Second International Symposium on Geotechnics 
Related to the Environment Held in Kraków, Poland, September 1998 
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Fridays, the children would come and relieve them of their duty, and they went to 
whatever home they had in Cairo to take a shower and recuperate.  
Because Ezbet Khairallah is considered an informal settlement, it spent several 
decades without utility services, such as potable water, waste-water disposal, or 
electricity from the state. In the absence of these services, networks of informal 
distribution of potable water and illegal connection of electrical cables to adjoining 
neighborhoods and state power lines were established. In the late 1980s and 1990s, state 
and international fears about the rise of militant Islamic ideologies, supposedly centered 
in informal areas, prompted an expansion of a variety of services. Chief among them was 
the construction of police stations, but other projects were also initiated such as bringing 
potable water to improve the living conditions in these areas (Sims 2010: 68).  
The next chapter expands on the question of utility establishment by examining 
the history of water provision in Cairo, in particular to areas such as Ezba.  According to 
an interview with a contact in the ministry of antiquities, the Egyptian state intends to 
formally recognize the area by assessing the value of property and offering local residents 
the option to purchase the title to their land and buildings. According to this source, an 
application for the sale of this property has been submitted to the antiquities department 
for a review of the historical significance of the land. However, as with many 
bureaucratic operations in Egypt, the application has been pending for a number of years 
and is expected to take quite a bit more time.   
PLANS FOR THE FUTURE   
Looking towards the future circa 2010, the Egyptian state had revised its plans for 
informal areas, and the first thing to change was the taxonomy. First, areas were 
classified as unplanned or unsafe. The term unplanned areas replaced ashwa’iyyat, or 
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random areas. Unsafe is a distinction within unplanned areas that specifies a level of 
danger to the occupants. Within the unsafe category, there are three degrees of 
seriousness. The first degree of seriousness meant that an area poses immediate danger to 
the occupants, who must be moved straightaway.46  The cost for these relocations comes 
out of the national budget. The second and third degree of unsafe involve unhealthy 
situations or areas facing some kind of specific threat such as industrial pollution, or 
exposed high voltage power lines. The fourth degree is back to unplanned, where the 
major obstacle is that occupants lack tenancy, but tenancy is a broad term.  
This new schema was explained to me by Dr. Faramwy, the head of the Informal 
Settlements Development Fund (ISDF). I met with him in the Fund office, which is right 
across from the college of medicine for al-Azhar University. The building was unmarked 
and had a guard at the gate. The guard asked me where I was going and let me in to call 
up at the front desk when I said that I wanted to talk to the ISDF.47 The guy at the front 
desk called up for Nahla, the woman I’d spoken to on the phone to make the 
appointment. She had me come on up, but one of the guys from downstairs escorted me 
up. I got the feeling that it was pretty unusual for them to have guests. The building was 
pleasant, but not sumptuous. They are located on the fourth floor, and the reception area 
was nice but nothing exceptional. The director’s office, however, was very large and all 
lined in wood and exactly what you would expect from the head of what is essentially a 
bank. Dr. Faramwy is tall, with grey hair and warm eyes. He seemed relatively friendly 
and sometimes quite amused while we were talking. He appeared to be quite familiar 
with the informal areas that are subject of the Fund’s work. He knew the geography of 
                                                 
46 The demolitions along Establ Antar on the north west ridge of Ezba above Zahraa were made under the 
authority of this classification 
47 The Informal Settlement Development Funds (ISDF) was created in after the Duweiqa incident in 2008 
by presidential decree 305, with the aim of financing, coordinating and monitoring improvements to 
unplanned areas. 
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Ezba and could describe the sites where people had been moved in Establ Antar and the 
ridge area.  
 
 
Figure 6: A view down from the Cliffside where houses had recently been 
demolished. Image by author, 2010. 
The two new designations of areas in Egypt that used to be ashwa’iyyat came 
almost exactly from the UN Habitat document, which has very specific definitions of 
what fits each category. Unplanned areas are not of immediate concern. The people living 
there are, relatively speaking, okay, having the necessary services, ect. The Fund is most 
concerned with the unsafe areas, locations that need immediate action. Places like that are 
already being addressed, with the people being moved to the Nahda area near Cairo 
University,  Sixth of October city on the very Western edge of the Cairo, or even the 
buildings of Suzanne Mubarak housing projects, some of which were built in Duweiqa. I 
asked if that was the situation in Ezba, as some people had been removed from Establ 
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Antar. He replied that most of Ezba was unplanned but not necessarily unsafe. The areas 
has, for example, improved sanitation. 
The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) specifies an area of unimproved 
sanitation as one in which the removal of waste is done by hand and there is no way to 
know all of the users of a bathroom. This he contrasted with the example of an airplane 
bathroom, where if someone was found to have H1N1 you could track down all of the 
people who had used the bathroom because they are all registered as passengers of the 
plane. In Ezba, they make their own trenches and have a vehicle come and remove the 
waste. They don’t remove the waste by hand and they have private toilets. For example, 
UNICEF would say that 90% of Egypt has “improved sanitation.” The Egyptian 
government, on the other hand, would say that maybe 4 % of villages have improved 
sanitation because Egyptian government standards mean sewage systems and larger 
networks to move liquid waste. They’re talking about a much more expensive version of 
improved sanitation.  
The Fund is designed so that projects begin with a request from the Governor of a 
district, who would present the Fund with a detailed action plan that meets the 
requirements that the Fund sets out. Those requirements were, in turn, created in 
reference to the UN habitat documents on slum upgrading. The local actors have to have 
all of the legal documentation done, all of the plans in place and a fully acceptable Action 
Plan in hand. The Fund would then loan the governorate the money, which the 
governorate would use to “upgrade” the area, and then pay back the money. According to 
Dr. Faramwy, part of the innovation of the Fund in Egypt is that the plan is based on 
local, decentralized planning.48  The goal is to have 60 programs ongoing simultaneously. 
                                                 
48 Pushing decentralized planning is also part of the project of a number of the international organizations 
work in Egypt, as the firm hold of the central government on authority to make such changes has been seen 
as a block to development in the country. 
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As of mid-2010, they had 30 action plans on track, 14 approved for funding and 5 
projects operational, meaning that the money has been sent to the governorates. 
Attempting to get a better understanding of the function of the fund, I asked Dr. 
Faramwy: 
 
Farmer: Does the Fund do the actual implementation of these projects? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: No, the Fund loans the money to the local government and it’s 
 implemented by them. 
 
Farmer: Is Ezba one of those which has started? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: No, the removal that was done in Establ Antar was done by the 
 government and it was a first degree of seriousness. The money for that comes 
 from the National Budget. There are other projects in Qena and Kafr al-Sheikh. 
 Cairo so far has preferred to do just the emergency moving. But we are 
 encouraging them to start phase two. 
The whole project is set up on a cost recovery basis, or as Dr. Faramwy put it, 
land-based finance.49  The idea is that the land belongs to the government anyway, but 
they can’t access it because they can’t move people who have built housing on it without 
giving them somewhere else to live. So the Fund told the government that they should 
take the land on which people have built one or two story homes, strip it and build a five- 
or six-story building of apartments on half of the land. Take the other half and sell it. 
Then use the money from the valuable land that was recovered and pay back the loan for 
building the apartment building. The excess from the sale of this land would then go to 
cover the expenses of the removing areas that were of the first degree of seriousness, and 
for the social programs that are built in to the project.  
                                                 
49 Landbased finance is a policy in favor with organizations like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as it provides an alternative way to fund necessary infrastructure building in 
developing countries that isn’t based on debt. Proponents argue that it encourages efficiency in urban land 
markets (Peterson, G. 2008). One could also argue that it opens up vulnerable areas in the urban Global 
South to more direct appropriation by moneyed interests. 
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 Farmer: How would it be sold? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: It would be sold commercially at auction. 
 
Farmer: Would the Fund do that? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: No, it would be done by the local government. They will decide 
 how to go about selling that land. But they will want to sell it to the highest bidder 
 so that they can pay back the loan. And the land is valuable. See, there has to be a 
 way for the program to pay its own costs. 
 
Farmer: Is it literally the same land? So, if one feddan was recovered, half would 
 be sold? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: Yes, say you recovered ten feddan. You would build an apartment 
 building on five feddan and sell the rest. 
 
In the package for the development of the area is the whole network of water, 
sanitation, electricity, etc. Also included are monies for social development. The Fund 
provides money for Women’s Health, Youth Employment, Adult Literacy, and National 
ID cards. This is paid for by the land sale.  
 
Farmer: Do the houses belong to the people of the area?  
 
Dr. Faramwy: No, they are rented apartments. 
 
Farmer: Will the same people be moved back in who were living there before?  
 
Dr. Faramwy: That’s all up to the local governments. The process is local and 
 decentralized. Local governments get together with their stake holders, NGOs, 
 local  representatives, and decide what’s important to them. The General 
 Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) prepares strategic plans in 
 cooperation with the local governments. The way it used to work was that the 
 “Priority for Cairo” would pay 15,000 to 25,000 LE of the cost of building an 
 apartment that maybe cost 75,000 LE. The local government would pay the rest. 
 Then, if the tenants didn’t pay their rents, it became a drain on the revenue of the 
 local government.  
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Farmer: So, how did the Fund get started? Who had the idea for it? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: Well, it started with Duweiqa. You’ve heard about the slide 
 there?50  
  
Farmer: Yes.  
 
Dr. Faramwy: One week after that, the government had a meeting about 
ashwa’iyyat with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Local Development, The 
Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Housing and Urban Development 
[among others]. They asked me to present solutions, as I was the UN Habitat 
Officer. I made this plan based on the UN rules for slum improvement,51 with 
slight modification, with some issues switched around. They accepted it and we 
are now in the first two year pilot stage of the project. What happened in Duweiqa 
is the fault of many entities. There were many NGOs and there were organizations 
and so forth in Duweiqa and none of them did anything about the situation there. 
They all knew how serious it was and they knew the UN rules. Why didn’t 
anyone red flag this area? [making the gesture of raising a flag and waiving it].  
 
Farmer: Was there a mechanism for them to do that? Who would they have 
 complained to? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: They just needed to bring it up and make it happen. We don’t need 
 action plans that take three months to create, to deal with cases like that. They 
 need to be handled immediately. There is plenty of guilt to share around. Donors 
 like to upgrade areas that are okay, they like capacity building, things like  that. 
 These are not as expensive. But now we are working with capital investment 
 money. 
 
Farmer: They don’t like working in ashwa’iyyat? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: I don’t like the word ashwa’iyyat. It denotes a past situation, in 
 policy, date, everything. I know if someone comes in using that word that they are 
 from the old project.  
From 1994-2004 there was a project that was called the Development of Informal 
Areas. It was under the Ministry of Local Development. It provided infrastructure like 
water, roads, sanitation, electricity. In 2004 it moved from the Ministry of Local 
                                                 
50 In 2008 there was a rockslide in the Duweiqa area of Mansheit Nasser, which killed 119 people. See 
Chapter Three for further details on the event. 
51 http://ww2.unhabitat.org/programmes/guo/documents/mdgtarget11.pdf   Accessed March 9, 2014 
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Development to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. The Ministry of 
Housing was supposed to review the report and the project that had been completed and 
decide where to go from there. They choose to focus on land ownership and 
infrastructure. In many cases the plans for improvement were not implemented, for 
different reasons.  That was the situation from 2004 until September 2008, when 
Duweiqa happened. The other projects didn’t stop, they are still working on some of the 
same projects. The shift has been to move from infrastructure to building houses. The 
projects concentrated on improving unplanned (but not necessarily unsafe) areas by 
default because they needed to have a legal document, the detailed plan, which they 
couldn’t get in ashwa’iyyat. So ashwa’iyyat were left alone.52   
 
Farmer: So What is happening in Ezba, then? 
 
Dr. Faramwy: In Ezba, the national Authority for Sanitation and a Germany 
 Company are working on putting in the sewage system in the unplanned areas. 
 The people living on the edge of the cliff and in Establ Antar are being moved [he 
 got up and found a map of Ezba and showed the red lines where the 1st degree of 
 danger was where people had to be moved, and how all else was just an 
 unplanned area].  
 
Farmer: But I thought that the fourth level was where the residents didn’t have 
 tenure? Ezba residents don’t have tenure. 
 
Dr. Faramwy: Well, the government would have to either remove them into new 
 housing or offer them a way to get title. 
 
Farmer: Is there a mechanism to get the local government to deal with the tenure 
 issues  in Ezba? 
 
                                                 
52 A refrain that echoes of the state “seeing without seeing” areas such as Ezba, places built on state land 
without title to the land that purchase of agricultural plots has provided other technically informal areas 
means that services went to these latter areas first, as the necessary “paper-life” of places like Ezba couldn’t 
be established. 
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Dr. Faramwy: No, we don’t need a mechanism. We just need to tell them to do 
 one or  the other. But that comes lower on our list of priorities. We have a clear 
 hierarchy of urgency. 
A clear hierarchy of urgency that puts potential rockslides and public opinion at 
center stage—yes, the Duweiqa rock slide killed 119 people, but, according to people in 
Ezba with whom I spoke, the people in Establ Antar whose homes were bulldozed were 
given only a few hours’ notice by authorities that their houses would be razed. They were 
provided with alternative housing at the very outskirts of the city, away from their 
networks of kin and connections. On my most recent trip back to Ezba in December 
2013, the homes along Establ Antar had been rebuilt, although it is not clear if they were 
rebuilt by their original inhabitants. 
ONE LAST STORY OF ARRIVAL 
It was through my first attempt to ride the fifty-piaster pickup trucks from the al-
Zahraa metro station to Ezba that I met Um Wasam and Um Kareem, who were taking 
their children to visit Fostat Park.53 We became close friends and eight months later, I 
returned with them to the same park that they had been visiting when we first met. Our 
journey into Ezba, however, was markedly different. Having spent the afternoon and 
evening in the park, we began our return around 8:30pm by walking approximately half a 
mile from the park to the nearest intersection. We waited for about 45 minutes there, 
looking for a bus or microbus headed to Ezba. We finally found a bus headed there but it 
was jammed so full that there was no way we could fit three adults and eight small 
children into it.  Feeling responsible for returning them safely as this visit to the park had 
                                                 
53 I had seen the open backed trucks transporting people into and out of Ezba, and had come to the area that 
I had seen people being loaded. I didn’t know how much the truck would cost, or what the unspoken rules 
were for navigating a seat. Um Wasam and Um Kareem took pity on the newcomer, told me that the cost 
was half a LE for adults and steered me towards the front of the pickup bed closest to the cabin. We chatted 
during the ride down to Zahraa and made plans to meet up the next week. 
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been my idea, I started flagging down taxis. They all refused to go to Ezba. “Ezba? No, 
no.”  As time wore on, I began offering the inappropriately high fare of LE15, but they 
refused altogether. Finally, a driver in one of the new-style white-metered taxis stopped 
who didn’t know where Ezba was. I told him it was near al-Basateen and that we knew 
the road back, thinking that Um Wasam or Um Kareem would know, and told him I’d 
pay 15LE.  In a moment reminiscent of a circus act, we then began to pile into the car. I 
sat in front with one child and all of the bags, and they sat in the back with the remaining 
seven children.  At this point, the driver started getting upset, asking me how many 
people there were with me. When we finally got settled in, he said, “What, no one else? 
Fine, good. We aren’t missing anyone.” 
It turned out, however, that Um Wasam and Um Kareem didn’t know how to get 
back, having never come in a private car or taxi before. However,  I remembered the way 
from our trip out via microbus and from previous trips from Malek al-Salah. I told him to 
take the left beside the big mosque, which we did, then to go straight and we’d take a 
right in a little bit.  
Driver: No, left.  
 
Farmer: No, left is al-Basateen, which I’d mentioned as being next to Ezba, but 
 we want to go right. 
 
Driver: No, left.  
 
Farmer: No, right. See all of those lights on the right hand side? Those are Ezba.  
He gave me a considering look, and continued on the road.  
 
Driver: So, how long have you been here? 
 
Farmer: Where, Egypt? About a year. 
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Driver: Where are you from? Lebanon? Sham? 
 
Farmer: Yani [a non-response]  
 
Driver: How do you like Egypt? 
 
Farmer: I love the people. And these two ladies are two of the best mothers in the 
 world. 
 
Driver: And you’ve never met them before in your life, right? 
 
Farmer: No, how can you say that? 
 
Driver: You met them five minutes ago. 
 
Farmer: Why would I go to Ezba with them if I’d just met them? 
 
Driver: Don’t you live there? 
 
Um Wasam (from the back seat):  No, she lives in Hadayek al-Maadi 
 
Driver: So you don’t live in Ezba, but you know how to get there and they don’t? 
 
We had reached our turn, so I told him to take a right after the military base and down the 
road to Ezba.  
 
Driver: This road is closed, look at this road. Is it even a road? 
 
Farmer: Yes, this is how we came down, we left from this road. It’s open. 
 
Driver: All of this for 15LE? I’m going to have to pay 10LE to wash the car after 
 this. Isn’t that right? Won’t I have to pay that much? 
 
Farmer: I have no idea how much it costs to wash a car. 
 
Driver: What even brought you here?! 
 
Farmer: I have friends here. 
 
Driver: Ah, but what brought you to visit this place in the first place? 
 
Farmer: Ezba is nice and is getting nicer as they put in a sewage system. 
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Driver: But this place— 
 
I cut him off because I could tell that insults to Ezba were coming, and to the people who 
live there, and I was embarrassed for him to say those sorts of things in front of Um 
Wasam and Um Kareem.  
 
Farmer: Ezba is a decent place and the people here are ashen nas [the best people] 
In response, all of the adults in the car began laughing. 
 
Driver: Ashen nas? 
 
Um Wasam: And the best cars are the cars of Ezba! 
 
Um Kareem: And the best roads, the roads of Ezba! 
 
Farmer: Why are you laughing? I don’t understand. 
  
Um Kareem: Malesh, malesh [never mind] 
But the absurdity of the moment was clear to them. As we drove past the guard at the 
gate to the cavalry station, his face mirrored his surprise to see one of the new-style white 
taxis drive into Ezba. Um Kareem kept pointing to the people who were laughing and 
pointing at us, enjoying the strangeness of the moment. 
We made it most of the way up the hill on al-Negah Street,  then got trapped by a 
truck of pallet wood coming down in a too narrow street. We decided to get out and walk 
the rest of the way. Um Wasam and Um Kareem insisted that I put down the child I was 
holding, as she’d woken up from sleep, and make her walk herself. They tried to 
convince me to stay the night at their apartment. I told them that my husband insisted that 
I return home and they politely accepted my lie, a common moment of ist’bat. They 
stood and waited with me for one of the service cars going down to al-Zahraa and I 
literally had to hold on to the door as the car backed up and turned around to keep my 
place. I’d wanted to let Um Kareem and Um Wasam go home to their apartments rather 
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than wait with me, but they wouldn’t go until I got into the car.  The long journey into 
and out of Ezba over, I finally made it home to Hadayek Al Maadi around 12:30am. 
 
 
Figure 7: A view from an Ezba rooftop of the Cairo Ring Road and the Moquattam 
Hill in the background. Image by author, 2010. 
Traveling in and out of Ezbet Khairallah, in microbuses, taxis, and on foot, serves 
to make clear the complicated position of this location as one that is and is not tied into 
the urban fabric of Cairo. People who live and work in Ezba provide furniture building, 
wood recycling, marble processing and many other services for those living in other areas 
of the city. Things that make it in and make it out of Ezba are connected in looping 
networks of obligation and possibility with people in neighboring areas and in Upper 
Egypt, connecting families and contacts in chains that people attempt to use for survival 
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and prospering. Yet this place is also distinct, and bodies moving into and out of it 
marked, as dangerous and full of potentially unmanageable potential. One “item” moving 
into and out of Ezba that makes this ambiguous position particularly apparent is sewage. 
The next chapter will take a closer look at the role that sewage has played in shaping and 
typifying Ezbet Khairallah.   
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Chapter 3: Sewage in the City 
 
Figure 8: View of Ezbet Khairallah from below, showing the limestone foundation of 
the area. Image by author, 2010. 
It was evening when we got off at the Dar al-Salam metro station. This would be 
my first visit to Ezbet Khairallah, the site of my research. I had waited all day for my 
escort, a young male family member, to have the time to take me. I was told that a 
woman does not visit a place filled with such misery and danger alone. At the urging of 
my family I agreed, at least for the first visit.  
Walking in the direction of the main road to find a micro bus, my companion 
stepped in a puddle of standing water. He stopped cold, raised his foot and shook it 
sharply, then headed in the direction of the nearest pharmacy. “We need some rubbing 
alcohol,” he said. I replied, “I have a tissue. Would that work?”  
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“No, I need to clean it with alcohol. Who knows what’s in that puddle? Maybe 
swine flu.” 
Inside the nearest pharmacy my companion cleaned his foot and sandal with 
disinfectant, then asked for directions to Ezba. Surprised, the pharmacist asked, “Why 
would you want to go there?” 
 Farmer: I’ve heard a lot about the water issues in that area and wanted to see it. 
Pharmacist: You don’t want to go to Ezba, it's filthy. There is garbage piled up 
 higher than your head. The people are all covered in filth from head to toe. 
 
Farmer: Have you ever been to Ezba? 
  
Pharmacist:  No, why would I go there? They are all thieves and drug addicts and 
 prostitutes. People there have scars across their cheeks [he gestured with his 
 thumb from ear to mouth] from the knife fights. The streets are covered in 
 sewage. Ezba is not a place to visit. 
This encounter encompasses much of what is compelling about wastewater in 
Ezbet Khairallah: it is a product and productive of certain geographies of difference, 
colonial legacies and neoliberal agendas mapped out in space and on people's bodies. It is 
a marker of this place and its inhabitants as deficient and dangerous, as needing 
management and sanitization, not just sanitation, in order to protect the rest of the 
population from disease, rock slides, theft and prostitution. It is a legacy of the modernist 
dual symbolic of the city as both citizen maker and source of pestilence, and a location 
intimately involved in the flows and frictions of capital in this structurally adjusting state.  
Sewage in this location creates a series of manifold challenges: sewage in and from Ezba 
must be managed because it presents a danger to public health; because it endangers 
nearby tourist sites and the money that they represent; and because it would pose a threat 
to Egypt's international reputation if there should be a repeat of the Duweiqa rock slide 
disaster of 2008. In response these multiple pressures, a sewage system was approved and 
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began to be installed in 2009. This provides a claim for residents in the process of legal 
recognition and increases the value of land, while at the same time creating new sets of 
stratifications. The increased value of land benefits land owners there, but drives up rents 
for those newly arrived from the countryside looking to establish a foothold in the city.54  
Certain areas that have a history of neglect from ministries in the Egyptian government 
have begun to be monitored and measured and in certain cases dismembered, as when 
houses along cliff sides weakened by sewage were bulldozed. Because sewage isn't inert. 
It is socially, physically and affectively operative. Sewage seeps down into the water 
table, eats away at the limestone foundations on which the area rests, threatens to dissolve 
artifacts being preserved for posterity and tourism dollars in Fostat, clings to shoes and 
marks bodies as poor wherever they move through the city, brings intestinal worms and 
nurtures mosquitoes and, who knows, maybe contains swine flu.  
The garbage, the sewage, the scarred and dirty bodies are common themes that 
swirl around Ezbet Khairallah, echoing as a refrain in newspapers, popular media, and in 
conversations with people living in surrounding neighborhoods. Having served as a 
wilderness retreat, garbage dump and cemetery at various times over the last century, and 
having become a densely populated squatter settlement over the course of the last forty 
years, Ezba is the kind of place you don't go unless you must. On my first visit to Ezba 
during daylight, garbage and sewage did indeed greet me. The main road coming in by 
Basateen was a veritable lake of sewage-fed mud; thick, dark and pungent. There is no 
asphalt, and the mud has hardened into tight waves in some places while in others it 
creates doorstep-to-doorstep sinkholes of indeterminate depth.  
                                                 
54 It also prices newly married couples out of the market for housing in the area. 
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Built along the slope of a limestone ridge, shit literally rolls downhill from burst 
pipes, overflowing septic tanks and water discarded from buckets at doorsteps, following 
oddly angled, narrow streets to the bottom where the microbuses link Ezbet Khairallah to 
Fostat, al-Malek al-Saleh, Sayeda Aesha, and Khalifa. There are garbage piles along each 
of the major entrances to Ezba, heaps of plastic bags and organic waste playing host to 
rodents, semi-feral cats and dogs, and occasional herds of grazing sheep and goats.55   
 
 
Figure 9: A small heard of sheep and goats were brought to feed on the collected 
garbage under the Ring Road overpass at the entrance to Ezbet Khairallah 
from Abu Ashraf. Image by author, 2010. 
                                                 
55 For most of the 20
th
 century, a community of people known as the zabbalin, primarily Coptic Christians, 
collected and recycled most of Cairo’s garbage. The organic was used to feed their pigs. In 2003, municipal 
authorities awarded contracts to international corporations for trash collection, impeding but not stopping 
the zabbaleen’s work in collecting trash around the city (in many cases the zabbaleen were subcontracted 
by the multinationals to do garbage collection, but there were conflicts over the ownership of the material 
collected). Additionally, in 2009, the municipality killed off  most of the pigs within the city limits as a 
precaution given the global H1N1 scare, known widely as the swine flu epidemic. Without pigs to feed, 
much of the organic waste of the city remained uncollected. 
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What this refrain of Ezba-as-zone-of-exception fails to account for, however, is 
the economic vitality of this place, the upward trajectory of gaining ground in services 
and recognition from the state, the ongoing implementation of a state-run sewage system 
that dots the streets with the gaping maws of sewage pipe trenches dug by backhoes or by 
hand. In some senses, Ezbet Khairallah is on its way up, in a tenuous and hopeful stage of 
upward mobility, provoking hope for a better future, as well as suspicions about the real 
goals of these improvements and anxieties about what all of this will mean to current 
residents.  
This chapter will engage with a series of moments in which sewage comes to the 
forefront of consciousness, both public and personal. In the first section, I look at the 
Duweiqa Rock slide that happened in 2008 that was blamed on sewage from informal 
housing in the area, but whose story is much more complicated. The rockslide in 
Duweiqa was a moment that   altered the ways in which various entities in the state 
engage with informal areas, leading to the creation of the Informal Settlement 
Development Facility (ISDF), which I will also address. Next, the chapter turns to the 
daily impact of sewage on the lives of residents, looking at the bodily and social 
implications of being unable to escape waste. My first meeting with a longtime contact in 
Ezba, Asma, was an introduction to some of the refrains about sewage in Ezba; bodies 
that are remade by their engagement with the systems of water and waste management 
that make life possible, and the sensitivity to the messages of exclusion and neglect that 
the absence of state services conveys. Asma’s story also gives a glimpse at the gendered 
labor involved in managing the patchwork of services that people use to meet their needs, 
as Asma carries the burden of her house on her head. Providing an overview of the 
physical system of septic tanks as they have operated in Ezba, the chapter looks at the 
material and social networks that have been established to mitigate sewage overflow. 
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This includes a telling example, the story of an engagement party marred by an unruly 
septic tank.  
Marking a shift in material systems, the chapter next turns to the changes 
surrounding the implementation of the new sewage system. The improvement to the 
material circumstances in Ezba that the sewage system installation represented were hard 
fought for, won both by happenstance and activism, and met by residents with 
expectation and anxiety. Recounting a conversation I had with Ezba residents while 
watching the progress of installation on the street below, the anxiety of residents about 
what improvements may mean for residents comes to the fore. Maybe Ezba will be a 
dream place to live, some hope, relatively close to downtown and with easy access to 
transportation routes. But, if Ezba becomes a dream place to live, will the people who 
live in Ezba still be around to enjoy the benefits? It’s a question that people pondered. 
Following up on changes in the wake of the implementation of the state system, the 
chapter looks at what happened to one septic tank when it was no longer needed; what 
happens to unnecessary spaces? Engaging with encounters with sewage brings with it the 
sensory, smell in particular, which I will investigate as it sends messages of value about 
people and places. I will additionally look at the sense of smell and the things which emit 
scent as part of the larger story of infrastructure in cities and all of the entities that it 
makes possible.  And finally, the chapter turns to the arrangement of space within a home 
around competing needs for cleanliness and management of waste, reading the bathroom 
as a particularly fraught place in an Ezba apartment.    
THE DUWEIQA ROCK SLIDE 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the kinds of risk and uncertainty associated with 
Ezba crystallized in the fallout over the Duweiqa rock side disaster of September 2008, in 
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which 119 people were killed and many more wounded by the collapse of 18,000 tons of 
rock from a cliff side onto a neighboring slum below in the Mansheit Nasser.56  
 
 
Figure 10: Image of the Duweiqa rock slide in Amnesty International’s Report, see 
footnote 56 for citation. 
In the immediate aftermath, roughly a thousand buildings in the area were destroyed and 
people forcibly relocated, some to government-provided housing. Sewage was a central 
part of the story of the Duweiqa rock slide, as overflowing septic tanks from informal 
housing on the hill caused layers of clay to expand and put pressure on the limestone 
layers that comprise the foundation of the hill.57  Residents had been warning the 
Ministry of Housing and local elected officials about the danger posed by rocks that hung 
perilously over their homes, but received no reply. But this is only one piece of the 
puzzle, one that received a great deal more attention in the national and international 
                                                 
56 "Buried Alive: Trapped by poverty and neglect in Cairo's informal settlements." Amnesty International, 
November 2009. 
57 ibid: 16 
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press.  Another piece of the puzzle was the construction of luxury housing on the top of 
Moquattam plateau, the Uptown Cairo project by Emaar Egypt, a subsidiary of UAE-
based Emaar Properties.  The use of extensive amounts of water to prepare land for 
building, and for use as water features in landscaping and golf courses, added additional 
pressure to the already-eroded limestone foundation.58 When the rockslide took place, 
problems caused by the slow and incoherent response by official rescue workers were 
compounded by refusal of the police and military to let in voluntary assistance from other 
sectors. People who lost their homes were moved to Sixth of October city, with some 
reports of large families being housed in small rooms without services in mining camps, 
or of being forced to sign contracts for resettlement apartments that they did not receive. 
Hard on the heels of the rockslide, houses nearby were demolished by the government 
largely with their contents intact, as people were simply told to evacuate immediately and 
did not have time to preserve their belongings.59 The stories told of the Duweiqa rock 
slide continue to focus on unplanned housing, careless government officials, and 
unmanaged sewage. 
The month following the rockslide, then-President Hosni Mubarak issued a 
presidential decree establishing the Informal Settlement Development Facility (ISDF) 
with purview over improvements to slum areas on a national scale. The first step of the 
ISDF was to survey all of the ashwa’iyyat [random or informal areas] and categorize 
them as unsafe or unplanned. Unsafe areas were slated for immediate demolition. One 
such area was Establ Antar, an adjoining squatter settlement located to the south of Ezbet 
Khairallah, both of which are located on the same limestone outcroppings as Mansheit 
                                                 
58 Hussein, Abdel-Rahman.  "Emaar accused of culpability in Duweiqa rockslide" Daily News Egypt. 
September 18, 2008 
59 http://madamasr.com/content/evicted-and-nowhere-go Last accessed March 23, 2014 
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Nasser. With little notification, buildings along the cliff side of Establ Antar were 
destroyed and people were again forcibly relocated, this time to a desert satellite city 
named Sixth of October, far removed from their social networks and places of work. 
Some have subsequently returned to the area, transformed from modest home owners to 
anxious renters or staying part time with friends and relatives in the area in order to 
access employment opportunities.  
The formation of the ISDF was a product of a state-in-crisis mode and the 
brainchild of Dr. Ali El Faramwy, who, as introduced in Chapter One, was serving as the 
Egyptian National Program Manager at UN-Habitat at the time of the Duweiqa rockslide. 
According to Dr. El Faramwy, the ISDF is basically an implementation of UN Habitat 
guidelines, with minor tweaks,60 functioning essentially as a bank to lend money to local 
governorates that would use the funds to build new housing on half of the land and sell 
the other half to repay the debt.  This close relationship between international capital and 
state security forces has reinforced rather than mitigated the structural inequalities facing 
the urban poor in Cairo. The move to relocate people to the desert satellite city Sixth of 
October reverberated through Ezba as a dire warning of a possible future for all of Ezba's 
residents if the land that they sit on becomes too valuable. Importantly, a central factor 
sparking this chain of events was sewage. Unmanaged wastewater was a key factor in the 
original Duweiqa rock slide. Moreover, such overflows of waste echo though Ezbet 
Khairallah as a key indicator of the area's location in state priorities.  
Something like a weary sewage cosmopolitanism is arising in Ezbet Khairallah. 
When I asked people what they thought Ezba would be like in a few years’ time, many 
said that they thought it would be the best place to live in Cairo. It is only five miles from 
                                                 
60 Personal Interview September 20, 2010 
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Tahrir Square and located near to the metro and to Salah Salem Street. The future looks 
bright if utility services continue to improve and if, once improved, the people who live 
in Ezba now are still around to enjoy the benefits. Residents of Ezba have learned to 
create advocacy communities centered on issues of wastewater management, in part in 
response to the Duweiqa incident, but largely centered around their own collective action 
to change their situation. People marched. People protested. People sat on the doorsteps 
of ministries and didn't go away. As one long time employee of the Ministry of Water 
told me, "Those Ezba people came and kept coming, and they would block you from 
getting in to the Ministry. Eventually, the Ministry just gave in." Not quite “just gave in,” 
maybe, but were certainly motivated by public pressure that area residents were able to 
put to bear, including some savvy leveraging of new media. One Ezba matron said in 
response to my question of how Ezba managed to get approval for a state sewage system, 
that they marched and embarrassed the government. "You can see me on Dream TV at 
the marches" she told me. "Look it up on the internet--they have everything there."  
In another iteration of the refrain of Ezba's poverty cosmopolitan, broader than the 
sewage cosmopolitan that area residents have developed, and arguably less grounded in 
local concerns, was a recent (August 2011) Tweet back campaign on behalf of Ezba's 
residents. In what is hailed as Egypt's first Twitter fundraising campaign, social activists 
hot off the social media connectivity of the revolution that ousted former President Hosni 
Mubarak were able to raise $218,855 in ten days for Khair Wa Baraka organization, 
which intends to use these funds to pave roads in the area. 61 This fits in with the 
narrative about the political changes in Egypt that have been on the forefront of political 
consciousness since January, 2011; technologically savvy urban youth meeting injustice 
                                                 
61 "EGYPT: Activists use social media to help slum-dwellers" on Alternet. Accessed October 16, 2011. 
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/egypt-activists-use-social-media-to-help-slum-dwellers. 
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with electronic connectivity. Certainly, that is an important piece of the puzzle. However, 
as many moments in this dissertation demonstrate, people in places like Ezba have been 
engaged in everyday work to challenge, work with, evade and selectively misunderstand 
state institutions and representatives thereof, often around concerns over the basic 
services of life. Sewage in Ezba is one such example, as Asma shows me in the next 
section as she urges me to give the problems in Ezba a loud voice.  
SEPTIC OVERFLOW 
The first time I met Asma, I was lost in Ezba and turned down a narrow side 
street, no wider than six feet across. Sewage puddles spanned almost from doorstep to 
doorstep, and sitting by her front door a woman was having a cup of afternoon tea. She 
told me that she had just spent the morning ankle deep in the puddles, pushing the 
wastewater out of her small street and onto to the main thoroughfare. Her neighbor told 
us that the water comes up yellow and turns black with the contact with the dirt. She 
pointed at a spot in the middle of the street, where we could see it bubbling up from the 
unlined concrete septic tank below. They had been trying for days to get a truck to come 
and suck the sewage out, and Asma told me that the only way to get the sewage trucks to 
come and clean the tanks was through bribery. What was there to do? When the septic 
tank was full, as frequently as once a week or once every few weeks, they had to go in 
search of a septic removal truck and hope that they could get it to come before the whole 
street filled up. This week they hadn’t been lucky, and Asma had spent the day trying to 
manage the overflow. 
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Figure 11: A puddle in a side street in Ezba caused by an overflowing septic tank, or 
transh. Image by author, 2010. 
I asked her if that kind of contact with sewage would harm her. "It already has," 
she replied, lifting first one leg and then other, pulling back her long galabeya to mid-
calf, offering her feet for my inspection. It was a gesture I became accustomed to, in 
response to questions about health and the impact of sewage, or as punctuation in the 
course of a life history retold. A proffered body part without visible injury, but offered in 
the spirit of proof. Here, see this. It tells my story. This foot, this arm, this cheek, it lives 
in Ezba.  She told me that she wanted me to take the water problems in Ezba and give 
them a loud voice, to make those responsible hear. She also said something I heard 
repeated a number of times in my first months of fieldwork: “Do you think you could live 
here, in these conditions? Do you, really? Not a day. You couldn’t live here a day. Where 
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in Cairo is there a good place for people to live? Zamalek? Garden City? Fine, if you 
have the money. But to each what he is able. People live here who are poor, what can 
they do? They will live here.” 
Bodies matter in the story of water systems in Ezba, carrying pails and pushing 
puddles of sewage, kidneys and livers and feet bearing signs of making do, thriving 
maybe, if you look closely enough. A young girl's eyeballs deformed from the labor of 
Sisyphus, carrying water up and down five flights of stairs every day on her head.  Bodies 
are vibrant matter (Bennett 2010) that exist in assemblages, are enmeshed in the water 
and sewage systems that they engage in, that coalesce in moments where somebody asks 
for an accounting of what life is like in this place, Ezba. Concrete steps leading up from 
flooded streets, brick walls in living rooms that collapse after sewage water corroded 
their foundations, PVC piping in a neighbor's house that breaks and floods your home in 
minutes, destroying twenty years of accumulated bridal china months before the 
wedding. Meter upon meter upon meter of pink tile for all of the bathrooms that were 
redone as the state sewage system was put in.  The old bathrooms and front halls had to 
be broken open to retrofit the pipes, so significant amounts of remodeling took place to 
bathrooms, including the bathroom in Asma’s downstairs apartment.  
"I CARRY THIS HOUSE ON MY HEAD" 
Asma's role as the woman of her household is both longstanding and awkward. 
She is the eldest of a large family from the Qena region of Upper Egypt62 and came to 
Cairo to keep house for two of her brothers something like 13 years ago. Her two eldest 
brothers came down from Qena, pooled their resources to open a shop in Zaytuna and, 
                                                 
62 Qena is a provincial capital located in Upper Egypt, some forty miles to the north of the major tourist 
town of Luxor. Qena is roughly 450 km to the south of Cairo, as the crow flies. Please see Figure 1 in 
Chapter One for a map of Egypt that includes Qena 
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following the lead of networks of kin and neighbors from Qena, purchased land in Ezba 
to build a modest two story house. Asma was nearly thirty at the time and had opened up 
a small candy and home goods kishk (kiosk) outside her family's home with money she 
had saved. The family decided that she was the most appropriate person to keep house for 
her younger brothers and Asma left her kiosk in the care of her elderly father. 
 
Asma: Now he has it and he keeps the money from it. He doesn't even put fifty 
 pounds in my hand when I come home. I built it, and he keeps it. 
  
Farmer: Didn't he pay you something to take it over? 
 
Asma: No, but what can you do? He's old and poor. 
Perhaps these are the words of fifteen years of growing accustomed to an 
awkward in-betweenness, of seeing that she can't quite claim or hold on to a piece of 
certainty for herself either in her natal home or in her brothers' house. She neither resides 
in Qena nor is fully settled in Cairo. She has been in Cairo to take care of these brothers 
until they married, or she did, but she has been a part of building the household from the 
time the foundations were laid. She carried cement. She chose fixtures. She cleaned the 
ground. She negotiated with trades people, with porters, with builders, with shops for the 
components of each aspect of the house. She forged relationships with neighbors, learned 
where to buy the best produce, stood in bread lines every morning to supply the house 
with all that it needs. She washes her brothers’ clothing, irons them, washes the floor, 
feeds and waters the chickens, oversees the removal of the septic tank's contents. She 
argues for the best deal. When the sewage system went online and the family decided to 
remodel the bathroom, as many families did at that time, she chose the tile and carried 
that home on her head, and the cement to set it, and the new pipes to fix the bathroom and 
the fixtures for the new sink. "I carry this house on my head," Asma told me when we 
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were walking back from the market and I laughed at the sight of her carrying a cabbage 
home on her head. A cabbage is, I guess, a small thing to place there when so much 
weight has already been carried. 
By this, Asma doesn't just mean that much of the physical labor of creating her 
brother's home had fallen to her, though that is certainly true. She also means that she has 
been the social center of the household, establishing and maintaining personal and 
professional relationships with people in the area and has carried this out with more than 
a little force of personality. Asma's brother told me once that Asma is the one in the 
family that you go to if you have a fight or need to get something done. She is the sit al 
bait [lady of the house] and she carries it on her head, but it is not, after all, her house. 
Whatever her efforts to establish and maintain the household, there has never been an 
expectation that she would live the rest of her life there. When the elder of the brothers 
married, he moved to live in the upstairs apartment with his wife and Asma remained 
downstairs to take care of the remaining brother and a third who spent his vacations from 
an extended military career in their Cairo household. When the married couple had 
children, Asma became babysitter, nursemaid and playmate. A few years before I met 
her, a bitter family division over religious issues caused her eldest brother and his family 
to move from the upstairs apartment, sell his share of the shop in Zaytuna and cut off all 
ties. Asma describes being profoundly depressed at the removal of the children that she 
had been raising since their infancy, and told me that she spent months crying every day, 
but still she remained in Cairo while her other brothers needed care.  
The eldest of the remaining brothers got married late during my tenure in Ezba 
and moved himself and his new bride, the assistant from the shop in Zaytuna, up to the 
apartment above the stairs. Asma anticipated that this would be the time that she would 
move back to Qena and told me that she was torn between relief and frustration. She was 
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careful not to describe the situation when the elder brother and his family lived upstairs, 
but said that it would not be possible for her to remain as a servant for the latest bride. 
She had very mixed feelings about the impending return to Qena, where she would be 
there to help her aging parents, but would have much less freedom of movement than she 
enjoyed in Ezba and would furthermore face the enduring tensions of familial religious 
dispute. To stay or to go? In my final weeks in Ezba, her brother's new bride had become 
pregnant and her brother had asked Asma to remain in the apartment downstairs to help 
take care of the house and to watch the baby while his wife worked in the shop. Should 
she stay or should she go? "I carry this house on my head." If she were to leave, who 
would be around to manage all of the many needs of the house that she had carried? Just 
to manage the septic tank was in itself a chore that required a large commitment of time, 
as I will show in the next section.  
SEWAGE TEMPORAL 
The transhat (pl.; singular is transh), or septic tank, system in operation in Ezba is 
a highly porous waste management arrangement. The septic tanks are large concrete 
block rooms, roughly 1.5 meters square, sunk into the dirt streets in front of each 
building. They were put in by residents when they upgraded from the stone and mud 
rooms built by the first squatters, to the brick and mortar and occasionally concrete 
structures that have developed over the last forty plus years as Ezba has solidified into a 
stable housing area. Unlined and often covered only with a plywood sheet, the transhat 
are a constant source of seepage and overflow. All water disposed down the drains or 
toilets in a household are flushed by a simple system of gravity and water pressure 
through a central outtake pipe near the top of the septic tank.  
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Figure 12: An outtake pipe made visible when trenches were being dug for the 
instillation of the new state run sewage system. Image by author, 2010. 
Squat toilets, kitchen faucets and bathroom taps flush shower water, laundry 
runoff, excrement, and bits of food through PVC piping running from upstairs 
apartments, through the open area in the center of the building under the front stairs of 
the building into the tank in front of the house. The household pipes are mostly the 
product of unlicensed plumbers or DIY infrastructure.  
Different housing units fill their tanks at different rates. While a single family 
home may fill its tank every week to two weeks, the tanks of newer concrete apartment 
buildings may only last a day or two before needing to be pumped. People manage this in 
different ways, with some residents attempting to restrict use of water at the individual 
level, and others living with minimal water supply as mandated by landlords, who shut 
off water for the majority of the day, or for several days in a row, in order to limit the 
number of times the trench has to be emptied. Even after residents illegally put in DIY 
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water pipes to get potable water to their homes, septic tanks have functioned to limit 
water consumption in the area. 
Residents pay for the removal truck, splitting the bill in the case of multi-family 
homes, and woe betide any woman who is away when the tank is emptied. One young 
mother in Ezba described her recent frustration when she returned from an overnight trip 
to her mother’s house to find that the trench had been emptied in the morning and 
neighbors in the building had rushed so quickly to clean their homes, wash their laundry 
and scrub their rugs that the trench had become full by the time she arrived home in the 
afternoon. She recalled surveying a pile of her young daughter’s dirty clothes that had 
built up over the previous week which would now have to wait until the next time the 
trench was emptied, while going to her purse to get money for her share of the removal 
fee. There are no discounts for having missed the opportunity.63   
This is just one example of many kinds of disagreement and conflict in the area 
centered on the septic tanks. When the tank is full, if someone runs water and causes it to 
overflow, they are very likely to get a visit from angry neighbors, or reproaches repeated 
to them by neighboring shop owners who listened to the complaints of customers and 
passersby. With a full tank, people may choose to forgo or delay household cleaning, and 
use only minimal amounts of water in a bucket to perform ablutions for prayer, to clean 
their faces, or wash their hands.  
This bucket of grey water poses its own set of problems. It can’t be dumped in the 
drain and nowadays there are few bare areas in which to pitch it out. Some women 
reported conflicts with neighbors arising from someone having surreptitiously taken a 
bucket of grey water and poured it into a neighbor’s transh. Other women tell of 
                                                 
63 As one of the other neighbors had joined us while she shared this story, I felt that the moral of the story 
was intended for an audience greater than me. 
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arguments caused by someone who simply dumped their bucket in the street without 
considering the consequences. Even the daily ritual of shops casting water over the dirt 
streets to keep the dust down can cause argument, as neighbors comment on the amount 
used. Because the transhat are so porous, the roads likely to turn to mud, and septic tanks 
emptied only at the expense of individuals, all water that appears in the street is subject to 
negotiation and contestation by concerned parties.  
Sitting on the ground, cross-legged, peeling potatoes and snapping beans for 
dinner, my conversation with Um Nabeela and her neighbors turned to the tricky 
management of her eldest daughter's engagement. The late afternoon sun pushed its way 
through the cracks of wooden shutters, lighting the halo of hennaed hair above Um 
Nabeela's quick, expressive eyes. "We decided to have the engagement party here. Even 
though our apartment is small, and Ezba is not a nice place to bring visitors, we wanted to 
do the party here rather than in Sohag.64 My husband insisted." This last was by way of 
praise for her second husband's generosity. Um Nabeela had been a young bride with two 
small children in Sohag when her first husband passed away. After a few years, she 
married her current husband and moved to Ezba where he has a small mashrabia [latticed 
woodwork] workshop, leaving her eldest children to be raised by her brother and his wife 
in Sohag. Now her eldest daughter is in her late teens and engaged to a young man who 
has Um Nabeela's conditional approval. Her approval was conditional because she 
disliked that he often attempted to control Nabeela’s movements “while she is still living 
at home."65  He is, it seems, a far inferior choice to the owner of a dry goods store down 
                                                 
64 Sohag is a regional city in Upper Egypt, where many of  the residents of Ezba came from. Please see 
Figure 1 in Chapter One for a map of Egypt that includes Sohag. 
65 Farha Ghannam (2002) discusses) this aspect of gendered relations, describing how control over 
women’s movements are a significant issue in the demonstration of masculinity. 
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the street who had been Nabeela's first fiancé, but who had proven himself too strictly 
religious for Nabeela's taste, much to her mother's chagrin and continued remonstrations. 
On a previous visit, Nabeela had quietly listened to the catalogue of her previous 
suitors’ manifest virtues, merely commenting that she hadn't cared for the dress she was 
wearing in the engagement photos that Um Nabeela was showing me, and saying that he 
had acted like her uncle. No great catch in a teenager's mind, such an avuncular groom. 
The new fiancé is in his mid-twenties and works in his uncle's shop near to Ezba. He met 
Nabeela a year ago when she was down visiting her mother and had shortly thereafter 
approached Um Nabeela, who thought him a bit overbearing.  Never-the-less, Um 
Nabeela plays go between and conciliator when the prospective groom calls to enquire 
angrily if Nabeela had gone to her cousin's house after he had expressly forbid it.  Um 
Nabeela played dumb, ist’bat, telling him that she had sent Nabeela to get something for 
her from their house, despite having warned her daughter a few hours earlier that her 
fiancé would be upset as she left the house. Better that his frustrations should be directed 
at her, and Um Nabeela told him that she had not known his wishes, diffusing the issue 
by assuring the fiancé that she herself was unknowingly at fault and preventing her 
daughter's frustration at his overly careful management. This is to give sabona [soap], to 
let chafing parties slip easily by on either side of her as she pivots, keeping all in motion, 
greased by soap as it were.  
The engagement party that had been held for the young couple a few months prior 
was a mixed success. "I wish you had been there to see it!" Um Nabeela said to me. 
Um Maya, who had brought a bowl of rice to sift for her family's dinner, looked 
up with a laugh from her inspection of the rice for stray small stones and insect parts, 
"Why?! It was a disaster!"  
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"No, she would have been interested. For her research. But it was embarrassing to 
bring people to Ezba."  
Um Nabeela repeated a sentiment that I heard often in Ezba, that it is 
uncomfortable to bring guests to the area. How can you explain away sewage on the 
streets to prospective in-laws and country relatives, not to mention the area's reputation 
for crime and danger?  But Um Nabeela's husband having made up his mind, they began 
to prepare for the party to celebrate the engagement. The arrangements for such affairs 
are always complex, negotiating who must be invited and who was likely to take offense, 
renting an elaborate colored gown for the bride, choosing a hair and makeup stylist, 
preparing the house and food to host relatives from out of town, sweets and soda for party 
guests.  
A few days before the party, Um Nabeela began to make plans for how to manage 
the wastewater needs of her party. She needed to have the tank emptied in order to 
accommodate the extensive use of water that the party would entail, but she couldn't 
empty it too early for fear that her neighbors would have filled it all the way back up by 
the time of the party arrived. Um Nabeela's husband paid a small bribe to the driver of an 
emptying truck to come on the day of the party, and Um Nabeela spoke with all of her 
neighbors, who would be guests at the party themselves, asking them not to use much 
water on that day.  
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Figure 13: Septic tank removal truck in Ezbet Khairallah. Image by author, 2010. 
The day of the party, however, the emptying truck driver failed to show and Um 
Nabeela was in a quandary. Off marched her dutiful spouse, looking for another 
emptying truck, independent contractors all. Neither luck nor a sufficient amount of extra 
cash being available, this plan failed. How was Um Nabeela to manage a house full of 
guests without using water? If she did use water, she was sure to court the disapproval of 
neighboring buildings and passersby, as her transh filled to overflow.  By late afternoon, 
a command decision was made not to be conservative in water use, but it was by that time 
fairly irrelevant. Sewage couldn’t be contained, bubbling up in a pool above the trench 
and running down the street. Later that evening, Nabeela came down stairs and picked 
her way carefully down the street to where the stage and lights had been set up, a vision 
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in a huge peach hooped dress, matching hijab and veil, cautiously lifting her skirt out of 
harm’s way.66 Um Nabeela placated as many neighbors as possible by inviting them to 
participate in the festivities and later took small gifts of sweets to other neighbors in an 
attempt to sooth feelings over her perceived lack of consideration. These small gestures 
of consideration, connectivity and neighborliness helped to mitigate the difficulties of 
living without state services.  
NEW PIPES, NEW EZBA 
During my tenure there, a long-awaited and much-sought project to install a state 
sewage system was underway and had some significant impacts on life in the area. The 
most immediate sensorial impact was the shift in the scent of the streets in Ezba, which 
was never uniform.  In some places there was a reduction while in other places there was 
a new concentration of odor. On hot days, the smell of sewage rises up to meet you from 
the road, a warm wave of tangling scents with a short sweet overlay. On cold days, the 
smell is deeper, more earthy and pungent. It varies by location, thicker near the main 
streets, which have hosted generations of sewage churned into mud, lighter on side streets 
when puddles have migrated elsewhere for the moment. It changes by situation, like a 
quick sock in the nose when water has been left on in the house and let to overfill a septic 
tank in the road, mixing the contents and unearthing too many propositions to count—but 
surely enough for a neighbor to come and complain. Heavy or light, sweet or pungent, it 
enters homes through cracks in windows or open doors, and the message received by 
people in Ezba, as they tell me, is one of state neglect and social exclusion.  
The story of utility services provision in Ezba is one of votes-for-services swaps, 
in which community members petitioned the state through demonstrations and public 
                                                 
66 Engagement ceremonies are often large affairs, with the prospective bride dressing in a large and 
variously colored hooped dress and being made up at the beauty salon as she would be on the wedding day. 
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gatherings to get services. In response, political candidates promised to implement first 
electricity and then water utility services in exchange for votes in parliamentary elections. 
For years, this dynamic played out in pre-election surges in water pressure, changing the 
pace and smell of life as weak trickles at odd hours turned to strong flows during daylight 
time. The recent installation of a sewage system took a slightly different route, however. 
Again, the community came together to protest lack of state utility services, but the final 
clearance to build the system required a push from a different quarter.  
Ezbet Khairallah is located near the prime tourist sites in Coptic Cairo, falling 
technically under the umbrella of the Ministry of Antiquities, and it was partially an 
effort to preserve these sites that led to final approval. The sewage system was created in 
order to combat the large amount of wastewater creeping down the hill and threatening 
the tourism dollars that those sites signify. While the location of Ezba is considered 
valuable for its proximity to downtown, and the potential ramifications of sewage on 
neighboring tourist destinations created a situation in which the political will was 
mustered to install public sewage services, the residents fear that they themselves are 
quite expendable. This raises the question of a future ordinary, or a vision of what life 
will be like in the day to day at some point yet to come. The future ordinary that many in 
Ezba are envisioning imagines legal recognition, paved roads, clean drinking water and 
high property values. This is balanced by an imagined future catastrophe, a dystopia, in 
which a wholesale demolition of the area is carried out by a billionaire and all of Ezba’s 
residents banished to a desert satellite city. This image of a more prosperous place and 
better living standards for residents falls into and out of the teleology of the welfare state 
and urban development. It is a future that follows the broad strokes of technological 
progress but sees its instantiation as a point of constant contest and peri-legal 
negotiations. It is what Singerman and Amar (2006) might call a weary cosmopolitism, a 
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vision of a better future that takes little for granted and makes few assumptions about 
where “assistance” will come from or what it will cost the people of the area. 
On my way to visit a contact in Ezba, Um Ameer, I came in close contact with the 
work of the sewage system implementation. At least half of the length of her street was 
open, and in this instance workers had not left much of any room to walk along the side. 
The wooden planks were there, but fewer than usual, and the backhoe was perched at the 
near end of the opening in the middle of the street. Two men moved out of the way to let 
me start going by, then one muttered after me “if you are even able.” I made it around the 
side and then had to turn around and come back along the other side to get into Um 
Ameer's apartment building. Her aunt had temporarily closed up her small street-front 
store because of all of the work in front of their place. I went to the apartment and Um 
Ameer noticed that I was out of breath from the climb around the pile of dirt. She went 
outside on the balcony, both to get more light into the room, and to take a look outside at 
all of the goings on. I followed her, and we both looked down on the activity below. 
 
 
Figure 14: The view from Um Ameer’s balcony as the trench for the new septic system 
pipes filled up with water from a burst main. Image by author, 2010. 
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I asked her how she was managing with all of the work going on in front of her 
place. She replied that she said that she hadn’t been out of the house since the day that I 
had last been to visit, two weeks prior, when the kids were going off to their 
grandmother’s, because there was so much going on downstairs. She noted that the 
workers were having a particularly bad day today, and that the mass of thick, dark water 
filling the trench was from a septic tank that they had punctured while digging the ditch. 
The ditch was almost full, and they had put in a pipe and pump and were draining the 
dirty water into the main street of Ezba. It was just a river of sewage onto the main dirt 
road. While we were standing there, Um Ameer told me that she had heard that the 
government was going to move people from Ezba to Sixth of October City, as had 
happened with those whose houses were destroyed in Establ Antar. She said “Maybe it 
won’t happen. Maybe they will only take the people near Eyen El Sera that they are 
afraid will fall into the water. Like they did with the people whose houses collapsed.67 
Did you hear about that?  They may take them for their own protection.”  
“But isn’t it weird that they would put in all of the services and then move 
people? Especially as they are putting the services in along the routes of the streets as 
they are now [very uneven]?”  
“Maybe it won’t happen.”  
Her sister-in-law arrived with her little girl and joined us on the balcony. While 
we were standing there, we heard a commotion among the workers. The dirty water in the 
ditch was being expanded by water from a main that they had also struck, and they were 
worried that it would overflow and flood buildings along the street. They had finally been 
able to get ahold of the guy in charge of the water main and he had refused to turn off the 
                                                 
67 Um Ameer was referring to the Duweiqa rockslide in 2008 
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water switch. As her sister in law explained to me, “Everyone in Ezba drinks, cleans, 
does dishes from this water. People need to pray Maghreb.68 What can he do? He can’t 
turn off the water.”  
Um Ameer responded, “All of Ezba will be full if they don’t close it.” Downstairs 
we could see a group of men arguing, one in a suit with a clipboard and looking very 
official, who was arguing with a group of workers in “professional” clothing, while a 
group of workers stood around. Finally, some sort of decision was reached and a worker 
was sent to adjust the pump that was draining the sludge—with his bare hands and 
standing in his white galoshes on a very small wooden plank over a huge pit of sewage 
water. More water for the main street below. 
Um Ameer's sister-in-law turned to her and said that it didn’t matter, that they 
were all going to be moved to Sixth of October and that Ezba in its entirety was being 
sold to some rich guy.  
 
Um Ameer: They are only going to move the people by Eyen El Sera, where they 
 are afraid that they will fall into the water. 
 
Sister-in-law: No, they’re going to start up there, by the church, and then take all 
 of Ezba below, we are all going to be moved. 
 
Um Ameer: Then why would they be installing all of this? Why all of this work 
 on a sewage system if we are just going to be moved?  
 
Sister-in-law: Those aren’t sewage pipes! Haven’t you seen those pipes? Look 
 below you? See those pipes? They are gas pipes. Haven’t you see the trucks 
 coming and going, coming and going from Ezba? They aren’t installing sewage 
 systems for us! They’ll leave Ezba for five years then take us all out to the desert, 
 to the far Sixth of October.  
                                                 
68 She was referencing the need for water to perform the pre-prayer ablutions known as wadu. 
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She looked to me for sympathy and recognition of the disaster that this would 
pose for them. Having witnessed the plight of those left homeless from Duweiqa, living 
with the implications of being in an area that the government “sees without seeing,” it 
was hard to trust the intent of the governorate. Backhoes and heavy equipment rolling in 
to Ezba conjure dystopic images of destruction and displacement for those who more 
often find themselves at the receiving end of state security forces than as the recipients of 
state welfare services. 
CLOSING OFF OLD SPACES 
Near the end of my fieldwork, Asma’s street was put online on the state sewage 
system. I visited her while she was having her trench drained. Two men were there with 
long cloth hoses and a simple pump, bringing the water up from the trench and putting it 
in the newly installed drainage “box” outside Asma’s door. Just as I arrived they were 
pulling the pump back up and preparing to leave. Asma was telling them to keep the 
pump down there until all of the water was gone. They were insisting that there was very 
little water left and that the motor would burn/break if they left it to work when the water 
couldn’t reach the intake filter. She took several rocks and threw them forcefully down 
into the trench to demonstrate how much water remained. Finally, the younger man got 
the older to appease her by lowering the pump again and running it briefly to show her 
that no more water would come up. The older one lowered the pump by a rope to the 
bottom of the trench, then secured the rope under a concrete slab. They got a little water 
to come up, but couldn’t get much. Asma continued to argue with them, and insult them 
in really strong terms, and provoked one of the guys to pick up a brick and threaten her 
with it, without much intent. I came to sit next to her, not sure how the situation would 
unfold. They asked about me and she told them that I was from America and came to see 
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the people of Egypt, the good people, not the smelly sort that they were, and shouldn’t 
they be ashamed to act that way in front of me. The older man said that he would clean 
the trench “ashen khatrik” [as a special favor to her] which made Asma laugh, saying “As 
a favor to an American, they would finish!” 
When it was clear that still not much was coming up, they unplugged the motor 
from inside Asma’s house and pulled the pump back up. She told them that she wouldn’t 
pay them if they didn’t clean the entire trench. They told her that it couldn’t be cleaned 
more than that and she said, “As you like. I won’t pay you if you don’t clean it in its 
entirety.” The guys started wrapping the hose back up, and managing the water that was 
inside. At first they tried to empty it into the new septic “box” but ended up putting all of 
that water back into the trench. A neighbor’s six- or seven-year-old son was enjoying 
being in on the action, and kept trying to help get the water out of the hose, despite being 
yelled at by the men and finally by Asma. All of this work was barehanded, without any 
form of protective clothing. One guy was wearing pants cutoff at mid-calf and a t-shirt, 
while another had on a pair of sturdy work pants. They put the pump and the piled hose 
on a pushcart, like a big dolly, and dragged it away under Asma’s insults. She got a 
neighbor to come and look at the trench to tell her if there was still water, to arbitrate in 
the dispute, and he told her that there was just a little water left (by showing her where it 
would reach from his fingertips to his mid-arm between wrist and elbow). She disagreed 
with him and said that half was still in there. He said, “This what I see. You asked me to 
look; I looked and told you what I thought. If you don’t want my opinion, then it’s none 
of my business,” and then returned to his home.  
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Figure 15: Asma’s street after the new state system had been installed. Image by 
author, 2010. 
 Asma then started putting bricks and debris into the trench to begin filling it and I 
helped move some discarded building materials from the street. She got garbage from 
inside her house and from her in-progress bathroom renovation to put in as well. Then 
she tried to put the cement covers on top of the new septic box and the old trench. They 
were much too heavy for her, so she sent a child to go and get a male neighbor to move it 
for her. Several either refused, citing work, or just didn’t come, until she found one that 
would help her. While we were standing there, the younger guy with the pump yelled 
from down the street that she should not leave the trench without a cover in case a 
neighbor child would fall down and she yelled back at him to go away and mind his own 
business. A little while later that same guy came back and chatted with her, telling her 
she owed him 60LE. To my surprise, the man turned out to be her neighbor. She said, 
“Not just my neighbor but a friend, like a brother” (showing two index fingers entwined). 
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“Ahh,” I said, “I could tell that you love each other from the way that you speak to each 
other!” They laughed, and he said that he was used to Asma by now. She still refused to 
pay him at the time, but did give him the money a few days later.  
While all of this was going on, a female neighbor of hers came out with her four-
month-old daughter. She’d been married over a year, but had been living somewhere else 
until recently, when her husband moved them back to his family’s home in Ezba when he 
found he couldn’t afford the rent outside. She says that her daughter was born with 
allergies and illnesses due to the trenches and she never used to bring her outside, and 
would often go and stay with her sister, because of how dirty the trenches were, how 
much they stunk and made everyone ill. She’s very happy that the sewage system has 
arrived and the family has already filled in their sewage tank. “The smell,” she said 
“made you ill even inside your own home.”  
Smell rose to public consciousness again one morning when I was riding a shared 
taxi into Ezbet Khairallah. The driver stopped at the top of the hill from Zahraa to pick up 
a woman and her small child. After climbing in to the car, the women told the driver “oh, 
I can’t stand the dirt and filth and garage and smell” as if by way of explanation for 
requesting to be picked up at what would normally be half way through the trip. In 
response, the driver replied, “Ezba is full of it” 
 
Woman: Ezba is covered in garbage 
 
Driver: If here people don’t smell garbage in the morning they get allergies 
 
Woman: It smells terrible 
 
Driver: If there isn’t garbage in front of the houses, they’ll call the zabbalin 
 [garbage collectors] and tell them “Leave me a bag!” 
 
Woman:  The place is a good one, but the people are dirty. It could be nice if the 
 people cared. 
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Driver: The people here are filthy 
 
Woman: Well, there are some good people here too 
 
Driver: No, finding good people in Ezba is impossible 
This conversation reminded me of possibilities for scent to convey messages. In 
Prodigal Summer, the novelist Barbara Kingsolver evokes the richly textured world of 
sensory messages. A young woman, washing dishes in front of an open kitchen window, 
catches the scent of a particular flower. Still tense with lingering anger from a fight with 
her husband, her body responds to the fragrance of a flower that he had, in the past, 
brought to her as a token of passion or apology. She hears a pause in the drone of the 
mower he is using across the field and anticipates that this scent has come to her as a 
message of contrition or love. Her nose and ears become passageways for a moment 
remembered and a moment desired. The flower’s fragrance has invaded her body as a 
perceptual experience (Serametakis 1994: 6). It has been re-perceived (1994: 9). Did she 
sigh? Once ingested, did the scent shift the chemicals in her body, alter the flow of 
neurotransmitters from synapse to synapse? Did her body soften, shoulders relax, hands 
rest on the ledge of the sink as she leaned closer to take a deep breath in, an inhalation of 
forgiveness? Her porous body has moved into a circuit of communication with the 
flower, the fight, her husband, the window and the memory of a surprise moment earlier 
when this flower was handed to her and meant, “I was thinking of you before I walked in 
the door, from the moment I saw this flower until now.” The scent was not the scent of 
any flower, but this flower, evocative for the suggestion of a remembered gesture as well 
as for its aroma.  
Kingsolver sets the scene for an inquiry into the language of the flower itself, 
which exists not only as an object being exchanged in this story but also as a subject 
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issuing a message of its own. The flower bears its scent as a call or invitation to come 
closer, to touch, to breathe deeply, to eat. Who is the message intended for? An answer 
from across the Great Divide between what counts as nature and what as society (Latour 
2004) may be that the messages of scent and color and symmetry are intended for an 
insect audience, that these things are tied to natural cycles of which humans are proximal 
recipients. But this explanation perpetuates the myth of human exceptionalism and 
shortcuts a necessary discussion of the vernacular, or consequential, worlds of the flower. 
In the Botany of Desire, Michael Pollan (2002) discusses the co-evolutionary 
relationships formed between some plants and animals where the existence, function, or 
reproduction of each become inseparably tangled, a system of which human beings are a 
part. What gets planted, what gets plucked, what makes food that sustains life, these 
things are not of one side (human) or another (nature), even if such a distinction were 
possible to posit (Tsing 2005). This sensory message of the flower is not only a product 
of human relations, but also as a message of seduction generated as the flower’s own 
proposition. This proposition, this claim on inclusion in the collective to use Latour’s 
terms, is difficult to understand as such for a number of reasons, not the least of which is 
a difficulty in positing intention or agency in entities that fall on the Other side of the 
Great Divide. Were we to recognize the scent as filled with intent, how do we account for 
calls to be eaten, to be touched, broken, or plucked within a framework that sees agency 
as resistance to power or utilization? To move yet another step further away from a 
comfortable ordering of relations with objects signaling their potential for inclusion in the 
collective, what are we to do with repulsive Others? For example, what are we to think of 
the bacteria making a living and a world in the sewage pools in the streets of Ezbet 
Khairallah? This layer of inquiry adds to the complexity of the questions around sewage 
in Ezba, signifying its poly-vocality. The challenges that sewage poses to the wellbeing 
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of residents of Ezba, the damage to the artifacts and limestone, and the political 
possibilities that have arisen out of these dynamics are pieces of a larger story of human’s 
enmeshment in the systems that support and test life in urban settings. Management of 
this engagement with waste marked particular places as more socially charged than 
others; Ezba in relation to other spaces in Cairo was more charged in part because of this 
management of waste, but spaces within homes could be more or less charged as well as 
in the case of Bathrooms. 
BATHROOMS 
Bathrooms are a charged space in Ezba homes. You need to know a family fairly 
well before you can ask to use the rest room, and you need to do it in a pretty low key 
way if you want to eliminate waste. Because kitchens were so little functioning in some 
homes, with blocked sinks and slow water taps-something you just can't afford to wait for 
when you've only got water every few days- the heavy spigot in bathrooms often 
becomes the main water feature. This is especially true for those living in apartments as 
opposed to homes, where there is more control over the quality and repair of fixtures.  
But even in homes, large water-related projects of all sorts often take place in the 
bathroom; cleaning clothing, washing out water storage bottles and tanks, cleaning 
children, rinsing fruits and vegetables, and washing big piles of dishes. The sensibility 
about how to divide tasks by space seems to be based on volume or amount of work to be 
performed, rather than by the nature of the task. A tray of tea cups or a snack plate could 
be rinsed while standing at the kitchen sink, but the pots and pans from a large meal were 
more comfortably done in the bathroom, squatting or sitting on a low stool before some 
sort of large tub.  Elbows on thighs, legs straddling aluminum or plastic basins, with thin 
plastic flip flops on feet to prevent rheumatism from traveling up from cold tile floors and 
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settling in hips, women in Ezba squat or perch on overturned soda crates or buckets, 
sinking into a posture of labor. 
These bathroom spaces are charged on a number of fronts. Bodily practices of 
eliminating waste were particularly sensitive, but simply entering this space meant 
moving from public to private areas of homes. A guest might be brought to the bathroom 
to perform wadu, and have a fresh bar of soap opened in their honor, while the host or 
hostess waits near the door holding a towel for hand drying.  Once a certain level of 
familiarity with the family is established, one could move into and out of the bathroom 
without being accompanied, but not without notice. A number of Ezba contacts told me 
that bathrooms are the place to really see if a women keeps a clean home, so they are 
charged places in the moral economy of good home stewardship.  Bathrooms are also a 
prominent location of jinn [supernatural others] and there are very particular rules about 
bathroom behavior and speech intended to maintain good relations with jinn neighbors. 
All religious speech is considered inappropriate, particularly the mention of God. One 
should always give warning before throwing hot water, as hot water returns jinn to 
childhood, which poses quite an issue for beings with such long life spans and is 
understood to be quite a painful experience. Turning a jinn back into a child, or other un-
neighborly bathroom behaviors, is sure to earn you the ire of the jinn’s family. Where 
people can do so, they build sinks outside of the bathroom proper, or in some other way 
delimit the space of the sink from that of the toilet.  
Um Wasam lives in an apartment block near the top of the plateau on which Ezba 
rests. This is the area in which many of the new concrete apartment buildings have been 
built, located near to the one government-run elementary school within Ezba's 
boundaries, and situated on the main market thoroughfare. I met Um Wasam and her 
sister, Um Kareem, while trying to figure out how to ride the 50 irsh pickup trucks, and 
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visited them often in their apartments only a couple of floors apart. Having married 
brothers, then having each having had one boy, two girls, and currently with a male 
toddler, every visit was a large family affair. Um Wasam frequently told me that I really 
came to visit them because I was lonely without children of my own, and I wondered if 
she'd forgotten about my research or if she'd figured me out. Eight children under the age 
of six in one apartment meant a lot of bathroom sharing, one child on the toilet that 
hardly flushes and has no cover, another squatting on the floor near the drain.   
 
Figure 16: Um Wasam’s bathroom. Image by author, 2010. 
Um Wasam’s three-bedroom apartment had a single bathroom, fairly large by the 
standards of Ezba. The sink inside had been broken for months, and had become a 
repository for the dirty linens of the youngest child. The toilet was an flush toilet, though 
the flushing mechanism no longer operated and it required a large amount of water to be 
poured into the bowl in order to force waste down the outtake pipe. When the shared 
apartment building transh was full, waste simply accumulated until an opportunity arose 
or the waste became too much to bear. The toilet was also the receptacle for large kitchen 
waste fluids, such as frying oil that had been used often enough, or that had had fish fried 
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in it. Like all families in Ezba, Um Wasam kept a series of plastic and aluminum tanks, 
barrels, and jugs to store water for bathroom and washing purposes. In the corner near the 
drain she had a large blue water barrel set up on a bucket, with a tap built in near the 
bottom of the barrel.  
This, she said, was to avoid the difficulty of contaminating the water when using a 
dipping cup as happened with the open aluminum containers. The lid to the barrel was a 
wooden plank, and piled over the lid were children’s clothing, awaiting washing day. In 
another corner sat a local washing machine, an open drum with an osculating paddle. 
Being a frequent visitor in her apartment, and having spent time in the bathroom 
with her cleaning out water bottles when the landlord had unexpectedly turned on the 
water supply, I felt fairly comfortable entering Um Wasam’s’ bathroom. On one visit, 
however, I entered the room as she was using a squeegee to clean the floor after one of 
the children had not been able to wait for their turn for the toilet. Startled and 
embarrassed, Um Wasam told me to get out, to go and sit in the guest parlor, a room I 
hadn’t entered for months. A short while later, she joined me in the parlor and studiously 
avoided any mention of bathrooms or bodily functions until I left. The ubiquity of sewage 
on the street did not erase the taboo of bodily excretions, and the moment was an 
embarrassing one for us both.  
Ezba bathrooms came under close scrutiny as an exemplar of mismanaged urban 
waste in early 2009 when it was selected as a site of research on sanitation. One part of 
the tripartite arrangement of sanitation surveillance, Ezba stood in for urban slum, cast 
into comparison with village and peri-urban areas. The report, written by the Center for 
Development Services (CDS) on behalf of the World Health Organization (WHO), 
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examined women and children's roles in sanitation.69 More specifically, the report 
interrogated the behavior of women and children around using public and private 
bathrooms, hand washing, consumption of water from communal sources outside the 
home, and viewership of media messages about proper sanitation behavior, under the 
rubric of market research. The CDS articulated an agenda of proving a baseline of current 
water and sanitation systems in poor areas in Egypt, understanding gender and 
generational roles in managing water and wastewater, and, significantly, assessing the 
willingness of households to contribute financially for potable water and wastewater 
services. Managing waste in appropriate ways is key to creating proper national subjects, 
but it is also necessary in the structurally-adjusting state to assess these communities as 
future consumers of sanitation services. This report is also this other thing, this 
justification of continued interventionist policy, this marker of lack and backwardness. 
These people don’t have their shit together. 
Sewage in Ezba marks absences, of state services, affordable housing for low-
income migrants from the countryside, social capital, respectability, growing empty 
spaces in limestone. Sewage in Ezba also marks excesses, of flies and bacteria, conflict 
with neighbors, waste that accumulates rather than disappears or even dissipates. Sewage 
marks Ezba bodies by smell, by traces that may be more felt than seen, by association 
with matter out of place. Sewage issues cannot be delinked from questions about health, 
concerns over management of populations, urban design and teleological 
developmentalist ideals.  Residents of Ezba have worked to create a better future for 
themselves, advocating for better services, but each step brings with it attendant anxieties 
about the value of the area in their absence. The next chapter takes up five water-
                                                 
69 Center for Development Services (CDS) "Market Research Report on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene" 
June 2009 
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objects—the pump, the meter, the bill, the tomato, and the sabil (fountain)—to 
investigate daily water practices and the interaction of the residents of Ezba with 
representatives of institutions of the Egyptian state. 
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Chapter 4: Water Objects 
 
Figure 17: Charitable water fountain, or sabil, in Ezba. Image by author, 2010. 
WATER INFRASTRUCTURE  
Water infrastructure is a key component of making modern cities, not simply for 
creating the conditions necessary for survival in urban spaces, but also as an essential 
element in the rationalization of space. This rationalization of space is at the heart of 
reshaping cities to be locations for citizen production, capital accumulation and the 
development of municipal governance (Gandy 2004). Infrastructure of all kinds is 
implicated in the modeling of the affective landscapes of cities, not just for the 
component parts of concrete, steel and PVC that may be inherited or do-it-yourself 
(DIY), but also in quotidian evaluations of possibility and plans for the future dreamed of 
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by residents.   Urban water infrastructure is built on the particular histories of a given 
city, tied up in strands of colonial encounters, geographical anomalies, instantiations of 
new mechanisms of control, everyday rhythms of subversion, attachment, and the vagary 
of accretion. Onto or within these networks of received possibility, people plan futures, 
make do, and hope.  
This chapter will discuss urban water infrastructure and its connections with 
affect in the city. It will do so through an examination of Nigel Thrift’s (2004) 
articulation of structures of malice and kindness built into western cities. This literature 
examines the ways in which city infrastructures create particular affective realms, 
principally negative and misanthropic in many cases, but also possibly kind. Furthermore, 
it engages with the question of what the relationship is between kindness and hope for a 
potentially better future. The chapter then turns to Abdel Malik Simone (2004) for an 
interrogation of the spatialization of possibility in urban centers in Africa, investigating 
the breakdown in previous structures that had provided life prospects and the difficult 
work of crafting new kinds of less solidified networks of opportunity. Then it will turn to 
a consideration of Mathew Gandy’s analysis of urban water infrastructure as it exists in 
the very different spaces of the global north and global south, looking at the 
particularities of water’s impact on life for disenfranchised urban communities. Utilizing 
this literature, the chapter examines certain water-related objects to examine how people 
make do, imagine futures and live in the informal Cairo neighborhood of Ezba 
Khairallah, and also engages with questions of how residents manage the tricky footing 
of state recognition, surveillance and monitoring through drops of water and jolts of 
electricity.  
By focusing on the addad [meter], mator [pump], fatora [bill], oota [tomato], and 
sabil [charitable drinking fountain], this chapter will demonstrate the gap between 
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aspiration and reality, the possibilities for conflict when one’s gain is another’s loss, or 
when the terms themselves can’t be agreed upon, and the creative management of forces 
far beyond one’s control. Attention to the issue of the meter pays dividends in deeper 
understanding of the role that people expect the state to play, and fears about the meaning 
of greater surveillance and control over their personal lives that improved services may 
mean. The chapter discusses the multiple implications of measurement, where concerns 
over what is being measured and who is keeping track bump up against arbitrary 
processes of accounting for water.  When tracking one aspect of a complicated system 
like water, what other things come into view? For example, if you can track what’s going 
out (sewage), can you track what’s going in (illegal tapping into water pipes)? The pump 
brings forward the limits of cooperation and shifting alliances as people work to make 
life possible with resources always stretched just a little too thin. In particular, the pump 
illuminates the possible disjuncture between scales of the social and the material 
infrastructure necessary to get water from the Nile to a household tap in Ezba, where 
improvements to one aspect of the system throw into stark relief the gaps in other facets.  
How is one to take responsibility for one’s share in small but vital aspects of 
infrastructure when the means for meeting basic needs are so hard to come by?  
The bill links these water-objects together, weaving together a story of efforts to 
collect rent for services by the state, attempts by representatives of the state to divert 
some of those rents to their own pockets, and struggles by people to selectively engage 
and evade recognition by the state at times; ist’bat or the game of playing dumb. Being 
held accountable for the cost of water and sewage systems also makes one countable, 
knowable and identifiable in a particular place. Such countablity holds out the promise of 
recognition from the state of one’s rights to that space, a key aspect of designing possible 
futures, but such recognition produces anxiety both for the fear that it may not be 
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forthcoming, or if it is, that it may spill over into excess.  As Elizabeth Povinelli (2002) 
points out, recognition from the state can be cunning, as the double-edged sword of 
recognition may provide additional privileges but at costs that can be prohibitively high. 
Excessive recognition can bring its own problems, when so much of getting by is about 
extra-legal creativity. Alternative versions of systems, in which services are managed and 
needs met through other circulations, are an important piece of how life is managed in 
Ezba, as the example of the tomato brings to life.  
 Focusing on the tomato demonstrates the connections that sustain and constrain 
life in Ezba, with circular movements between rural and cities spaces that bring people 
and food, and water with them. Tomatoes help us to trace both the affective terrain and 
the shifting economic and political situation in Egypt over the last four to five years. 
Finally, the chapter will take a look at sabils, or charitably endowed drinking fountains, 
as an instance of water Do It Yourself (DIY) infrastructure in Ezbet Khairallah, 
investigating sabil practices for what they can show about the history of the area and 
shifting evaluations of the possible.   
MEETING JUHA 
After a long trip to the market, we sat as a small group of women in the cool first-floor 
apartment of Teta (grandmother), the affectionate nickname of the family matriarch. Teta 
could rightly claim the title of hajja, having completed the pilgrimage while spending 
several months with her son who was working in Saudi Arabia. Rolling miniature 
eggplants a few at a time from their plastic bag to cut the stems and empty them of their 
contents for mahshi [stuffed vegetables], the ladies were in a joking mood. Negl’a, Um 
Sameer’s youngest daughter, took up her customary role as the teller of jokes. 
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Figure 18: Mahshi project with cabbage leaves. Image by author, 2010. 
Negl’a told one of the many Juha jokes: Once Juha went to take a train home and 
brought his donkey with him. He asked the ticket booth, “How much is the ticket?” The 
vendor replied, “One pound for you, half of a pound for your donkey.” “Ok,” Juha 
replied, “give me two tickets for donkeys.” This joke fits the Juha template, where the 
wise idiot figure, Juha, turns common logic on its head. The figure of Juha is an Arabic70  
literary and cultural figure who often plays the fool to comic effect, but whose wisdom 
comes out in subtle ways. In this joke, Negl’a was invoking Juha as one who played the 
fool to save money, one of many ways to get just a little further ahead in each interaction. 
Fifty piasters saved on a ticket are fifty more piasters to have for cigarettes or long-term 
projects. Of course, a train ticket costs far more than one pound, but here Juha’s crafty 
ability to save what he can is appreciated by those who also work diligently to make each 
transaction take them just that much further. The joke hinges on ist’bat, or deliberate 
                                                 
70 Juha is also found in Persian and Turkish literature, sometimes under the name of Nasraddin. 
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misunderstanding, which is a technique of managing the appearance of knowing or 
understanding something, and key to being a smart individual, or managing life well.  It 
is also significant that it is with his donkey that Juha is willing to make himself 
equivalent, not only because the donkey is often his companion in the joke, but also 
because the donkey itself is a figure of the idiot for doing what others are not willing to 
do. If you want to call someone stupid, you call them a humar [donkey] but, as always, 
there is more to the story, as it is the donkey that can see jinn [spirits].  
A strong knock on the outside door to the building was answered by one of the 
children in the house. He came back in and told the group that the man with the 
electricity bill was at the door and needed to speak to someone. Um Sameer moved to 
respond on behalf of her mother, putting on her outer abaya [long dress for outside wear] 
and niqab [face covering], and went to meet the man at the door. The interaction took 
several minutes, as we could vaguely hear as she greeted him and they each asked after 
the other’s families. When Um Sameer returned to the group, she was exasperated about 
the high cost of the bill. Entering into the topic and the spirit of the moment, Asma told 
the story of a recent interaction with the meter reader. Knocking on her head, she said 
that sometimes her head was as hard as stone. The reader had come to her house to read 
the meter for water. Stepping into the front entranceway of her building where the device 
is located, the reader mentioned that he was thirsty and wanted some tea. It was an 
unusual request in the situation, but within the realm of the possible to offer him tea, so 
Asma asked him how he liked it, “shayk khafyf wala-mazbut? [do you take your tea light 
or just right with sugar]”  
“No,” he replied, “ana bahib eshai enashif [I like dry tea].”   
Not comprehending the implications, Asma said she smiled and went to the 
kitchen to boil the water. He finished reading the meter and left without drinking the tea. 
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It wasn’t until later, she said, that she realized he had been asking for a bribe to read the 
meter in her favor. “Shai nashif! [dry tea]” she laughed. 
Asma’s laughter was both self-directed and in appreciation of the resourcefulness 
of the meter reader. She was mocking herself for having missed the clue that this was 
“that kind” of conversation, that he was opening the door to a negotiation about self-
interest and mutual benefit out of the sight of the state system for the collection of rent on 
water. Being quick on the uptake in these sorts of situations is part of making life 
possible in the difficult margins of the city, small extracurricular acts of evasion, 
selective misrecognition, kindness, or shatara [cleverness] that open opportunities to earn 
a pound or save a pound. As the Juha joke suggests, practices of ist’bat are part and 
parcel of making do, as well as part of maintaining sufficient social space to allow for 
making or missing alternative arrangements. Since she didn’t follow through on the 
request, it is hard to say if the cost of the bribe would have saved her enough in the 
difference in the water bill to have come out ahead, but the chance had been presented to 
make the infrastructure of water provision bend in their favor just a bit.  Additionally, 
Asma was laughing at the inventive use of the idiom of hospitality to both mask a direct 
request for a bribe and also to shift the footing of the interaction to one of social 
obligation and a measure of kindness. Kindness and its absence is a key aspect of the 
affective landscape of urban spaces, as Nigel Thrift (2004) articulates, and the 
relationship between kindness and hope is important to understanding how Ezba residents 
plan for the future. 
 INFRASTRUCTURE AS ANIMOSITY AND HOPE  
Poking around in the grim corners of misanthropy, Nigel Thrift (2005) 
investigates the darker sentiments undergirding human relations in cities.  In his 
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rendition, as part innate trait of humankind, part response to the daily lacerations of 
rubbing up against others, part product of institutions ostensibly designed to mediate 
against negative emotions, and perhaps part secret pleasure, this wellspring of animosity 
is a key attribute of the contemporary Western city. Thrift has written extensively on 
affective aspects of cities, and argues that cities must also be understood as “emotional 
knots.” Sociality, the endless interactions of humans in and with space, encompasses both 
compassion and kindness, but also “active dislike being actively pursued….malign 
gossip, endless complaint, the full spectrum of jealousy, petty snobbery, personal 
deprecation, pointless authoritarianism, various forms of shadenfreude, and all the other 
ritual pleasures of everyday life” (2005; 140).  
The “market for fear” in and about cities that Thrift describes can also be read 
through the lens that Foucault provides on the role of the state to protect those portions of 
the population that must be cared for from the portions that pose dangers to them 
(criminally, bacteriologically and racially) (Foucault 2003). As the population became the 
target of governance, certain bodies and the spaces that they inhabit were marked as 
“dangerous” to the body politic.  Extending Thrift and Foucault, the affective “gist” of 
particular spaces in the city can be very different, and different yet again at various 
spatial and temporal removes. The affective knot of Ezba is inflected by a moral universe 
of religious notions of the value of charitable works, water sharing, resourcefulness, 
attachments to the place that Ezba is and could become, as well as fear of what had been 
known as a dangerous space and anxiety about possible dystopic futures.  
An additional aspect of the production of the undertow of spite in cities that Thrift 
(2005) articulates is the militarized organization of space around notions of domesticity 
that tend to produce and channel animosity, which expresses itself as cruelty and 
violence. He argues, following Laruen Berlant and Laura Kipnis that ideas of domesticity 
 135 
centered on romantic love are infused with militarized imperatives (2005: 142). Spatial 
arrangements organized around such notions of domesticity are, in this rendering, 
productive of enmity and its correlates of cruelty and violence.  Additionally, such spatial 
arrangements function to channel antipathy towards the most vulnerable members of the 
domestic sphere.  Here, I draw a connection to the production of such internal, private, 
and domestic spaces as it is often linked to changing notions of hygiene in the nineteenth 
century with the shift away from miasmic explanations of illness due to the discovery of 
germs (Gandy 2004). Whatever the ordering logic, the end result is malice built into the 
structures of the city. Such ill will is engendered by arrangements that cause people to rub 
up against each other in unwanted, unpleasant exchange such as crowded subway cars or 
busy summer streets stuffy from the multiplying effects of urban heat islands, to name a 
few. 
Balancing this perspective is Thrift’s contention that western cities are far more 
resilient than generally given credit for, due in large part to integral processes of repair 
and maintenance at work. Such processes serve to keep necessary infrastructure intact 
through the labor of municipal workers and volunteers.  These processes of repair and 
maintenance, in turn, offer something like a glimmer of hope, a politics around a possible 
future that is inherently optimistic but also realistic (Thrift 2005: 143). Thrift is arguing 
for the creation of a system of repair and maintenance of the city’s structures of kindness. 
Extending the work of Ernest Bloch, Thrift argues that hope is about a thirst for the 
future, a politics of anticipation, a yearning towards what might be possible. Kindness 
must be installed in the city in ways beyond the everyday acts of generosity already in 
operation. Kindness must be built into the very structure of the city, physical, social and 
institutional, and extended to others beyond the human, including but not limited to 
animals (2005: 144). Cities “have to be designed as if things mattered, as if they could be 
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kind too,” (2005) and would then become spaces capable of replicating positive affect . 
Hope, in this interpretation, is enabled through repetition and the expectation of familiar 
turns; “the pace and rhythm of everyday life, the sheer turn-up again-ness of each urban 
moment and the quantum of hope that goes with it” (2005: 138-139). Repetition, then, is 
a key component of imagining a future of and in the city. 
The expectation of repetition and return is exactly what Abdel Malik Simone 
(2004) argues is missing in urban centers in Africa, where life has lost reliability, and the 
people within these urban spheres often find it difficult to predict the outcomes of even 
oft-repeated events and activities, or to rely on previous methods of survival or networks 
of affiliation. As I will show in this chapter, the situation in Ezba mirrors Simone’s 
description in some aspects, and doesn’t in others. In Ezba, life has not lost that turn-up 
again-ness to such a dramatic extent, but the practices of repetition on which a certain 
future orientation is based are disrupted by uncertainties in ways that color hope about 
Ezba’s future with traces of anxiety.   In Simone’s rendition of life in certain cities in 
Africa, young people find it increasingly difficult to spatialize an assessment of their life 
chances (2004: 3).71 For example, previous arrangements that organized where people 
would live, where or through whom they might search for work, where educational or 
vocational opportunities existed, and what geographic shape their networks of 
associations would take have become overburdened and largely obsolete. This dissolution 
has made it necessary for urban youth in Dakar, Pretoria, Douala, and Jeddah to spend 
increasing amounts of time and effort in the search for networks, connections and 
opportunities, and the newly created bonds are likely to be spatialized in more flexible 
and less predictable ways. These networks of scale operate in opaque and ephemeral 
                                                 
71 Simone is speaking specifically about informal economies and social networks in Dakar, Senegal; 
Pretoria, South Africa; Douala, Cameroon; and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
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ways, as people attempt to invent new ways of surviving through utilizing and co-opting 
the social, material and ideological resources at their disposal. Old ways of doing things, 
knowing people, or making meaning become pieces in new puzzles of opportunities 
outside of immediate kin or neighborhood networks, but these puzzles only “fit” for short 
periods of time, if at all. A constant process of making, undoing, and remaking new 
ephemeral platforms on which to secure a livelihood is continuously in progress, 
sometimes successfully, sometimes not. It is through the connections between disparate 
places, the transitory networks between individuals of different groups that extend into 
other neighborhoods in the city, to other cities in the region, to other nations, that life is 
managed and survival secured in the inventive reordering of the existent into the possible. 
In Ezbet Kherallah, the dissolution of existing networks is less stark. Many people 
came to live in the area through following relatives or neighbors from areas in Upper 
Egypt, and connections between friends and family are often the first way in which 
people pursue work, housing and marriage opportunities. Kin and neighborhood networks 
drew many people from Qena and Sohag in Upper Egypt to settle in Ezba, as well as 
chains of connection from Kafr El Sheikh in the Nile delta to the North of Cairo and then 
to the area. That these networks are overburdened, however, is clear, as there are a finite 
number of any kind of opportunity, but a nearly limitless supply of people with claims on 
one. Two aspects of Simone’s theorization describe Ezba with particular acuity. The first 
is that endless searching, testing and enforced flexibility of networks is on constant 
display. An American or Canadian NGO (depending on who you asked) hung around 
Ezba like a specter, having provided small cash grants, household goods, and assistance 
with medical care up until two years before my fieldwork period. Almost invariably, in 
my first months in Ezba, each conversation with a new contact would include requests for 
information about the status of this NGO. Is it still operating? Would it come back? Is 
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someone else receiving the benefits now, and could I help them get back on the list? 
Networks could be very concrete, such as in the case of a man who found work in his 
brother’s food preparation workshop, and a furniture workshop owner hiring the son of a 
neighbor for deliveries. Networks could also be ephemeral and odd, as with one young 
man who had found an advertisement on the internet to serve as an audience member in 
television shows out in the Media City at 20LE a pop. The family of the young man who 
earned extra money as an audience member lived largely without water, but they had 
internet on a second hand European-used computer and a very long Ethernet cable from 
the nearest cyber café, bought and paid for by his father’s labor repairing air-conditioning 
units.  
 The corollary of the endless search and the second piece of Simone’s theory that 
describes many encounters in Ezba, is the need to play everything very close to the vest 
to protect fragile possibilities. The same NGO was responsible for putting in a water 
pump and connecting a woman’s house to the water pipes, and her neighbors bitterly 
resented that she had never told them about the NGO. They finally found out when they 
went up to a worker during the installation and asked them how she was doing all of this 
work, and the person told them it was from an American aid organization.  “We don’t 
need anything, we are very lucky, we have a house and food and are fine, we just wanted 
to know if you had heard of, or had any information on, this organization.”  The careful 
management of knowledge, or the appearance of knowing something, was again at work. 
Who knows what, when, and what such knowledge is worth is a source of constant 
speculation. When one has valuable knowledge, playing dumb—ist’bat—is one way of 
making sure that such knowledge remains useful.  
 Practices of ist’bat are not limited to urban residents, but might also be accurate 
descriptors of some actions of state agencies and their representatives. Examining the 
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history of water infrastructure in Mumbai, Mathew Gandy (2008) describes the ways in 
which plans to manage potable water provision and wastewater services were shaped by 
conflicting impetuses of the post-colonial state’s limited interest in investing in 
infrastructure, incomplete modernization projects, laissez-faire attitudes of wealthy urban 
residents, and the repeating fear of pestilence from “undesirable” portions of the 
population.  Indeed, urban water infrastructure was instrumental to the development of 
municipal governance (Gandy 2004). Gandy suggests that in the case of Mumbai the 
deficiencies in infrastructure are likely to be disguised rather than addressed, looking at 
the way in which the city was chronically unable to meet the water needs of its rapidly 
expanding population and dogged by competing political agendas. To repair the aging 
and degraded water infrastructure and extend service to the poor would require financial 
investment difficult to imagine, with private companies retreating from large municipal 
water projects and schemes financed by international aid organizations failing. Amassing 
the political and financial will was far beyond an Indian state that is invested in the 
middle class as legitimating political populace.  
Investigating the relationships between the built form of cities and the patterns of 
life of urban inhabitants, what he calls “second nature,” Gandy argues that we must 
attend to the ways in which some cities, particularly in the Global South, “brutally 
circumscribe” access to basic necessities (2008). Deeply in need of these services, 
marginalized communities are especially vulnerable to manipulation by those who 
promise improved services in return for political allegiance or who make more direct 
demands for “rent” for provision or access. In part, severe inequalities in the distribution 
of water and sanitation services are enabled through other mechanisms of spatial and 
social disarticulation, where the impacts of too little to drink or wash with and too much 
sewage can be differentially imposed on parts of the population. With respect to public 
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health in Mumbai, Gandy notes that “severe disparities in public health can persist 
because of the array of technological, scientific, and architectural innovations that enable 
wealthy households to insulate themselves from the environmental conditions of the 
poor” (2008: 122 ). 
The careful distinction between western cities, where technology is booming and 
infrastructure established and maintained, and cities of the Global South, which are 
characterized as operating on informal, DIY and improvisational networks, begs the 
question of hope in the margins. What kind of city-kindness is possible in Cairo’s 
informal settlements, where infrastructure is only slowly encroaching but informal 
networks certainly abound? Places such as Ezba do not fall neatly into any dichotomy 
between have and have-not cities, as dire needs for utilities are met with practices of 
maintenance and repair both formal and springing from attachments to the spaces in 
which people reside.  
WATER IN EZBET KHAIRALLAH 
Creating potable water infrastructure in Ezba has been a difficult, long-term 
struggle for residents.  When the area was first settled, the only available water was from 
public taps in neighboring areas, and no other utility services were available (see Chapter 
One for an expanded history of the area). For many years, water was brought to Ezba by 
women walking from the public taps in Abu Ashraf and al-Basateen, balancing jerkins on 
their heads. Several women who had been in the area from that time told me that the lines 
at the ghorab [public taps] were very long and it could take hours to get to one’s turn. 
Women would sometimes send children with an empty jerkin to wait in line, and only 
come later to carry it back. At other times, people would leave the buckets by themselves 
to keep their place, but that risked someone jumping in front of them. One woman told 
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me that she had seen several physical fights between women in the lines, and had been 
afraid as a young teenager to go by herself with the jerkin. It was better, she said, when 
you could collect a few people together to go at the same time. Many of the women who 
lived in Ezba at the time said that the people of those areas, Abu Ashraf and al-Basateen, 
did not like the people from Ezba coming in and crowding the lines at their public taps, 
and conflicts over water exacerbated tensions between the areas over the perceived 
lawlessness and danger of Ezba residents. This infrastructure of lack reflected the larger 
disinterest of the governing structures in the wellbeing of the people of Ezba, produced 
malice as people rubbed up against one another in a physically exhausting and time-
consuming daily practice, and exacerbated tensions between the areas as the affective 
reverberations of Ezba as a dangerous space grew. These were Ezba’s bad old days. 
Later, when the road infrastructure improved to a degree, or at least the unpaved 
roads were formalized as spaces of transit, water began to arrive to Ezba via tanker 
trucks. In one of the ubiquitous inequalities of water access globally, the cost of such 
small water provision by tanker truck far out stripped the cost per liter that wealthy 
residents of Cairo paid for provision directly to their homes. Hajja Basma had lived in 
Ezba for 26 years, and her daughter Sumya had lived the entirety of her 22 years there, so 
they had seen it all. Describing the situation that she’d lived through, Hajja Basma said, 
“At first there was no electricity or water or sewage. People carried water from nearby. 
[Piped] water came to Ezba about 10 or 15 years ago. Before, it used to be that a truck 
came around and sold you drinking water for about ¼ of a pound for a jerkin of drinking 
water, or a couple of pounds for a big barrel of water for building the house.” The barrel 
water was not, she and her daughter stressed, for drinking. In addition to construction, it 
was also the water used for household chores and bathing. “Electricity came to the area 
much earlier than water,” the Hajja noted. Ezba finally got water thanks to Fayda Kamel, 
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who stood for parliament and, when she won, brought water to the area. “Fayda Kamel 
and some other man, whose name I don’t remember. They stood together for election and 
when they won they brought water in, created a water company. But you can find all of 
this history on the internet” she assured me, “it will all be written there.” 
 
Farmer: What was the water situation for you like? 
 
Hajja Basma: We put in water pipes before and the water was free. [When it 
 became official] they told me that I owed I don’t know how much! Something 
 like 3,000 LE. I couldn’t pay it all at once, but little by little, gathering money 
 from my sons, I was able to pay it off and finally I got a meter and now only pay 
 for what I use. A meter like they have for electricity. Now each apartment has its 
 own meter [in the family building].  
 
Farmer: How did you get the sewage system started? 
 
Hajja Basma: Oh, lots and lots of people went to the Minister and complained. 
 We did many protests. Did you hear about them? We did many protests and 
 finally got the government to agree to put in a sewage system.  
 
Farmer: How long have they been working on it? 
 
Hajja Basma: A year and a half? 
 
Suyma: It’s going on two years. 
Echoing the experience of Mumbai that Gandy details, utility services in Ezba 
were largely obtained in votes-for-services swaps, in which community members 
petitioned the state through demonstrations and public gatherings to get services. In 
response, political candidates promised to implement first electricity and then water 
utility services in exchange for votes in parliamentary elections. For years, this dynamic 
played out in pre-election surges in water pressure, changing the pace and smell of life as 
weak trickles at odd hours turned to strong flows during daylight. As Gandy points out 
about the long arch of water infrastructure, those with the greatest need and the most 
limited access to centers of power are often the most vulnerable to the political 
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mechanizations of ballot box electioneering. Speaking with officials it becomes clear that 
they are, in turn, also pressured by the presence of places like Ezba, when the volume of 
people and the unofficial drains on water networks reach such levels that they can no 
longer be ignored. One employee of the Holding Company for Water and Waste Water 
center responded to my question about how Ezba got official permission for water, “The 
government had to respond to what they found in front of them!”  
I spoke with Dr. Mehdi Alam, the representative to the People’s Assembly for the 
Zahraa area of which Ezba is part. This meeting with him helped to clarify the 
relationship of ist’bat or selective misrecognition characterized the relationship between 
Ezba and many entities of the Egyptian state system.  
Farmer: Following up on the fact that the people in Ezba do not have tenure, 
  
Alam: Yes, they do not have licenses [deeds]. 
 
Farmer: Yes. How do they get water?  
 
Alam: They have unofficial connections. They know that there is pipe 500 
 meters long and they have some plumbers or engineers without licenses. Mainly it 
 was portable supplies through cars which carried it into the area to sell it to them. 
 
Farmer: They have bills in their names, how do they get bills in their name? 
 
Alam: Bills are for the new connections, just for the newly connected. Old 
 connections don’t have bills. 
 
Farmer: Are the people there able to vote? 
 
Alam: Anyone who has an ID card can vote. 
 
Farmer: Anyone who has an id with an address in a certain area? 
 
Alam: No, when someone goes to vote he looks on the list and if they find his 
 name he can vote. It is not necessary to carry the card. Starting in 1981 it was 
 automatic enrollment. Births before that, they have to go and apply for 
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 registration to vote. So it is not necessary to carry the red card of the election as 
 long as you know you are registered in your unit. 
 
Farmer: Are people in Ezba registered? 
 
Alam: Many of them. 
 
Farmer: And they got this through an ID card listing their address in Ezba? 
 
Alam: Especially the new generation, they can automatically go to their unit and 
 vote, starting in 1981. 
 
Farmer: Do you campaign in those areas? 
 
Alam: Of course. 
 
Farmer: What kind of environmental issues are there in Ezba? 
 
Alam: There are all of the kinds of issues there (laughs). You can have all the list 
 of pollution and put it there. They are lacking sanitary water. They are lacking 
 drainage for the sewage water. They are lacking a solid waste system. They have 
 some air pollution because of the open burning of solid wastes. Because in the 
 slums there are small industries using furnaces, and in the furnaces they are using 
 some of the plastics so this is another source. They are mixing activities. The 
 house is not only a house. It is a house and workshop and farm all in the same 
 time, so this is another kind of pollution. The social pollution is a major one.   So 
 they are suffering from many environmental problems. 
 
Farmer: Are there any plans to ameliorate Ezba? 
 
Alam: There is plan for all slums according to the plans of the Fund [see Chapter 
 One for more information on the Informal Settlements Development Fund]. 
 
Farmer: Have you been to visit Ezba? 
 
Alam: Many times, because I was elected local counsel for Cairo governorate for 
 12 years and I represented this area. I know the area when there were only 10 
 houses and I know the area when there are 10,000 houses.  
In response to a question about how these houses in Ezba got started, Dr. Alam 
said that gangs came in and divided the land up between themselves, then sold plots to 
those newly arriving to the city from areas in Upper Egypt.  
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Farmer: Who would do that? 
 
Alam: Many people. People here use the resources of the country as if the 
government is not seeing them, or sees them blindly. So they do anything. The 
illegal actions are a lot. So every year you have a lot of houses being built and no 
one asks them why. This is an old bureaucratic attitude, coming from Turkish and 
British colonization. They keep it to be lazy in the government, this is a good rule. 
To be active in the government you will be fired so quickly.  
This interview with the Representative for the Zahraa area, including  Ezba, both 
provides insight into the establishment of the area, and demonstrates the political 
situation in which Ezba residents find themselves as they seek to gain services while 
maintaining some kind of balance in the costs of gaining recognition. The kinds of ist’bat 
practices of state agencies-- for example, taking account of the water being drained in 
unofficial connections to the water supply without fundamentally acknowledging the 
existence of spaces in which such tapping is done, or reading meters but sending out 
collectivized bills-- are substantively different from the kinds of creative ways that people 
manage vernacular infrastructure in Ezba. As seen with the bills, such provisionality by 
state actors can seem quite inflexible to those experiencing its effects, such as paying 15 
LE for a water bill one month and 200 LE another month. When confronted by deliberate 
evasions, misrecognitions and disavowals by state agencies, people can force themselves 
into visibility. It was through, at one level, the sheer force of the amassed bodies and 
bricks and piles of concrete, and the potential for these to exceed the limits of this space, 
that Ezba residents were able to get piecemeal accommodations from various 
departments of the government. Gaining services all the while remaining discursively 
equal before the law—they could vote because they had residence cards, even if their 
tenure on the land was in question. The double edge of the recognition sword sets the 
stage for the lives of other water objects, such as meters. What does it mean to have water 
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in Ezba? So not just how did it get there, but how does it get measured and what does 
measurement mean? 
METERS 
The reading of meters and the bills that come around afterwards are related, but 
often in less than direct ways. When faced with a bribe-asking collector, Asma had the 
opportunity to lower her water bill, but at a cost that may or may not have been greater 
than the difference in the bill. Many times, the cost on the bill is not based on the reading 
of the meter itself. Bills often seem to be randomly assigned at very high rates, and many 
residents said that it was done to recoup some of the costs of provision to those without 
meters at all. Representatives of the Holding Company for Water and Waste Water 
(HCWW) denied that bills were based on anything other than meter readings, but it was a 
story I heard often from Ezba residents. In addition, a portion of the cost of the 
installation of the sewage system started to be prorated on a monthly basis on the water 
bills, increasing some bills to over a hundred LE when they may have been 5 - 20 LE 
previously. Each month was a surprise, and people complained about the lack of 
predictability. The problem was larger than the water bills, as electricity bills also 
fluctuated widely. Systemically, the messiness of measurement systems—too few meters, 
long histories of unofficial connections, bureaucratic gaps in accountability—made utility 
bills particularly open to contestation.           
 Ali has lived in Ezba for about 25 years, the first eight of which, he said, there 
was no electricity; they had been using lamps that caused his family lung problems.  His 
house had just gotten an electricity bill for the previous two months for more than 300 
LE. His wife, Amina, had gone to the electricity company office in al-Basateen to argue 
that they couldn’t possibly have used that much electricity in a two-month span, but they 
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told her that the bill was set by the government and there was nothing she could do about 
it. She would just have to pay. Amina stressed to me that they didn’t have much that ran 
on electricity, just a few lights and a TV they used a few hours a day, and a shop built 
into the first floor of the family building that is always closed. It is possible, Ali said, that 
the government just looked on the registry and saw that there was a shop and assumed 
that it must have used a lot of electricity. But, Amina responded, on the paper the shop 
was for selling bread, nothing fancy, as that was the original purpose of the shop.  At 
various points in the past, the shop had been used for a variety of things—after its tenure 
as a bread shop, Amina had sold her bridal gold to get the capital to open a “snack” shop, 
selling sweets, sodas and juice. The shop had gone under because so many people had 
taken items on store credit and the shop had died by the slow dwindling of cash. After a 
few years, Ali had gotten the space redesigned to work as a butcher shop. He said that he 
used to get a sheep and slaughter it in the street and everyone knew that his meat was 
clean. That venture also failed, as now he doesn’t have the money to run the shop because 
even small sheep are very expensive and the wholesale market has raised their prices. As 
he explained, “People in Ezba are poor, they can’t afford expensive meat.  Rich people 
can do what they want but poor people can’t do anything or even say anything about 
water or bills or the system here. They will send in the National Security Police. 
Everybody in Ezba is just saying “yes” to the government, whatever they tell us.” 
Ali said that it seems to him they just estimate how much one should pay and it 
may have nothing to do with the reality of one’s life, and there is no real choice. If one 
doesn’t pay, they take the meter, which means being left without electricity. This was the 
flip side of having formalized the electricity connection, which Ali's family did as part of 
a strategy to get recognition from the state of their land tenure. But, he said, they didn’t 
have any kind of real rights to the land. They finally got the electricity installed because 
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there was a candidate who said that those who went to sign up to vote for them would get 
electricity. Ali signed up to vote for that candidate and had to pay five percent of the 
value of his land so that the government would consider him a tenant of a “condemned” 
building or ruins. So in the end he has no real right to the land.  
Meters for water had also developed into a part of the “recognition” matrix, 
becoming more necessary as government services expand into the area. This holds out the 
promise of “legitimating” land tenure, but also creates unwieldy costs for low-income 
residents. Many households in Ezba had not installed meters in the time since the water 
pipes were installed informally, though a few had through the years. Now, however, the 
cost of installation had risen dramatically and priced some of the most vulnerable out of 
the market.  What had cost 700 to 1000 LE when Teta installed her meter roughly five 
years previously was costing approximately 3,000 – 6,000 LE during my fieldwork 
period. It was something of a catch-22. On one hand, the implementation of the sewage 
system had increased demand and visibility of meter installation, and the cost had risen. 
On the other, the sewage system was a key component in the move towards granting land 
tenure to the people living in Ezba, where being able to register plots of land requires 
residents to provide a history of utility bills as a proxy.  The expansion of the state 
services thus had the push and pull of offering the opportunity for recognition by the 
state, but at increasingly prohibitive costs. As the possibility of land tenure came into 
view, those families who were not able to install expensive meters and pay for the high 
cost of collectivized bills, and who also had not formalized their electricity connections, 
were being left out. Such dramatic fluctuations called into question the broad narrative of 
progress, the dream future of Ezba where strong nets of infrastructure undergirded a 
pleasant place to live. In these ways, the dream future of Ezba became dystopic for some, 
where the space improved for those with the means to keep up, while others simply fell 
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further behind. Where one falls on the spectrum of recognizability is a question open to 
interest and speculation by neighbors and acquaintances, though one might wish to keep 
such information private. 
Um Amina’s small soap and toiletries store was a place where people often 
gathered to discuss issues big and small. Upon my arrival for one visit, there was a group 
of ladies standing in front of Um Amina’s store complaining about water bills that people 
were receiving. They had just heard that the government was charging roughly 6,000 LE 
to have a meter installed, when it used to be about 1,000 LE, and they were speculating 
that the change in cost was due to the septic system. The eldest of the ladies present, Um 
Fatma, was the mother of the bride in a recent wedding, where the festivities had fried 
Um Amina’s TV due to surging power. She said that that everyone had to pay for the new 
sewage system in one way or another. She said her meter had been in forever, but Um 
Amina insisted that she didn’t have one.  
“No,” Um Fatma replied, “we installed it when your mother-in-law was still 
living in the room behind you,” gesturing into the house. Um Fatma was working to 
manage knowledge by playing ist’bat, because who knows what it would cost for these 
women—or a newly arrived anthropologist—to know about one’s meter-status.  The 
ladies visiting the store then collaborated to create an impromptu list of names of those 
around them who had installed meters. Um Negl’a also complained that the bill had risen 
a great deal since she’d had the meter installed. It used to be seven LE a month, which 
she split between herself and the tenant in the apartment over her house, but it was now 
25 or 30 LE per month. When asked, Um Negl’a estimated that this change in cost 
happened over the course of seven to ten years.  
After they left, I asked Um Amina if she had a meter and she said no, she had 
never installed one and that very few people in Ezba have meters. She started hearing 
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rumors in the last 10 days or so that they were going to be charged around 6,000 LE and 
said, “The government should help people get water legally, but instead they make it 
more expensive.” “What happens if you don’t have a meter, do you pay anything?” I 
asked. “Yes, if you don’t have a meter you pay gharas [doorbell]. Someone comes to 
your door and rings the doorbell and asks you if you have a meter. If you don’t, they 
charge you 100 or 200 LE. It’s better to have water officially, but the government is 
making it very hard. This water thing frustrates me.” 
I heard repeated complaints about the immorality of charging for water, as water 
is something created by God and therefore should be provided free of charge. Echoing 
the concerns that David Osgood from Chemonics articulated, local officials expressed the 
urgency of impressing on the population the difference between paying for water and 
paying for water services. One official from the Eyen al-Sera compliant center for the 
Cairo Water Company asked me to be an intermediary, to explain to the residents of Ezba 
that the government is not, in fact, charging for the water itself, but rather charging for 
the cost of getting it to their houses. “You know them [people in Ezba], you speak to 
them. Please explain this to them! Explain to them that we are not charging them for 
water. We are charging them for the cost of bringing it from the river Nile to their homes. 
Is it free to pump the water? Is the pump free? Is it free to purify the water? To build the 
pipes and pay the people to bring the water all the way to their faucet? No. It costs, and 
they must pay their share. People in Egypt don’t pay much for water, not like the rest of 
the world. In other countries it costs a lot, and here it’s almost free—like we are giving it 
away.” 
Meters presented other anxieties, as the measurement they represented introduced 
other uncertainties. What exactly was being measured? Who was keeping track? To 
whom did one owe? One woman whose house had not yet installed a meter asked me if 
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the government would be able to tell how much water she was consuming by measuring 
what the sewage output was. What goes in must come out, and she was afraid of an 
unpaid wave of sewage bubbling up and telling tales of theft. 
Um Sameer’s concerns over measurement were weightier. When discussing the 
implementation of meters in Ezba, Um Sameer was struck by a thought, “If we are 
paying for water now, and they say we have been stealing it this whole time, can you 
imagine the [moral] cost? Think of all of the millions of drops of water over the last 
fifteen years—to be held responsible for all them.” The moral burden of having “stolen” 
what would amount to hundreds of millions of “drops” of water over these years was an 
overwhelming thought. Were they to be counted as individual deeds? 
MOTORS 
In the ways that water systems overlap, improvements to one don’t always lead 
neatly to improvements in others, or they can bring to light or exacerbate existing 
problems in related systems. Visiting an apartment building, I heard several versions of 
the day’s argument. The previous day the apartment building had finally been put online 
on the sewage system, a major step forward as they now had a place for all of the water to 
go—the chief reason that the landlord had limited the running water to their apartment 
building to certain hours of the day. While the people in the building were responsible for 
coming together to pay for the septic truck to pump out the transh [septic tank] in the old 
system, a building of that size would have filled even their relatively large trench in a 
matter of hours if all of the tenants were using water at the same time, making sewage 
removal constant and very expensive. Overflows would have made neighbors near the 
building angry, and they would have held the landlord responsible. Long story short, the 
building was largely dry, in that the water was severely limited, and that in turn limited 
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the amount of rent he could charge. Additionally, even when the water was turned on, it 
rarely reached above the second or third floor in the seven-story building because the 
pump was too weak. Women in the upper floors had to come down to their neighbors’ 
apartments while the water was running and fill buckets and jerkins, to be carried up the 
stairs on their heads. 
The promise of the sewage system coming on line was the promise of round the 
clock water, finally having access to use the water that was available via DIY piping for 
the last roughly fifteen years. But there was one step left—getting the water from the 
subterranean pipes up to the top of a seven-story apartment building. That would require 
a pump, to pull water up to all of the apartments. One representative of the HHWC told 
me to be careful not to drink water from homes in Ezba because they kept water in large 
water storage tanks on the rooftops of their buildings, and the tanks were filthy with mold 
and dead animals. Rooftop tanks are relatively rare in Ezba, despite the fact that they are 
designed to serve precisely the kind of uncertain, intermittent water flow situation from 
which Ezba had long suffered. For many houses, they were an unnecessary expense 
because water came often enough that most houses could survive during periods of no 
flow with water stored in jerkins and bottles in their kitchens and bathrooms.  
Additionally, many of the single-story or two-story homes didn’t have pumps to drive the 
water up to the roof, as they relied on water pressure in the pipes to fill their water needs. 
For others in Ezba a tank was simply too expensive an investment, or it was too difficult 
to organize payment in the case of multi-family buildings, however useful it might be.   
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Figure 19: Water meter in Cairo apartment building. Image by author, 2010. 
The day’s argument centered on the issue of pumps. The landlord came and told 
them that he needed 100 LE from each house to buy two new water pumps to get water 
all the way up to the top floor for each side of the apartment building. People on the first 
and second floors did not want to pay, including Um Wasam, because they were getting 
water with the pump as it existed. Returning from work Madam Nafesa found everyone 
gathered together at the entrance to the building. An elderly woman from the fourth floor 
was yelling at Um Wasam that she would pay. Um Wasam was yelling that she wouldn’t, 
how could she spend 100 LE that her husband had earned with the sweat of his brow on 
water for other people?  
The conflict unresolved, the landlord told them that he would run the water from 
6am to 9am every day for now, until everyone got their money together to pay for the 
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pumps. People were saying that it was a shame that there was less mercy now, with the 
magari [sewage and/or sewage system] running, than there had been before, and it should 
be the opposite, especially since Ramadan was going to start in a few weeks.  Sitting with 
Madam Nafesa and her college-age daughter Sumya, they complained about this lack of 
mercy between people, “at first our problem was the sewage, because the magari was 
broken. The thing that was tiring was the magari. But now, that’s ended. The magari has 
been fixed. There should be mercy, but there isn’t any. Those in control of the water have 
closed it; they don’t want to open it up for anyone until they collect the money. They 
want 100 LE from each apartment even if they only have 50 LE. There are people who 
have [money] and people who don’t have [money] [at the moment]. How will they [who 
don’t have it] give money? We have one lady upstairs who doesn’t have work. How will 
she pay? It’s up to God to find her the 100 LE. And the lady who lives next to her, her 
husband died, for example, or she’s raising kids, how will she pay? Haram [forbidden] or 
haram, this way? This is the center of the problem.” 
Madam Nafesa was expressing frustration not only the lack of willingness from 
some in the apartment building to act collectively, but also at the difficulty imposed by 
the expectation that residents be responsible for the cost of the pumps. 
 
Farmer: Who was demanding the money? 
 
Madam Nafesa: One who is in control of the apartment building, the landlord. 
 
Sumya: No one can live without water, right or wrong? 
 
Farmer: Right. 
 
Sumya: Especially in Ramadan. During Ramadan the water is always on. 
 Everyone has guests, for example. There are dishes to be washed. The rugs need 
 to be cleaned. The water needs to be running. Being without water is impossible, 
 Haram. God will keep account of their actions and punish them. We just want a 
 little water but no, some people don’t want us to have what they have. There is 
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 one old woman on the fifth floor who has to haul water from the ground floor all 
 the way up on her head.  My neck hurts me too, from carrying water. Water is 
 heavy.    
Sumya’s frustration is with both the landlord’s imposition of the fee and with the 
neighbors below who “didn’t want others to have what they have,” despite the daily 
presence of those who were suffering from its lack. Shouldn’t there be mercy for those 
who couldn’t pay, especially in the month dedicated to reminding those with bodily 
comforts about the deprivations of those who have less? Where was the kindness? 
Despite the pronouncement by the landlord that water would only run from 6 to 9am, 
which he intended to be a hardship, the water came on while I was there in the afternoon. 
After hearing the first version of the argument I went to sit with Um Wasam for a 
while. Playing ist’bat gently, she talked to me about how difficult it has been to make 
ends meet without specifically mentioning the fight. If rent is 350 LE, plus other bills for 
utilities are maybe 150 LE, and her husband was in a small savings association to help 
pay back his brother’s debt for 500 LE per month, and he earned 1000LE a month, what 
did that leave her to live on? What would she use to buy children’s clothes, and to feed 
them? What about school costs? 
  
Um Wasam: But we are almost done 
 
Farmer: It’s almost at an end? 
 
Um Wasam: Yes, there are seven people ahead of us in the savings association, so 
that means that we have seven more months of this. 
They were in such dire economic straights because they were working to pay off 
the debt of an elder brother living in their hometown. The brother took out a loan for 
5,000 LE at a very high interest rate, so in the end he owed 9,000 LE. Unable to pay that 
back, the man he had taken the loan from was going to send him to jail, so the younger 
brothers were helping to pay it back. But they don’t have much money either, so it put a 
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huge dent in their lives and the lives of their families. The financial insecurity left Um 
Wasam on edge, she said, and made her frustrated with neighbors who insisted she would 
pay for the pumps. The pumps were a good idea for her too, she pointed out—“Who 
wants to get up at 6am to catch the water while it’s on?” If the pumps were installed, she 
would have all day, every day access to water. But, where would that 100 LE come from? 
What she wanted, she said, is a piece of land to build on and a truck of his own for her 
husband. That seemed ever further away.  
TOMATOES 
Lao Al Naher an-Nil ba’a salsa, mish ha'kafee al cusa ila feki ya msr. 
[Even if] all of the Nile River became tomato sauce, it wouldn't be enough [to 
 make mahshi with all of] the zucchini in Egypt. 
Zucchini, or cusa, is a gloss for nepotism and corruption, the joke being that the 
problem is so endemic that the literal river Nile in all of its profound length and depth, if 
transformed into tomato sauce, would be insufficient to handle the scale of the problem. 
This common joke describes the ubiquity of corruption and nepotism in Egypt circa 2010, 
as well as the ubiquity of the implied stuffed vegetables.   
In early February 2011, I made a phone call to a friend in my research site, Ezbet 
Khairallah.  I had only recently left the field, having traveled back to the US in mid-
January after the sixteen months of research. Between my departure and that phone call 
to a friend was, of course, the January 25th revolution that brought down Egypt’s long-
ruling President Hosni Mubarak. I wanted to check on her wellbeing, and see what news 
she had-- as there were reports that some of the thugs hired by the government to harass 
protesters were coming from Ezba. The first thing my friend wanted to talk about, 
however, was the dramatic rise in the price of tomatoes in the early days post-revolution.  
“Twelve pounds (LE) a kilo! Can you imagine?” she asked me. Twelve Egyptian pounds 
was roughly 2 US dollars at the time, and the price of a kilo of tomatoes is generally in 
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the 1 to 3 LE range.  Here, the tomato functioned as a shorthand way of referring to the 
difficulties of life during that uncertain moment, a kind of low-tech economic indicator of 
precarity. 
Tomatoes have figured in the news since the revolution for other things as well, as 
happened in the blogosphere kerfuffle in 2012 over a Facebook post by a salafist group in 
Egypt warning that the tomato was a Christian fruit because of the resemblance to the 
cross when cut in half lengthwise. This was another nail in the coffin of rational thought 
from the religiously-oriented, or so argued those against the rise in prominence of 
religiously-affiliated political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. “These people” 
can’t be trusted to think rationally, as evidenced by casting sectarian aspersions on the 
prosaic tomato. Then there were the rumors that Israeli tomatoes in the Egyptian market 
were poisoned with high concentrations of solanine, a naturally occurring glycoalkaloid 
in plants in the nightshade family, such as tomatoes and potatoes. The story started, it 
seems, from the idea that genetically modified seeds from Israel were being smuggled in 
through Gaza and poisoning Egyptians. Last, but certainly not least, were the news 
reports of tomatoes and shoes being thrown at US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
during her visit in summer 2012 by people who blamed the US for support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood during their short and contentious time in power. Secretary Clinton brushed 
aside the intentions behind those tomatoes and instead lamented the waste of food.  The 
humble tomato sure gets around. 
As with many things in life, the value of the humble tomato became most 
apparent in its absence.  In Ezba, tomatoes are fleshy, palpable vehicles of virtual water, 
they are objects manipulated in gendered labor, they are items indispensable to the 
demonstration of love, they are trace signifiers of circular movements between rural 
spaces and city neighborhoods, and they are economic indicators that signal the loss of 
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predictability of daily life in structurally adjusting Egypt circa 2010 and politically 
turbulent Egypt since January 2011. Tomatoes are items that epitomize contact, that 
demonstrate the ways that all entities and spaces are fundamentally composites of various 
interdependent space and creatures necessary for, yet also threatening, each other’s 
survival. Deep red and soft to the touch, light red with green around the edges, sweet and 
juicy or mealy and dry, tomatoes are a keystone species in Ezba. 
Twelve pounds a kilo for tomatoes was not, in fact, difficult for me to imagine as 
prices had soared during my fieldwork period as well. It also was not difficult to imagine 
the impact on people’s diets and daily lives when so much of the income of poor families 
in Egypt is spent on food.  No one knows quite why tomatoes became so expensive all of 
a sudden in September 2010, why on Sunday you could make mahshi and by Friday you 
couldn't afford it. Full and empty bellies told heads the story, expanding and contracting, 
churning acid breaking down nutrients one day and the next gnawing on useless calories 
from junk food, though the denomination in your hand hadn't changed. Some people in 
Ezba said it was because the unusually hot summer sun in Upper Egypt had desiccated 
the tomatoes in the fields. Others said it was that all of the tomatoes were being sold to 
Europe, while still others imparted with equal certainty that greedy middle men were 
price gouging during Ramadan.  Newspapers and magazines also provided a variety of 
explanations, though not necessarily more true simply for being written down.  
The arrival of a cartload of tomatoes in Ezba in the early morning hours marks the 
end of a long journey from fields in upper Egypt, where farmers utilize water diverted 
from the Nile through miles of progressively narrowing irrigation channels (Barns 
forthcoming) to feed the nation. This fecundity is part of the myth of Egypt, Egypt’s 
“beans, cucumbers, garlic, lentils, and onions” (The Qur'an, Surah al-Baqarah, 2.61). 
These tomatoes are transported in huge Mercedes trucks, or in small Isuzu pickups, 
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packed tightly but carefully in rickety wooden boxes, traveling overnight on the dizzying, 
ill-marked highways that connect fields and urban centers along the length and sinews of 
Egypt.  Mostly these tomatoes arrive first to centers of produce distribution in spaces on 
the periphery of Cairo, to be sold by middle men to smaller distributors or larger shop 
owners. They then make their way out to neighborhoods throughout the city, sometimes 
on trucks, sometimes on donkey carts. Fresh coriander, dill, and arugula make their way 
to housewives harried or browsing, and men stopping to pick up one last item on their 
way home from work. These little bunches of fresh produce come from small farms on 
the outskirts of Cairo, in fields that are slowly being engulfed in ever spreading shanty 
areas exploding outwards scattershot style from the city center. They often move under 
steam other than fossil fuel. 
These are some of the circular movements that link Ezba to other spaces in Egypt, 
to fertile fields in Beheira and small rest stops along the busy highways. Other circular 
relationships have people traveling back to natal villages to visit relatives for Eid 
[holiday] or for a wedding, young male cousins arriving in Izba to crash on the floor 
while they look for work, small children being sent to stay with grandma to finish the 
school year while their mothers and fathers try to earn a living. Baladi [folk or country]72 
chickens occupy Ezba freezers in anticipation of a special occasion or illness, gifts from 
mothers and sisters in Upper Egypt who carried water from canals or kitchen sinks to fill 
communal bowls and wet grain and old bread to nurture chicks in backyard or rooftop 
coops.  
 
                                                 
72 See EA Early 1993 for a description of baladi 
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Figure 20: Rooftop chicken coop in Ezbet Khairallah. Image by author, 2010. 
In all these relationships of movement, water is transferred from one space to 
another, following particular social relations of love and money. In this way, tomato-
travel is not so unusual, marking rather than creating the nodes of transport and exchange 
that make life possible in Ezba. Such is the weight of virtual water.  
The ladies in Ezba told me that to get the best produce, you have to go early in the 
mornings when these tomatoes arrive fresh to the market in Ezba or in Abu Ashraf. The 
best tomatoes, and the best deals, were to be had at the weekly market in al-Basateen, at 
Tunsi market, but that was before a car careened off of the Sayeda Aesha bridge into the 
wooden market booths and sparked a massive fire that consumed the whole market area 
in June, 2010.73  During my tenure in Ezba, the early morning trip to get produce was 
more ideal than reality. Mornings were times to rush around the house, urging reluctant, 
sleepy children to hurry to school, homework packed in backpacks, or a trip to get bread 
from the subsidized bakeries, to fight in line for one’s turn. For those who had the money, 
                                                 
73 “At least 3 killed in Cairo market blaze” al-Masry al-Youm. Accessed on January 7, 2012. 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/50990 
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morning was time for a quick bite of ful and tameya74 from the local place if you're in a 
hurry, or the better one just on the other side of the bridge from Ezba, if you aren't. Those 
without the money drank tea, and waited for the afternoon meal.  
Shopping trips for produce were often mid-morning affairs to get lunch ready, or 
early afternoon on the way back from picking the kids up at school. Um Wasam and Um 
Kareem were lucky, and could often take turns leaving their youngest children with each 
other while they ran errands. Accompanying Um Kareem to pick up tomatoes for a 
mahshi project one day, we first had to battle her youngest daughter’s desire to go with us 
on the errand. Minal followed us down the stairs, screaming that she did not want to be 
left with her siblings and cousins in her aunt’s apartment. Her mother attempted to ignore 
the disturbance, but Minal escorted us all of the way down to the building exit. There her 
mother took a bag of chips on credit from the small store in the facing building as a bribe, 
enduring a lecture from the proprietress about the length of her credit bill for treats for 
her children. With that, Minal headed back upstairs with her prize, and Um Kareem 
guaranteed an argument with the other children over favoritism on her return from 
shopping. Flustered, she turned to me and said that she didn’t want any of the children 
accompanying us because the day before her elder daughter had fallen down into the deep 
trench opened for the main sewage line and had had to be fished out, after which Um 
Kareem spanked her to teach her not to repeat the mistake. 
We walked down the stairs of her apartment building and out into the Negah 
street market area. It was one of the few benefits of living in the apartment buildings on 
this high end of Ezba, having such easy access to the everyday vendors. Around noon the 
sun was hot and strong, and most vendors had cloth umbrellas carefully positioned to 
                                                 
74 Ful are cooked fava beans, and taymeya is the Egyptian term for what is more commonly known as 
falafel. They are common breakfast items, sold in small shops and food carts throughout the city. 
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shield their wares, and themselves as well, or they sat in the shade of nearby buildings. 
Today we needed to buy a few kilos of small green peppers and eggplants, a kilo of rice, 
two bunches of fresh coriander, and two kilos of soft tomatoes. That the tomatoes be soft 
was a mandate of the mahshi project. As many people don’t have the  money to buy items 
in bulk and use them for multiple projects, each meal requires the project of assembling 
its components. Um Kareem and I found a vendor selling tomatoes for the going rate of 8 
pounds a kilo. His folding cart had three sections, the first of which had firmer, redder 
and less blemished wares, the second section less desirable tomatoes for 7.50. The third 
section at 7 LE were the sadder, overripe and imperfect offerings. Another women joined 
us as we picked over the cheapest section, searching for just good enough options for our 
mahshi project. She started a discussion with the vendor by first pointing out the low 
quality of his cheapest option and challenging his price. She suggested that instead he sell 
the low quality tomatoes for 6 LE a kilo. “No,” he cut her off, “tomatoes are on fire 
[regarding price].” She asked, “But how am I going to be able to make a meal for my 
family when I can’t afford tomatoes?” But how,” he responded, “am I to feed my family 
by giving them away to you?” Um Kareem watched the discussion with some interest, 
and then returned to the process of selecting tomatoes for her own family. With hungry 
children upstairs, she had her own work to do.  
Can you say "I love you" without tomatoes? Maybe, but your options are more 
limited. The material and moral infrastructure in Ezba provide particular opportunities 
and challenges, as limited resources meet careful evaluation of all alternatives that might 
make one’s budget stretch just a little further. Looking next at the practices of keeping 
sabils in Ezba, the connections between today’s challenges and tomorrow’s hopes come 
into sharp relief.  
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SABIL  
The sabil has a special role to play in shaping the material and moral 
infrastructure in Ezba, serving to mark spaces as livable and passable and perhaps also 
spiritual. Sabils also tell a tale about the development of Ezba from the early years of 
small settlement, and possibilities that have opened and closed again as the area has 
lurched towards incorporation into the municipal infrastructure of Cairo.  As in Thrift’s 
imagination of a vernacular infrastructure of kindness, sabils are drinking fountains set 
up as charity, directed to passersby or travelers. Sabils demonstrate the particularities of 
the moral universe in which Ezba’s affective dimensions take shape—they are tied to 
religious conceptions about the value of sharing water, to lines of historical precedent in 
Cairo, and to changing perceptions in Ezba about what it means to be a part of this 
neighborhood.  In the physical sense, sabils can range from simple earthenware pitchers 
that cool the water through evaporation on to elaborate marble buildings, though many 
modern sabils are mechanized water coolers.  
 
   
Figure 21: Mechanized Cooler 
Image by Author 
2010 
   Figure 22: Earthenware 
Pitcher. Image 
by Author 2010 
Figure 23: Termos. Image 
by Author 
2010 
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Cairo was once renowned for having combination sabil-madrasa [charitable 
water fountain combined with a school], though the waqf [endowment] system through 
which these dual functioning structures were funded in perpetuity by eminent people has 
largely collapsed (Mostafa 1989). Commonly placed on main roads, near schools, or 
outside mosques, sometimes people put sabils in front of their homes or businesses for 
ease of care, and in the case of businesses, perhaps also for improved foot traffic. 
Instituting a sabil gathers hasanat [merits accrued with God] for its creator, and those 
hasanat can be shared by those who participate in maintenance, or passed on to those to 
whom a sabil is dedicated. Dedications are often made to the memory of a loved one. The 
simple act of giving someone a drink of water carries a significant cultural load. To give 
someone water is to give them life, and to give one person life is to give life to all 
humanity.  
Um Hameed lives in a modest cement one-room apartment, the original structure 
that she and her husband built 26 years previously, and onto which her children have built 
apartments to the side and above. They live in an older section of Ezba, close to the ring 
road and Abu Ashraf, where many of the early arriving families built single room homes 
and accreted apartment buildings over time. They have an Ezba sort of success, arriving 
in the early days from a rural village and outlasting the deprivations of a service-poor 
area while their children and the utilities, transportation, and community grew around 
them. 
In her sixties, Um Hameed is mourning the untimely death of two children, a 
daughter and a son, who passed away in quick succession. To honor their memory, she 
and her husband decided to get a sabil. They spent a few years accumulating the 
necessary capital to purchase a mechanized water cooler, and finally had the 900 pounds 
for one of the cheapest versions on the market. They went to a shopping district in old 
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Cairo and bargained hard to get the one that they wanted, and brought it back to their 
home. They approached a nearby mosque to see if it could be installed there, but the 
mosque requested a lump sum payment of several thousand pounds, more than the cost of 
the device, for upkeep. Disappointed, Um Hameed and her husband decided to install the 
sabil outside their home on a tiny side street. In some places, people who purchase sabils 
will collaborate with family or neighbors living on a main thoroughfare to have the sabil 
placed at their home, thereby sharing the hasanat for their role in the maintenance of the 
sabil. However, these sorts of arrangements were beyond the social ties that Um 
Hameed's family could deploy in Ezba. They brought in a plumber, who drilled a hole in 
their main concrete wall through which to run electricity and a water line for the device. 
They bought a metal cage to protect the sabil from damage by passing cars. They hand 
painted a sign with the names of their children and hoped that passersby would pray for 
mercy on their souls, "pray that they were drinking from the rivers of paradise."  
When all of the preparation was finished, they gathered to turn on the sabil. 
Nothing. They plugged and unplugged it. They pulled the water hose off and on, 
tightening and loosening the fastener. Nothing. They shook it. It was no use, the motor 
wouldn't come on. They called a family friend who was a mechanic and he looked at it, 
and suggested that they purchase a new motor. They saved up and purchased a new motor 
for a few hundred pounds, and he installed it for a nominal fee. Even with the new motor, 
however, they couldn't get the cooling mechanism to work properly. For now the sabil 
stands in front of their house, collecting political ads and sorrow.  
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Figure 24: Um Hameed’s sabil. Image by author, 2010. 
 
Sitting in the cool of Um Hameed’s home over tea, I asked: But the water works? 
 You could take a drink from the machine?” 
 
Um Hameed: Yes, but it's not cold. What's the point if it's not cold? 
 
Farmer: Why don’t you get a simpler version? One of the plastic water coolers  
 or… 
 
Um Hameed: Look, we are getting the magari [sewage system]. Things are 
 improving. Maybe we’ll get this working, we just have to save up. Maybe it will 
 work out. 
Such moments highlight the shifting evaluations of what is possible by Ezba 
residents, what Thrift might call the politics of anticipation, where the future is uncertain 
but carries the possibility of better things both in the material sense of improved 
infrastructure and possibility within a local cosmological sense of preparations for the 
afterlife. 
Walking around Ezba, there are many sabils on display. Along al-Negah Street 
there are a few of the large earthenware pitchers in front of shops and small workshops, 
and occasionally a sabil tree, which is a metal frame that holds several small earthenware 
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pots. More frequent, though, are “termoses,” plastic water coolers set on side tables with 
a cup attached by a string. Residents told me that there had been few sabils in Ezba 
before the large-scale connection of DIY pipes tapped into municipal water supplies 
some fifteen years previously. Few people could afford the time or effort of hand 
carrying water from neighboring areas, only to give it away. As Ezba developed, and 
water connections proliferated, people began establishing sabils largely at mosques or in 
front of businesses. Children whose homes had not yet been connected would stop by to 
fill a water bottle on their way to school, mothers with small children would pause on 
their way home from shopping, men on their way to work, patterns which can still be 
seen although the need is less pressing. The mechanized sabils are favorite locations for 
political advertisements, and many have been plastered with political campaign posters.  
A sabil is a gesture towards the afterlife, “a bodily need met with a spiritual response,” as 
one resident told me.  
The proprietress of a small snack store a few blocks from Um Hameed kept her 
own kind of sabil. Outside of her home-based store she kept a white plastic bucket, which 
she filled with water from her bathroom tap. I had noticed it when walking in and out of 
her place before, but hadn’t remarked on it. One day while we were sitting in her 
customary location in the entranceway to the house, a dog came up, looked around 
carefully, and took a drink out of the bucket. I turned in surprise to Um Marwa, and she 
smiled, “That’s what it’s there for.”  
Farmer: You have a sabil for dogs? 
Um Marwa: Dogs, cats and birds. 
Farmer: Really, I’d never heard of a sabil for dogs and cats? Maybe birds. 
Um Marwa: Weren’t we told to take care of everything with a wet liver? 
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Figure 25: Um Marwa’s sabil for neighborhood animals. Image by author, 2010. 
Um Marwa was referring to a hadith in which someone asks the prophet if one 
would earn hasanat for the care of animals and livestock. Not just livestock, he replied, 
but anything with a moist liver. The equivalent might be anything with a heartbeat. She 
said that the idea had come to her after watching a cat come in to drink out of the bucket 
intended for watering the ducks and geese living under her stairwell, gifts from her 
daughter’s fiancé.   A widow of long standing, with a number of children to support on 
her husband’s death benefits and the modest income from the sale of cookies and soda at 
her shop, any kind of larger sabil seemed out of reach. “Do you gather hasanat for a sabil 
for animals?” I asked. Um Marwa replied, “Of course. A man went to heaven for giving a 
dog water out of his shoes.”  
This was an example often repeated in conversations about the value of water. 
The popular hadith told of a man who went to the well in the desert to get a drink. When 
he climbed back out of the well, he saw a dog that was licking the mirage of water. He 
climbed back down into the well, carried water back up in his shoes by his teeth, and 
gave the dog the water. God thanked him and forgave him [his sins]. It was often paired 
with a hadith about a woman who was careless and closed a cat up in a building without 
 169 
water or the ability to forage for food on its own, and the death of the cat was the reason 
for the woman being consigned to hell. 
Lauren Berlant’s (2013) recent work on the idea of the commons, investigating 
both the romantic notion of  a shared public good and its negative inversion through 
exclusion and resistance, points to the affective dimensions of infrastructure as it 
separates and connects people in non-innocent, hierarchal ways.  The water infrastructure 
in Ezbet Khairallah has been influenced by the changing patterns of housing for rural to 
urban migration in Cairo, changing state priorities for urban development, its proximity 
to tourist sites and geographical layout along a limestone hill (see Chapter Three), 
shifting political winds, and, the mother of all invention, necessity. Within this network 
of received possibility, the residents of Ezba have built new possibilities for themselves, 
for lives that work with water carried on heads or tapped into through extensive chains of 
DIY piping, for possible futures that manage the here and now challenges of mechanical 
failure and the promise of potential investments for the afterlife.  
The five water objects covered in this chapter—the meter, pump, bill, tomato and 
sabil—illuminate the ways in which water infrastructure is implicated in city 
possibilities, both of kindness and malice. Thrift’s articulation of the affective knot of 
cities is future-oriented, an accounting of the ways in which the built environment codes 
certain kinds of potentials that evoke hope, or don’t, that allow people to imagine 
possible futures by making the present knowable, patterns repeatable, or invoke 
uncertainty and model dystopic dream futures. In Ezba, water infrastructure is changing 
substantially, and with it attendant modes of measuring and accounting for water use, and 
of people’s belonging to particular spaces.  
As the conversation about who did and did not have a meter outside Um Amina’s 
soap shop demonstrated, managing the here and now, and potential futures, requires the 
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careful management of knowledge--a smart woman knows how to play ist’bat. A smart 
state employee knows how to play ist’bat as well, “seeing places blindly” as needs 
outstrip the possibility for state response, and as individuals manage their own careers. 
Bills demonstrate the provisionality of state players, as the man who loved dry tea may 
act to subvert the HCWW’s intention to improve the extraction of rent for water services 
by diverting some of that to subsidize his own very low wages, while the bill that results 
from his readings operates on a very different logic of measurement than the ticking of 
the meters would imply. Um Wasam’s conflict with her neighbors highlights the 
disconnect between scales of infrastructure systems, from massive government-led utility 
implementation projects to building-wide water sharing. Improvements to one system 
may begin to shed light on fissures in another.  The sabils of Um Hameed and Um 
Marwa demonstrate everyday rhythms of subversion, and attachment to place, as 
residents work endlessly to convert the existent into the possible.   
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Conclusion  
Um Mina drew her chin back, pushing her jowls out and looking at me from the 
corner of her eyes, "I clean it every day. I'm very clean, very clean. I clean the carpet 
every day. I put a lot of water on the floor, a lot! I cook every day, I don't serve leftovers. 
And I clean every piece of food that comes into my house." She invites me to go in with 
her to the kitchen and watch her clean her meat, pouring dish soap into the plastic bowl in 
the sink, kneading the chunks of meat like dough, squishing it between her fingers. At the 
same time, her daughters had pulled all of the rugs off the floor, demonstrating the vast 
quantity of water that they used to mop and clean the apartment floor. This refrain opened 
and closed every conversation that I had with Um Mina, "I'm clean, I'm very clean." For 
all the months that I knew her, I pondered the reason for her repetition of this assurance. 
Um Mina was unusually persistent in showing and explaining to me her wisdom as a 
housewife and mother, her vigor in cleaning, her attention to the details of her children's 
education, the propriety with which her three daughters conducted themselves. But this 
refrain was tied into an anxiety about Ezba that I often encountered. "Beta’rafi minina?" 
[Do you get disgusted by us?] was always the first question I was asked by hostesses 
when I made a polite refusal when offered refreshment, adding to the give and take of a 
hostess's duty to press drink on guests and the guest's job to politely refuse until 
sufficiently entreated.   
Um Mina’s concern over being recognized as clean indexes the social and 
affective repercussions of the material realities of life in Ezbet Khairallah. Residents are 
sensitive to the messages of value that are coded in the differing access that their area has 
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to the services of the city, and their bodies are marked by their enmeshment in these 
systems. The presence of sewage and challenges around obtaining and distributing water 
leave impressions and reform tissue relations and imprint scent on selves moving in and 
out of Ezba spaces. In the everyday forms of collaboration and ist’bat with 
representatives of state institutions, people in Ezba work to make utilities work for them. 
The comings together for actions like the blue jerkin demonstrations in 2008 are 
moments when area residents stake the claim to their right to the city. As Lefevre (1991) 
argued, the right to the city is one in which people make a collective argument for a 
transformed and renewed city. The sewage cosmopolitan as it has been articulated in this 
dissertation is a claim to collective belonging based on shared struggle, a broadly 
articulated but resolutely particular connection between people in a diverse city. The city 
that a sewage cosmopolitan may seek to arrive at is one in which there is collective action 
and recognition of  multiple versions of flourishing and the common elements of a 
successful platform on which such visions can be based. Reading the experiences of these 
everyday and collective actions puts into intimate perspective the literature on the nature 
of the state as neither disembodied nor totally attached to its boundaries; neither an 
omnipresent entity against which resistance is futile nor so wholly molecularized as to 
have no coherence in its processes. Residents of Ezbet Khairallah work within these 
systems of received possibility to articulate particular kinds of political opportunities that 
set the stage in many ways for the events in Egypt over the last three years.  
In this dissertation, I have examined the infrastructure of water and wastewater in 
Ezba as zones of contact linking the squatter settlement to outside spaces, and that also 
mediates relationships among its residents and between the humans and non-humans 
within its borders. I traced how wastewater’s flow and collection is shaped by pipes and 
drains, puddles and hill gradients; how state institutions and processes negotiate water 
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and sewage systems in interaction with particular marginalized spaces and their 
inhabitants; and how the universality of water and excrement make them contact zones 
between humans and an array of zoological strata. This framing offered a closeup shot of 
systems in place, crafting a geographic object that includes within it systems and spaces 
implicated in questions of what it is to be a human engaged in relations with our human, 
non-human biological, inanimate, and non-corporeal counterparts.  People in Ezba live in 
difficult economic, social, physical and political situations, and these systems, flows, 
frictions, and networks carry with them dangers and punishments, joys and flourishings 
both broad and incredibly intimate. It has long been the object of social science to see 
how people make lives, make livings, make homes, make meanings and make 
communities (which they also destroy and undo). What does it mean to flourish in these 
marginal urban spaces in Ezbet Khairallah, Cairo and the larger Middle East? What 
possibilities do histories of spatial segregation currently being remade enable or close for 
the many interrelated entities that connect there, the assemblages, be they built forms, 
nonhuman organisms, social worlds, or affective currents? What imagination of futures, 
world-weary though they may be, become visible in a concentrated engagement with the 
many lives becoming (Haraway 2008) in Ezbet Khairallah? 
Situating this dissertation as a reading of water as a total social fact (Orlove and 
Caton 2010; see also Mauss 1966 and Durkheim 1982 (1895)), we have been able to read 
some of the details of life in Ezba by looking at the pipes and puddles there. By following 
the processes of managing overflow and lack, and the implementation of a new state run 
sewage system, a sense of the material and political context begins to emerge. As detailed 
in the introduction, this builds off of earlier research in the city of Cairo, which looked at 
issues of economy, health, and housing practices in ways that illuminate the challenges of 
making it in this city for the urban poor. Taking the city as a scale of analysis allows us to 
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see the political possibilities of Cairo in their particulars, a project of cosmopolitanism 
arising from the margins of the city to articulate a notion of collective belonging 
grounded in the many struggles to claim right to the city. Cairo is neither the putative 
bomb nor the tomb, but instead a location in which people are coming together to 
advocate for the basic necessities on which residents can build workable and healthier 
lives.   
Building up from the city as a scale of analysis, there is a question of the nature of 
the state. When people campaign for better services and improved conditions, to what 
entity do they appeal? What is the fulcrum of their discontent? I have argued that we 
cannot assume the conceptual death of the state without looking at the ways in which 
such entities, or its representative institutions and people, are a necessary part in any 
struggle for improvement. The state may be a figment of its own imagination, not an 
entity but rather a collection of institutions or processes that work and rework power in 
the daily interactions of humans face to face. However, getting water and a sewage 
system in Ezba required action by such state and state-like entities as the Cairo 
Governorate, the Holding Company for Water and Wastewater, and the Ministry of 
Antiquities, to name a few. Looking at the state in the Global South is particularly 
instructive, as Chatterjee (2004, 2011) argues, because forces and relations that are 
normally considered extra-state or even a corruption of state forms are in fact 
fundamental to its operation. I would add that a careful attention to the political forces 
and forms in the Global North may also reveal the ways in which Chatterjee’s Political 
Society are deeply intertwined with governance in these spaces as well.  
The dissertation turned this review of the state to a particular attention to the 
water sector in Egypt, the always-in-flux institutional and organizational paradigms that 
have sought to manage and dictate relations between water and people in Egypt. It looked 
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particularly at how water matters in people’s lives, at how it is measured, and what 
different scales of analysis can tell us about how water is conceptualized as a vital 
resource and basic right. First looking at the where and what of water in Egypt, a picture 
emerges of the social and political ramifications of the material forms in which water is 
available—or not available. The Nile River is the primary water source for the country, 
and a great deal has been written on the impact of the Nile on the lifeways of Egyptian 
people, and political structures, as well as about the relationships that are dictated by 
sharing the river with upstream neighbors. Egypt is also home to several aquifers, the 
most significant of which is the fossil-water Nubian Sandstone Aquifer that is shared 
across four countries in Eastern North Africa. Managing all of this water, or attempts to 
do so, have played an important part in the fashioning of both colonial administrations 
and the nation-state in Egypt. Institutions were created to operationalize this management 
at the national and local levels, and such institutions have evolved over time in 
relationship with changing political and economic factors. City spaces have been 
particularly important, perhaps nowhere more so than the capital city of Cairo.  
The city of Cairo has a long history, stretching back over 1,000 years, and the 
proximity of Ezbet Khairallah to the remnants of this history is part of the story of how 
the area acquired a state-run sewage system. The water coming down the limestone hill 
from the unlined septic tanks of Ezba threatened to dissolve the artifacts buried in nearby 
Fostat, the area settled by the Fatimids in 969 AD. In the early days, Ezba was  subjected 
to sustained attempts at elimination, both because it was settled on state-owned land 
whereas other informal areas were purchased from famers who owned their land as 
freehold property, and because the government had given the Maadi Corporation a 
special building permit to develop luxury housing on the prime location.  Ezba is not the 
only informal area near Fostat, much less the rest of Cairo. In fact, much of the housing 
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built in the city over the 20th century has been in the form of ‘ashwa’iyyat, or 
random/informal areas.  Strict development and zoning regulations put in place in the 
1940s and 1950s, and tenancy laws instituted later by President Nasser, exacerbated 
shortages in housing driven by increasing migration from rural areas to the city by those 
in search of work.  These informal areas are characterized by little open land left for 
public space, and the plots of land developed are often covered in their entirety by 
buildings. In the newly designated typology of informal areas, Ezba has been marked as 
lower danger because it is not an imminent threat to residents. The area of Establ Antar, 
which boarders Ezba and lies along the face of the limestone cliffs, was designated as a 
first level danger and subsequently bulldozed by the Cairo Governorate on the advice of 
the Fund for Informal Area Development (ISDF). Residents were moved to Sixth of 
October city on the outskirts of Cairo, mimicking other movements of the urban poor to 
far-flung areas in the desert outside of the city.   
The affective connotation of ‘ashwa’iyyat is another lingering challenge to 
residents. Despite the fact that more than half of the population of Cairo live in places 
that fall into the informal category, certain places are considered more dangerous than 
others. Ezba has been marked out as particularly dangerous, a holdover from the origins 
of the area as a place where people from rural Upper Egypt first settled when arriving 
from the countryside.  Such lingering can be felt as a sensory sock in the nose when 
entering Ezba, as the sewage marks space and bodies in particular relationships of 
inclusion/exclusion in the city and in the welfare functions of the state. Such wastewater 
excess is produced by the colonial legacies and neoliberal agendas that have shaped so 
much of the material base of Cairo. In addition to being the physical manifestation of 
social relations, it serves to shape relations moving forward through time. In the 
imagination of the modern, the city is seen as the place in which people are remade into 
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proper citizens of the nation, as well as where pestilential dangers to the population are 
produced. Sewage mixes these meanings, being the excess of unmanageable populations 
that threaten the wellbeing of those who have been properly incorporated into the polity. 
Sewage from Ezbet Khairallah must be managed to mitigate these threats to Cairo-
proper, to the valued and valuable remains in nearby Fostat, and to stave off a repeat of 
the knocking that Egypt’s dignity suffered in 2008 due to the Duweiqa rock slide.  
The sewage system that was installed in Ezba from 2009-2011 enabled the 
residents of Ezba to make certain claims about ownership to the land that had previously 
been out of reach, creating a grid of officiality in utility bills and measured housing plots. 
However, the rising prices that have accompanied these changes push rents in the area 
out of reach for the poorest section of the population. Moreover, the promise of this 
recognition has worked in tandem with the history of the forcible relocation of poor urban 
populations to instill a sense of anxiety in area residents. Has this investment in 
infrastructure truly been made to benefit the current residents of Ezba, people ask. The 
sense of possibility for a revitalized and improved Ezba is matched by visions of dystopic 
futures in which the rug of services and infrastructure is pulled from beneath these people 
and redirected to those with the wusta [connections/nepotism] to enjoy the ear of 
interested parties in state apparatuses.  
The sense of future possibilities is intimately tied to the infrastructure of the city, 
one piece of which is the infrastructure of affect. Nigel Thrift and Mathew Gandy argue 
for a reading of the affective dimensions of the cityscape and how they are tied to other 
pieces of the urban benya tahtiya [infrastructure] fabric. Such city structures often have 
misanthropy embedded in them, but the potential for kindness also exists in the repetition 
and turn-up-ness again of city life. Utilizing this literature, the dissertation investigated 
five water-related objects to examine how people work to make life possible, imagine 
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possible futures and survive in Ezba Khairallah. The role that residents of Ezba expect 
the state to play becomes clearer through attention to the stories of meters in Ezba, 
looking at how measurement of what goes in and what goes out creates anxiety about 
losing the ability to manage how much recognition from the state one received. Hearing 
the conflicts that arose around pumps in Ezba demonstrates the gaps in systems, where 
just getting pipes to buildings doesn’t mean that water flows freely. There is cooperation 
and conflict that arise from meeting the state system at the door to the house or apartment 
building and making it work for all of the people who live there. As Asma’s story of the 
meter reader exemplifies, utility bills are a site around which residents of Ezba seek to 
selectively engage and evade recognition by the state. Following the tomatoes in Ezba 
traces for us a map of the movement between rural and urban spaces that undergirds life, 
as well as marking a particular piece of the affective puzzle in this place. Finally, the 
charitably-endowed drinking fountains, such as the sabil that Um Hameed attempted to 
create, illuminate some of the ways in which residents hope for a better future, as well as 
some of the challenges that they face making such dreams materialize.  
What does all of this mean for the future, in the present moment of political 
uncertainty in Egypt? During a trip back to Egypt in December 2013, I went to Ezba to 
catch up and check in. On our way, we passed by Establ Antar and all of the new houses 
that had been built back along the cliffside on the area that was bulldozed shortly before 
my original research trip began. The scent of the area had changed, having dried out as 
the full sewage system was completed, and more stores and shops had wares lining the 
streets. Sitting with Asma, I asked how things were going.  
  
Asma: zay al-zift [like filth]75 ! 
                                                 
75 Zift literally translates as tar, as in the composition of roads. Its connotative meaning  is something dirty 
or disgusting. 
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Farmer: Things got bad in Ezba? 
  
Asma: No, things are better in Ezba. It was quiet during the revolution, and my 
 brothers went out to join the groups of men protecting the area.76 But 
 nothing happened here, no violence. Some things have improved; they finished 
 the sewage system, and put in new water pipes. 
  
 Farmer: So what is zift? 
  
 Asma: As you see it, al balad kharbana [the country is broken]. The  
  economy is bad, the government is bad, nothing is safe anymore. I don’t  
  know what is going to happen here. 
 
While her tone was dire, and I caught her in a moment that contained little hope 
for a serene near-term future, I was heartened by the small personal and area 
improvements that had continued despite the political events of the past three years. Her 
brother’s shop was still open and he was able to support himself his wife and two new 
children, and the sister who remains in the home while the parents work. Since President 
Mohamed Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, there have been rumblings about whether or not 
Egypt is ready for democracy, or if perhaps a new strong man is needed to unite (in fear?) 
a population unable to come to an agreement on a vision for the country’s future. The 
political possibilities in Egypt are many, and unclear. 
 
  
                                                 
76 During the revolution, as police and security forces left their stations and retreated from the streets and 
neighborhoods of the city, local men in many places set up committees to monitor and defend their own 
areas from violence and looting.   
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